

**HISTORY OF THE AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
IN
CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

Part III

**History of the Central African Wing,
Air Transport Command
(15 December 1943 – 30 June 1944)**

Prepared using the original microfilms from the
United States Air Force Historical Research Agency

By

John Wilson

March 2015

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Compiler's Notes:

This is the third of a series of three reports prepared to document the activities of the U.S. Air Transport Command in Africa and the Middle East between May 1941 and July 1944.

This 300 page report was compiled at the end of World War 2 and eventually placed on microfilm record. In accordance with a personal belief that records of this kind should be made freely available for all collectors and researchers, I purchased these records and spent some time recovering the faded images before re-assembling them in hopefully legible form.

As received from AFHRA, the image of each page is a reproduction of a microfilm reduction of the original document. These images are quite poor, varying from being hard to read to virtually impossible to decipher. I took each image individually and processed it for legibility and alignment, then cropped it to remove all unwanted boundaries and restore it to a proper size and format. Having done that for all images, I assembled them into PDF (Portable Document Format) files, followed by further optimization and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to make the files word-by-word searchable.

In addition, **bookmarks** were added to identify each major section of the report. These bookmarks can be access by selecting the bookmark option at the left sidebar of the open PDF file. Selecting a bookmark moves the reader to the corresponding section of the file. These bookmarks were further processed to create a **Table of Contents** placed at the beginning of this PDF file. The reader can move immediately to a section of interest by locating the relevant entry in the Table of Contents, and click on that entry.

A specific topic or keyword can also be located by using the PDF **Find** or **Search** functions. As OCR can only recognize and interpret reasonable images of typefaces, the recognition software can have difficulty in finding every occurrence of a word or phrase in the report. However, intelligent use of "partials" can help. As an example, I find the location **Habbaniya** spelled in the report as: Habbaniyeh, Habbaniyah, Habbanaya, Habbanyia, and Habbaynia, so searching for our modern spelling of the complete word misses all of these. On the other hand, searching for "Habb" will locate all of them. One learns the tricks, and it is certainly an improvement on visually searching every single page.

The present report documents the history of the Ferrying Command in Africa and the Middle East during the early stage of the war, May 1941 through June 1942. The report consists six Chapters, and an Appendix which includes the relevant resource documents used to prepare the narrative within each Chapter.

John Wilson

March 2015

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HISTORY OF THE AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
IN
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PART III
HISTORY
OF

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN WING, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
(15 December 1943 -- 30 June 1944)

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HISTORY OF THE AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
IN
CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE-EAST

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
PART III

HISTORY
OF
THE CENTRAL AFRICAN WING, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
(15 December 1943 - - 30 June 1944)

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This volume contains historical data prepared by the Historical Office, Intelligence and Security Section, Central African and North African Divisions, Air Transport Command, in accordance with ATC Regulation 20-20, AAF Regulation 20-8, and AR 345-105, as amended.



6-2247-5

FOREWORD

This volume constitutes Part III, History of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command of the History of the Air Transport Command in Central Africa and the Middle-East. Although the Central African Wing covered the period from December 15, 1943 to July 31, 1944, this volume ends with June 30th. The last month - July 1944 - had previously been reported on historically by the Central African Division Historical Officer in a study entitled, Monthly Historical Report for July 1944, Central African Division, Air Transport Command, which was forwarded to Washington and accepted as being adequate.

This volume, edited by Captain Daniel W. Rohrbaugh, Acting Division Historical Officer, CEAD-ATC and Assistant Division Historical Officer, NAFD-ATC, and by Captain Monroe K. Spears, Assistant Division Historical Officer, NAFD-ATC, was written by the following personnel of the Historical Offices CEAD-ATC and NAFD-ATC:

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APPENDIX

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INTRODUCTION

The story of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, follows the course of its forerunner, the Central African Sector of the Africa-Middle East Wing. The stage was set for CAFW by the earlier organization, and all that remained was to develop new techniques and expand available facilities in the performance of its assigned mission. In no department were there startling nor particularly significant developments: in general, the wing operated under time-tested policies and procedures, with increasing efficiency (except for the upset caused by the transition to the C-46), during a period of gradually declining operations.

The present volume relates this history with appropriate brevity, stressing the mission of CAFW and the ways and means used in accomplishing it; throughout, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the history of the AMEW. Administration, comprising organization and administration, personnel, and intelligence and security, is first considered; followed by operations, including schedules and priorities and traffic; last comes the story of supply and services.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

A. Organization

The Central African Wing of the Air Transport Command was established at Accra, Gold Coast, British West Africa, at 0001, GMT, December 15, 1943.¹ It comprised the southern half of what was formerly the Africa-Middle East Wing of the Air Transport Command, while out of the northern half of the AMEW was formed the North African Wing. Geographically, the CAFW included the greater portion of the African continent; covering all of the British West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, the southern half of Arabia, and certain Central African countries, among which were the Belgian Congo and Kenya.

The reasons for the disbandment of the Africa-Middle East Wing and the activation of two separate wing organizations have been given in the history of AMEW. It is necessary to state in this chapter, however, that the most important reason for the division was the decreasing importance of the Central African section. This is important, as it illuminates the entire period of CAFW; it is noticeable in all phases of the mission and is especially noted in the Operations and Traffic departments. In the conduct of administrative affairs, the decline was less evident, for fewer personnel and less traffic did not appreciably reduce administrative problems.

The first official act in the discontinuance of AMEW came on November 10, 1943, when the War Department, at the request of ATC Headquarters, issued in-1. GO #2, CAFW-ATC, Dec 15, 1943. See Appendix I.

structions providing for the organization of two separate wing organiza-
2 tions for the African continent. The letter gave the following list of
stations that would constitute the Central African Wing:³

Station # 1	HQ, CAFW-ATC	Accra
Station # 2	Sector HQ, CAFW-ATC	Khartoum
Station # 3	CAFW-ATC	Accra
Station # 4	CAFW-ATC	Aden
Station # 5	CAFW-ATC	El Fasher
Station # 6	CAFW-ATC	El Geneina
Station # 7	CAFW-ATC	Fort Lamy
Station # 8	CAFW-ATC	Gura
Station # 9	CAFW-ATC	Kano
Station # 10	CAFW-ATC	Khartoum
Station # 11	CAFW-ATC	Lagos
Station # 12	CAFW-ATC	Laiduguri
Station # 13	CAFW-ATC	Masirah
Station # 14	CAFW-ATC	Roberts
Station # 15	CAFW-ATC	Salala
Station # 16	CAFW-ATC	Takoradi

Total personnel authorized for CAFW by authority of the same letter
was 801 officers and 4,162 enlisted men as of December 15, 1943. There
were actually 690 officers and 3,233 enlisted men as of December 15.⁴
According to projected plans this deficiency was to be made up by the
receipt of new men coming from the United States.

The official order creating CAFW was General Order Number 20, the last
official publication of AEW, issued on December 14, 1943. This was imple-
mented the next day by General Order Number 2 of the embryo Central African
Wing. For the purpose of clarifying the material that follows, the station
list published by CAFW is given:⁵

2. Ltr WDGS to CG, ATC, Nov 10, 1943, "Discontinuance and Establishment of Certain Air Transport Command Activities," in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.
3. Ibid.
4. Capt John W. Dienhart, "History of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command," in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.
5. GO #2, CAFW-ATC, Dec 15, 1943. See Appendix I.

Station # 1 HQ, CAFW-ATC	Accra
Station # 3 CAFW-ATC	Accra
Station # 4 CAFW-ATC	Aden
Station # 5 CAFW-ATC	El Fasher
Station # 6 CAFW-ATC	El Geneigh
Station # 8 CAFW-ATC	Asmara
Station # 9 CAFW-ATC	Kano
Station #10 CAFW-ATC	Khartoum
Station #11 CAFW-ATC	Lagos
Station #12 CAFW-ATC	Maiduguri
Station #13 CAFW-ATC	Masirah Island
Station #14 CAFW-ATC	Roberts Field
Station #15 CAFW-ATC	Salala

By comparing the two station lists—the one as given by the War Department letter of November 10, 1943, and the one given by General Order #2 of CAFW-ATC—it is evident that the two publications disagreed as to the correct number, location and designation of the CAFW stations. The discrepancies were also noticed by ATC Headquarters, and on January 19, 1944, Lieut. ^{Colonel} Samuel E. Gates, Chief of Contract and Organization Supervision of the ATC wrote to Colonel James S. Stowell, Commanding Officer of CAFW-ATC:⁶

1. Reference is made to General Orders #2 of Headquarters Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, dated 15 December 1943, issued in compliance with letter AG 322 (3 Nov 43) OB-I-ATCPG-M, dated 10 November 1943, Subject: "Discontinuance and Establishment of Certain Air Transport Command Activities."
2. It is noted that there are certain discrepancies between General Orders #2 and the AG letter. Specifically, the AG letter included in the list of authorized stations:
 - Station # 2, (Sector HQ) CAFW ATC, Khartoum
 - Station # 7, CAFW ATC, Port Lamy
 - Station # 8, CAFW ATC, Gura
 - Station #16, CAFW ATC, Takoradi

Colonel Gates continued with the statement that these four mentioned stations were not listed in General Order #2 as being activated, as was specified in the AG letter. He also stated:⁷

6. Ltr CG ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, 19 Jan 44, "Establishment of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command," See Appendix II
7. Ibid.

2. ...This letter must be complied with in every instance. If it is desired to retain the station, but not to station personnel thereat, it should nevertheless be activated with no allotment of strength made for station complement.

3. It is further noted that Station #8 is designated in the AG letter as Gura. General Orders #2 designated Asmara as Station #8, with no authority for this action.

4. In the event that no use whatsoever will be made of a particular station or stations for any purpose, or it is desired to activate a station at a different location from those designated in the AG letter, request for authority to inactivate or change the station or stations must be made to this Headquarters, where an amendment to the AG letter will be requested. For any deviation from the AG letter, request must be made for authority to do so.

The draft reply to the letter is much more informative than the actual reply that was sent. Of special notice is the paragraph that Colonel C. E. Allen, Assistant Executive for Operations in CAFW, wished to incorporate: this was as follows:

In any event, since the letter specifically directs us to comply [in ink] "in every instance" with the Adjutant General's letter referred to in paragraph 1, I would like to suggest incorporating in our reply a paragraph reading substantially as follows:

"The discrepancies noted in paragraph 2 of your letter between General Orders Number 2 and the Adjutant General's letter to which you refer evidently occurred because (the information supplied to the Adjutant General by ATC Headquarters displayed an unfortunate lack of knowledge on the part of your office concerning our setup in Africa at the time CAFW was activated). Consequently you may consider this letter a formal request by the Central African Wing on the Adjutant General to amend their letter...."⁸

In the reply that actually was sent, the reasons for the discrepancies were given. Station #2 (Sector Headquarters), Khartoum, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, was not activated because of the fact that the CAFW organization did not include any sub-divisions such as sectors. There was formerly in existence at Khartoum, Headquarters, Central African Sector, AMEW, which had been disbanded as of December 14, 1943, since it was not contemplated

8. Draft of 1st Ind CC CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, Feb 5, 1944, to Ltr CG ATC to CC CAFW-ATC, Jan 19, 1944, "Establishment of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command" (See Appendix II), in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files. The paragraph Colonel Allen wished to incorporate was attached. According to a penciled note at the bottom of the drafted indorsement, the indorsement was never sent.
9. Ltr CC CAFW-ATC to CG ATC Feb 11, 1944, "Amendment of Letter of Authority." See Appendix III.

~~_____~~ that any Sector Headquarters would be necessary in the Central African Wing. Air Transport Command operations ceased at Fort Lamy, French Equatorial Africa, mentioned as Station #7 in the AG letter, on May 21, 1943, and since that date there had been no A/C personnel stationed at the base. With the removal of A/C activities from Gura, Eritrea, mentioned as Station #8 in the AG letter, it was never contemplated by those planning for the organization of CAFW that this would be an active station. However, it was felt at the time of reorganization that, since no A/C personnel would be stationed at Gura, the numerical designation of this station should properly be assigned to Asmara, as various CAFW personnel would be stationed there in the future, since a Rest Center was being established at this Eritrean city. Also mentioned in the AG letter was Station #16, Takoradi, Gold Coast, British West Africa. As of February 5, 1944, there were no CAFW personnel stationed at this place; the last A/C personnel left Takoradi on December 7, 1943.

Effective as of March 15, 1944, and dated April 1, 1944; the War Department corrected the confusion by issuing another letter containing another CAFW station list, this time excluding the above discussed stations.

3. Administrative Organization, Problems and Policies.

The Commanding Officer of CAFW, from its activation until the period this history ends, was Colonel James S. Stowell, former deputy commander of the AMEW. A brief biographical sketch of Colonel Stowell's activities prior to his coming to Africa may be found in the part of the History of

- 10. Ibid; also explained in draft (see footnote 8 above)
- 11. Ltr WDAS to CG A/C, Apr 1, 1944, "Reorganization of Certain Air Transport Command Activities," in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

the Africa-Middle East Wing dealing with Personnel. Colonel Stowell
12
chose as his staff the following officers:

- Executive Officer - Lt. Col. James F. McCleendon, AC
- Assistant Executive Officer - Major Charles L. Wheaton, AC
- Assistant Executive for Personnel - Major Charles L. Cook, AC
- Assistant Executive for Operations - Lt. Col. Charles B. Allen, AC
- Assistant Executive for Supplies and Services - Lt. Col. Howard Reed, CE
- Assistant Executive for Plans - Lt. Col. Thomas G. Berry, AC
- Adjutant General - Capt. Charles B. Briggs, ASD
- Inspector General and Air Inspector - Lt. Col. Gaylord S. Gilbert, IGD
- Staff Judge Advocate - Capt. Rolland A. Kuckok, JAGD
- Wing Chaplain - Lt. Col. Wallace I. Holverson, CMC
- Wing Surgeon - Major James W. Brown, MC
- Wing Intelligence and Security Officer - Capt. Arthur B. Sherry, AC

As can readily be seen, there is a glaring omission in the above list. No mention is made of the Priorities and Traffic Section, an integral part of the Air Transport Command organization. The above list has been taken from records compiled by Captain John W. Diephart, former CEAD Historical Officer, and it is feasible to believe that the omission of Priorities and Traffic was merely an error. However, the list does show that changes had been made in the administrative organization in creating C.A.W. Under A.M.E.W. there had been four major staff sections: Operations, Priorities and Traffic, Supply and Services, and a rather inclusive section, labeled Administrative and Personnel. In this section were grouped the legislative sections of the wing, including Personnel, Adjutant General, Intelligence and Security, Medical section, Finance, and Statistical Control. In the organization of the Central African Wing, the more traditional organization was adapted. There were the three main sections of Personnel, Operations, and Supply and Services, and an equal section for Plans. The legislative activities were again separated, and:

12. Capt. John W. Diephart, History of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

reported directly to the Commanding Officer or to the Executive Officer instead of to the officer in charge of Administration and Personnel. This plan had numerous disadvantages as well as advantages: It increased the number of sections reporting directly to the Commanding Officer, but it enabled the important sections such as Intelligence and Security and Air Inspector to have equal status with the other sections of the staff.

There is very little difference in the mission of the CAFW and that of the preceding organization, AEW. The prime mission of both commands was the transportation by air of personnel, material, mail, strategic materials, and other cargoes for all War Department agencies and for any government agency of the United States or governments of the United Nations. The additional missions of CAFW were given as follows:

The ferrying of all aircraft across Central Africa to East nations within and outside the Wing.

The control, maintenance and operation of establishments and facilities on air routes of the Wing.

The provision of assistance for all units, aircraft units in accordance with existing directives.

The administration of priorities for air travel and the movement of cargoes by air on aircraft operated by or under contract for the Air Transport Command and on civil air carriers, in accordance with policies and procedures established by proper authority.

The utilization to the fullest extent possible of the services, facilities and personnel of the civil air carriers.

Fortunately for the Central African Wing, the only theater command with which contact was maintained was United States Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFME). Unlike the North African Wing, which extended

13. Capt. John W. Dienhart, History of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, in Historical Files, 32ND Central Files.

through three separate theaters, with accompanying problems, CAFW requisitioned, channeled correspondence, and coordinated with the single command. Relations with USAFIME, however, were a matter of primary administrative concern, for CAFW was dependent on USAFIME for certain supplies and equipment for airport construction and facilities, for certain specialized depot troops, and for military police and quartermaster, Italian labor, and medical units.

Wing and theater relations were governed by a War Department memorandum, dated February 26, 1943, implemented by a letter of instructions given to Major General Ralph Royce by General George C. Marshall, upon the former's assumption of command of USAFIME in September, 1943. The following statements are excerpts from this letter:

You will enforce USAFIME administrative personnel policies, including disciplinary control if necessary, over Air Transport Command personnel in your command area.

You will make available to the Air Transport Command such facilities, services, and personnel as are required by that command, and where not incompatible with your mission, assign such facilities, services, and personnel to the Air Transport Command.

Mention must also be made of the two sub-commands of USAFIME, MASC (West African Service Command) and MESC (Middle East Service Command), for although USAFIME theater had overall control of theater operations, the two sub-commands provided most of the assistance to CAFW, merely coordinating MTC demands with the parent organization.

The only other organization closely allied with CAFW was the 8th Air Depot Group, located at Accra. This unit provided necessary maintenance and supply for functions peculiar to the Air Corps, and was

14. Ibid.

assigned to WASC for administration.

The governing policies of the wing were those outlined by Major General Harold L. George, Commanding General, Air Transport Command, in his letter of instructions to Colonel Stowell. These policies, in relation to the mission of the wing, have already been discussed. In addition, policies governing the needs peculiarly applicable to the Central African Wing were issued by Colonel Stowell when deemed necessary. On December 16, 1943, the first in a series of policy letters prepared by the wing commander was issued, and stated:

This policy letter is the first in a series which will be issued from time to time by Central African Wing Headquarters, setting forth policies of the Wing Commander.

A policy letter file will be established immediately upon receipt of this policy letter and will be maintained by each Station Commander and the Head of each Staff Section in Central African Wing Headquarters.

Central African Wing policies must not be construed to nullify, supplement, or in any other way affect War Department, Air Transport Command or United States Army Forces in the Middle East regulations or circulars, or other publications emanating from higher Headquarters. Rather, they will serve as a guide to all concerned regarding policies peculiar to the Central African Wing.

Six days later, a letter was distributed to all stations ordering them to prepare a weekly activity report of station activities. They were to contain unusual incidents, such as the morale of the troops and general operations, and also pertinent information from other organizations at that particular station. That these activity reports were important was realized by all concerned, but considerable difficulty was experienced in creating a report that was effective.

- 15. Policy Ltr #2, CAPW-ATC, Dec 16, 1943, in O-3, CEAD Central Files.
- 16. Policy Ltr #5, CAPW-ATC, Dec 22, 1943, in O-3, CEAD Central Files.

evidenced on March 10, 1944, when a wing memorandum was issued on the correct preparation of weekly activity reports. This memo stated, in part:

An examination of reports submitted to this Headquarters pursuant to the provisions of Policy Letter #5, HQ, CAFN, ATC, dated 22 December 1943, shows a wide variation in the reports submitted by the stations and a misunderstanding, in some cases, of the subjects which should be covered. In some cases the reports submitted have been full and complete and have carried an accurate picture week by week of conditions at the stations so reporting. Others have been extremely brief and have contained little or no information of value to this Headquarters.

The purpose of these reports is to keep Wing Headquarters informed as to current station developments and particularly of problems affecting station administration in which the appropriate Staff Sections at this Headquarters are interested. When this information is made available, local needs can be more easily anticipated and quicker action may be taken in providing necessary supplies, equipment, personnel, and in taking corrective action where it is needed. In brief, the better Headquarters is informed of conditions at the various stations, the more efficiently it can act.

In an Army organization, there is a tendency to "over-administrate", especially in the relations of a headquarters command to the lower echelons of the organization. This was true within the Central African Wing. Three days after the wing was organized, on December 16, 1943, Colonel Stowell, acting on reports reaching wing headquarters, outlined administrative policies of the wing in regard to the number, type, and frequency of inspections to be conducted throughout the command. He stated:

Reports reaching this Headquarters indicate that Station Commanders are being overburdened and annoyed by continuous visits of officers from various departments of this Wing who represent themselves as "inspectors".

17. Memo #14, CAFN-ATC, March 10, 1944, in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.
18. Policy Ltr #4, CAFN-ATC, Dec 18, 1943, in OOS, CEAD Central Files.

Written authority or orders will be presented by bona-fide representatives of this Headquarters. Judgment and common sense will be the guide in dealing with individuals from theater, service commands, or higher Headquarters.

Inspection is a Command Function existing in all echelons. The intent of this letter is to add dignity and importance to this essential function of Command, as well as to clarify relationship between this Headquarters and Station Commanders.

In June, 1944, an informal inspection of the CAFW was conducted by Major General Junius W. Jones, assisted by Colonel I. B. Merch, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Watson, Lieutenant Colonel R. H. McCutcheon, and Major O'Nighton Deik Simpson. General Jones was the Air Inspector General of the Army Air Forces, and his report is invaluable in that it can be used as a basis for analyzing the administrative organization of CAFW up to the time the report was written. General Jones said the following about the Administration of the Central American Wing:

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The overall observation of administration in this Wing is satisfactory. There is a lack of standard operating procedure for Adjutants which results in those bases having aggressive Adjutants have above the average Administration....The majority of stations in the Wing... do not have adequate control of correspondence and as a result have no idea of how much open business they have on hand. They do not have an adequate follow-up system to insure action on correspondence....

The Administrative Inspectors throughout the Wing do not seem to have the overall concept of their duties. The Administrative Inspector's office at Khartoum was the best seen and was replete with reference data, schedules of inspections or other plans for the execution of inspection duties.

Most of the bases have a parade of inspectors, few of which have left any reports or memorandum for the instruction of the Commanding Officer; nor has any report been received through channels.

Although it was realized that the accomplishment of the primary

- 19. Ltr Maj Gen Junius W. Jones to CG AAF, June 8, 1944, "Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing." See Appendix IV.

mission of the Air Transport Command was not judged by the neatness of its bases, General Jones said that some bases stood out as being conducted in a soldierly and orderly manner, while others showed a laxity and general disregard for orderliness. "It is difficult to see how efficient administration can be conducted in disorderly surroundings", was one of the main points in his report. He stated that Kano, Khartoum and Accra were outstanding for their well-policed grounds.

The inspection team concluded their report with recommendations for improving the administrative organization of the wing. These recommendations were:

1. It is recommended that some standard practice for the control of correspondence, follow-up, and other procedures for Adjutants be published by Wing Headquarters for the guidance of all stations.
2. It is recommended that Administrative Inspectors be schooled by the wing, either by a handbook, correspondence course, or by having a qualified officer visit each station and instruct the Administrative Inspectors in the proper execution of their duties.
3. It is recommended that an effort be made to have the inspections of the stations made by teams of inspectors. This will relieve stations from the burden of a continual parade of inspectors.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

CHAPTER II. PERSONNEL

In the operation of any military organization the personnel section plays a very vital part. Furthermore, the activities of this section are much closer to the soldier as an individual than those of any other major section; for such matters as classification, promotion, furloughs, medical aid, religion, recreation, morale and discipline deal with the soldier on a personal basis, whereas the majority of sections are concerned with the soldier only as an impersonal unit in accomplishing the mission of the command.

The headquarters staff of the Central African Wing has been described in the chapter dealing with administration, and no mention need be made of it here except to point out the obvious fact that the commanding officer of the wing, Colonel James S. Stowell, was responsible for the performance of the personnel section. The following is a list of the names of the commanding officers of the stations that comprised the CAFW and the date of assumption of command:

<u>Station Commanding Officers</u>	<u>Date of Assuming Command</u>
Roberts Field Captain Floyd A. McJunken	Sept 10, 1943
Accra Colonel Alexis E. McAllen	Nov 24, 1943
Lagos First Lieutenant John Spalding	Jan 1, 1944
Kano Major Benjamin J. Nasief	Nov 1, 1943

1. Information taken from the various Base Unit histories, CEAD-ATC, forwarded to CG/AAF through CG/ATC, Aug 30, 1945.

Maiduguri	Captain Frederick T. Pipkin	Oct 11, 1943
	Major Thomas F. Collins	Jan 7, 1944
El Geneina	Capt Melvin R. Hansen	July 25, 1943
	First Lieutenant Joseph DesChamps	Jan 7, 1944
El Fasher	Captain Robert H. Bowling	Aug 19, 1943
	Captain Edward Burgers, Jr.	Feb 9, 1944
	Major Harry Johnston, Jr.	April 13, 1944
	Captain John L. Slack	May 29, 1944
	Captain Joseph DesChamps	June 4, 1944
Khartoum	Lieutenant Colonel Albert L. Edson	Nov 13, 1943
Asmara	First Lieutenant William F. Brennan	Oct 1943
Aden	Major Bain E. Fulton	Fall of 1943
	Major Vernon Byrne	Spring of 1944
Salala	First Lieutenant Ralph Murphy	Nov 1, 1943
	First Lieutenant E.B. Griggs	Feb 8, 1944
Masirah	Captain Charles Longacre	Oct 1, 1943
	First Lieutenant Gaejano LaSoina	Spring of 1944

The personnel who had been working in AEW headquarters prior to deactivation were divided between CAFW and NAFW when the split was authorized. Since the number of AEW headquarters was not sufficient, however, to complete the new organization's executive and administrative staff, additional personnel were drawn from the States. Staff Memorandum #10, dated June 29, 1944, superseding a similar memo published shortly

after January 1, 1944, gave information relative to the assignment of personnel within the wing. ² All newly assigned personnel, both officer and enlisted, were to report to the classification section of the personnel section upon arrival. This was for the purpose of establishing the completeness and accurateness of service records and for determining a recommended duty assignment. Assignment of personnel was the responsibility and privilege of the station commanders, and it naturally followed that individuals would be assigned positions commensurate with their classification. When an individual was sent to a station with a specific job in mind, an official letter suggesting this was written by the personnel section of headquarters at the request of the staff head concerned.

The first strength report of CAFW, prepared December 31, 1943, showed that there were 2432 ATC personnel in the CAFW. The organization grew gradually, so that by June 30, 1944 there was an increase of slightly more than 600. The following table lists all personnel assigned to CAFW, including not only ATC personnel, but also those of the various attached arms and services such as Quartermaster, Military Police, Signal Corps and Medical Corps:

PERSONNEL STRENGTH, CAFW, 1943 - 44³

<u>Year</u>	<u>ATC</u>			<u>Arms and Services</u>			<u>CAFW</u>
	<u>O</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total</u>
Dec.	568	1864	2432	75	234	309	2741

2. Staff Memo #10, CAFW-ATC, June 29, 1944, in Publication Files, CEAD Central Files.
3. "Personnel Strength Report, CAFW, 1943-44," prepared by Statistical Control Division, Air Transport Command, June 15, 1944 (C4-9159,AF). See Appendix V.

Year	ATC			Arms and Services			CAFW
	O	EM	Total	O	EM	Total	Total
1944	0	EM	Total	0	EM	Total	Total
Jan	558	2085	2643	87	283	370	3013
Feb	614	2254	2868	94	222	316	3184
March	589	2427	3016	95	154	249	3265
April	585	2421	3006	109	166	275	3281
May	593	2494	3087	97	129	226	3313
June	574	2493	3067	111	133	244	3311

As is the case for AEW, there are no available records of mal-assigned officers of CAFW. On December 31, 1943, there were 5.7% Air Corps enlisted men malassigned. This figure was reduced to 3.6% on June 30, 1944, showing that as the number of personnel increased, the percentage of individuals malassigned decreased.

The following table lists enlisted malassigned personnel of CAFW, ATC for the period between Dec^{ember} 31, 1943 and June 30, 1944:⁴

Air Force Enlisted Malassignment, CAFW, ATC 1943 - 44

<u>1943</u>	<u>TOTAL ASSIGNED</u>	<u>TOTAL MALASSIGNED</u>	<u>PERCENT MALASSIGNED</u>
Dec	1864	107	5.7
<u>1944</u>			
Jan	2085	100	4.8
Feb	2254	120	5.3
March	2427	80	3.3
April	2416	80	3.3
May	2494	64	2.6
June	2493	90	3.6

4. "Statistical Analysis of CAFW Air Force Enlisted Malassignment based upon AAF Form 127 Monthly Report", prepared by 1st Lt. John P. Shea, Statistical Officer, CAFW-ATC, Dec 15, 1943, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.

A. Utilization of Manpower

On ^{Army} JAN 6, 1944, General George C. Marshall addressed a memorandum to General Arnold, concerning the state of manpower throughout the Army. The Chief of Staff pointed out that large numbers of men were being discharged for physical or mental reasons, that units were discarding considerable percentages of their strength on similar grounds, and finally that physically qualified personnel were being used in limited service positions.

In a letter of February 7, 1944, addressed to the Commanding Officers of all AAF Commands, General Arnold enclosed a copy of General Marshall's memorandum and ordered each commander to effect immediately the complete and economical utilization of all personnel under his command. Excerpts from this letter are as follows:

The troop basis for 1944 requires that some of interior activities be sharply reduced. Personnel will be transferred to units destined for assignment overseas. The training and servicing job in domestic commands must be accomplished with fewer personnel and the flow of men and equipment overseas must not be diminished.

I specifically charge each of you with the reduction of personnel engaged in over- and non-training functions, and the replacement of general service men with those who are limited physically. All unit commanders will concern themselves unceasingly with preventative maintenance of the individual soldier. The rate of discharge must be cut by positive steps to strengthen the physical and mental stamina of our troops.

This was implemented for ATC on March 9, 1944, when General George ⁷ wrote concerning the utilization of manpower to Colonel Stowell.

5. Memo, Gen George C. Marshall to CG AAF, Jan 6, 1944, "Utilization of Available Manpower," in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.
6. Ltr CG AAF to CGs All Air Forces and COs All AAF Commands, Feb 7, 1944, "Utilization of Available Manpower", in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.
7. Ltr CG ATC to CG CAFW, ATC, March 9, 1944, "Utilization of Manpower," in 322 (Misc), CEAD Central Files

In order to effectively accomplish the mission of ATC, General George declared, it was required:

- a. That we use the right man in the job.
- b. That we dispose of those who are not useful.
- c. That we give the utmost of attention to economy in the utilization of manpower.

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Colonel Stowell replied on April 17, 1944, stating that:

- a. As of 31 March 1944 the percentage of malassigned Air Corps enlisted men in the CAFW is 3.3.
- b. An Officers' "Certification Committee" is functioning ~~which~~ actively inquires into and passes upon the qualification of all officers of this Wing.
- c. There is a considerable number of non-ve personnel employed as laborers through this Wing obviating the necessity for any considerable number of basic soldiers.

The matter culminated on June 5, 1944 when Colonel Stowell appointed a Manpower Utilization Board of eleven officers. The purpose of this committee was to conduct a survey of the utilization of personnel in the CAFW and to ascertain the desired strength for the wing by station and department, in order to effect ^{as} economical an organization as was possible, consistent with expected operating requirements. The group met at CAFW Headquarters, on the following dates: June 6, 8, 12, 17, 23, 24, 25, and 30, 1944.

The method of investigation of this Board, according to a report of Proceedings, June, 1944, was as follows:

1. Determination of operational requirements based on available information.
 2. Recommended changes in operational policy.
8. Ltr Col James Stowell to Gen H. L. George, April 17, 1944, "Utilization of Manpower." See Appendix VI.
 9. No. 197, CAFW-ATC, June 5, 1944, in Publications File, CGAD Central Files.
 10. "Report of Proceedings of Board of Officers, Station #1 (Hq) CAFW," undated. See Appendix VII.

3. Combination of assignments where practical and economical, regardless of department concerned.
4. Consideration of manpower saving from the efficiency standpoint of private enterprise.
5. Careful analysis of functions performed through private survey and consultation with department representatives and board members.
6. Detailed analysis of each section accomplished by conferences of manpower board.
7. Analysis of comparison of reports submitted by field representatives, Major Tanner and Lieutenant Mahoney.

After completing their summary, the Board prepared a report giving their findings and also recommendations. They discovered that a 20% reduction in assigned Air Transport Command strength could be accomplished without affecting operating efficiency; certain entire installations could be eliminated and the airports used only for alternate landing fields; some stations should be maintained principally for service activities; and the elimination of certain sections could be effected without handicapping Central African Line operation.¹¹

In view of these findings, the Board then made the following recommendations:

1. That the Air Transport Command personnel at Benson Field be removed and the landing strip used only as an emergency field.
2. That only the AAF enlisted men remain at El Gemaing to maintain the range and beacon and all other U. S. Army personnel be removed and the field used only for operational emergencies.
3. The strength of Lagos be reduced by 48% and the remaining officer and men be used for the handling of meat shuttles and in cases of emergency landings.
4. That Asmara personnel be reduced by 33%; the remaining officer and men to handle furlough planes, meat shuttles, and emergency landings when necessary.
5. That Salala, Arabia, be classified as an operational alternate and personnel be reduced by 45%.

6. That Iano, Nigeria, be reduced by 40% contingent upon the availability of fuel at Maidaguri.
7. That during the rainy season (through October) the personnel at Roberts Field be reduced by 40%.
8. That the entire Chemical Warfare section be declared surplus in order that their services may be more fully utilized elsewhere.
9. That the Central African Wing reduce in Air Transport Command personnel strength as follows:

Present	674	<u>Officers</u>	477	Reduction	217
		Proposed			

Percentage of reduction is 31.5%

Present	2634	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	2204	Reduction	435
		Proposed			

Percentage of reduction is 16.5%

Total Percentage of Reduction is 23% (including O & E)¹²

3. Promotions and Demotions:

In a letter of January 5, 1944¹³ Colonel Stewart told the commanding officers of stations in CAFW that the following should be noted as paragraph 3, a., of Policy letter No. 2, CAFW, December 16, 1943:

- a. In accordance with Paragraph 3-4, AFM-2 dated 30 June 1943, promotion may be made in a lower grade if there is an existing vacancy in a higher grade. Vacancy in the higher grade cannot be used so long as it is being used to assist in an average in a lower grade.

For example, if there is a vacancy in the grade of Staff Sergeant, but not an existing vacancy for a Staff Sergeant, it was considered to promote another Sergeant to the grade of Staff Sergeant by utilizing the vacancy in the higher grade. However, as long as the Staff Sergeant vacancy was being used to cover the average in a lower grade.

12. ibid.

13. Ltr Col James Stewart to COs, All Stations, CAFW-ATC, Jan 5, 1944, "Allotment of Enlisted Grade" in 370.4, CEAD Central Files.

In authorized Sergeant ratings, the staff sergeant vacancy was considered filled. Extra care was to be exercised by station commanders in using this authority, and it was to be employed only for very exceptional cases.

The procedure for allotment of enlisted grades in the CAFI was substantially revised on March 13, 1944. The station commanders were notified by Colonel Stowell that Policy Letter No. 2, CAFI, Dated 16, 1943, re amended January 5, 1944; and letter, Headquarters CAFI, February 4, 1944, subject: "Promotion of Enlisted Men," were received, with the exception of enclosures thereto. Some of the significant changes were as follows:

- 1. Enlisted grades, ratings, and strength authorized each station, in Central African Wing, are based on currently assigned strength plus sufficient additional authorization to provide for personnel now enroute to join or on requisition.
- a. Allotment of grades will not be exceeded, but grades which are excess due to inactivation of organization or transfers, and which cannot be absorbed within the station will be carried as excess until they are absorbed by subsequent increases in strength or transfer. Under no condition will excess grades be authorized.
- b. Before approving recommended time Station Commanding Officers will be responsible for ascertaining that the following minimum time in grade has been served:

Master Sergeant	- Four months in next lower grade.
Tech Sergeant	- Three months in next lower grade.
Staff Sergeant	- Three months in next lower grade.
Sergeant	- Two months in next lower grade.
Corporal	- One month in next lower grade.

14. Ltr Col James Stowell to All Station Commanders, ^{CAF-ATC} March 13, 1944, "Allotment of Enlisted Grades and Promotion of Enlisted Men," in 320.4, GMD Central Files.

15. Ibid.

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In Policy Letter No. 6, dated December 1, 1943, Colonel Stowell
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set forth the procedure for promotion of officers. Officers appointed
from civilian life, Reserve Officers, and National Guard Officers called
to active duty in grades higher than Second Lieutenant, would be credited
with active commissioned service (with respect to promotion) as follows:

First Lieutenant	Six Months
Captain	One Year
Major	Two Years
Lieutenant Colonel	Four Years

Provided a vacancy existed in accordance with AAF Regulation 35-18
and the officer considered and demonstrated his fitness and capacity
for the grade recommended:

- (1) A Second Lieutenant may be recommended for promotion with no reference to his time in grade;
- (2) A First Lieutenant may be recommended for promotion to the grade of Captain upon the completion of one year of service including credit for active commissioned service stated above;
- (3) A Captain may be recommended for promotion to the grade of Major upon completion of two years of service including credit for active commissioned service stated above;
- (4) A Major may be recommended for promotion to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel upon completion of three years of service including credit for active commissioned service stated above;
- (5) A Lieutenant Colonel may be recommended for promotion to the grade of Colonel upon the completion of six years of service including credit for active commissioned service stated above.

Nothing in this policy would be construed to prevent recommendation
of officers for promotion under existing regulations when they demonstrated

16. Ltr Col James Stowell to all Station Commanders, CAFM, ATC, Dec 31,
1943, "Promotion of Officers," in OOS, CSM Central Files.

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their ability to occupy a higher grade by performance of duty which was truly exceptional and outstanding to a degree which warranted their promotion above others of more service; neither would this policy operate to cause recommendation to be submitted solely upon the length of time an officer had been in the service.

When an officer did not have sufficient length of service on his present tour of active duty commensurate with the rank to which promotion ~~was~~ recommended, a letter justifying the promotion asking that an exception to the policy be made, had to be submitted with the recommendation. In ¹⁷ conclusion, Colonel Stowell remarked that:

It must be borne in mind that promotion is a reward or compensation for doing a job bigger than the one befitting an Officer's present rank. There are many Officers who will emerge from this war with the same rank with which they entered it, and rightfully so--they have reached their peak. Promotion is not something to be assured; it must be earned. Those who have "promotion fever" will receive little consideration from this Headquarters. In almost every instance where the watch or calendar is constantly consulted as to eligibility date for promotion, it has been the experience of the undersigned that demotion rather than promotion is indicated.

On February 19, 1944, General Arnold wrote to General George, expressing dissatisfaction with the ATC Report, "Demotion or Separation of Unsatisfactory Officers," because he believed that the prosecution of this effort in the ATC up to ³¹ ~~30~~ January 1944 had not been conducted as vigorously and effectively as ^{was} ~~was~~ desired. ¹⁸

With regard to the same subject, General George informed Colonel ¹⁹ Stowell on March 7, 1944 that:

17. Ibid.
18. Ltr CG AAF to CG ATC, Feb 19, 1944, "Demotion or Separation of Unsatisfactory Officers," in Publications File, CEAD Central Files.
19. Ltr CG ATC to CG CAFE, ATC, March 7, 1944, "Demotion or Separation of Unsatisfactory Officers," in Publications File, CEAD Central Files

Your attention is again directed to the necessity for carrying out the spirit as well as the letter of this program: No unsatisfactory officer will be retained in this Command.

In passing along the information contained in these two letters to the commanding officers of the stations, CAFV, Colonel Stowell mentioned specific standards to be used in rating officers. Colonel Stowell directed:

In making the entries, rating officers should bear in mind that the grade, length of service, and experience must be considered, and officers rated in contrast to others with similar background. There should be no tendency to rate senior officers high and junior officers low, since it may be presumed that the percentage of "superior" officers who are second lieutenants of short service is not far different from the percentage of "superior" colonels. Comparison must be made with others of similar grade and experience.²¹

In order that ratings may be accurate, and rendered in a uniform manner throughout the Central African Area, certain fundamental principles must be followed.

Standards for use as guides in the determination of ratings were stated as follows:

- (1) Professional qualifications (background of training and/or experience).
- (2) Leadership (Capacity to direct, control, and influence others in definite lines of action, while maintaining high morale).
- (3) Overall officer suitability (military bearing, discipline, and acceptance of military responsibilities and procedures).
- (4) Initiative (Trait of beginning needed work or taking appropriate action on own responsibility in absence of orders).
- (5) Attention to duty (Trait of working thoroughly and conscientiously).

20. Ltr CG CAFV to CGs, All Stations, CAFV-ATC, April 22, 1964, "Rating of Officers," in 201.39, CEAD Central Files.

21. Ibid.

- (5) Judgment and common sense (Ability to think clearly and arrive at logical conclusions).

Concerning the appointment of Flight Officers to commissioned grades, Colonel Stowell announced in Circular No. 1, January 5, 1944, that information had been received from Headquarters, USAFME, that:

The authority to appoint Flight Officers to commissioned grades in the Army of the United States has been withdrawn, and that only those Flight Officers who have demonstrated their fitness for appointment in actual combat will be considered eligible for appointment.²²

Therefore, no application for appointment would be submitted to Headquarters, CAFW unless the above requirement had been met by the applicant.

C. Rotation, Replacement, Leaves and Furloughs

The policy of the AF established on March 18, 1943, called for the replacement of all pilots, co-pilots, navigators, and radio operators after they had served nine months in foreign theaters and the return of such personnel to the U. S. for a rest and rehabilitation period before further assignment.²³

However, it is revealed by General Hoag, Commanding General of AFM, on September 8, 1943, that this program had not been carried out in AFM. In a letter addressed to Colonel Stowell, commanding officer of the Central African Section, he said:

It has been impossible until the present to return any officer prior to the completion of at least fifteen months' service.²⁴

22. Cir. No. 1, CAFW, ATC, Jan 5, 1944, "Appointment of Flight Officers to Commissioned Grades." See Appendix VIII.
23. Ltr Brig Gen C.R. Smith, C/S, ATC to CG AFM-ATC, Mar 18, 1943, "Replacement of pilots, co-pilots, navigators and radio operators in accordance with the plan for relieving War weary Flying Personnel," in Historical File, CEAD Central Files.
24. Ltr CG AFM-ATC to CG CAS-ATC, Sept 8, 1943, "Rotation Program for Flight Personnel," in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

On January 11, 1944, General George informed Colonel Stowell that, due to change in circumstances and the proposed requirements for rotation of other wings, the original policy (mentioned above) had to be considered inapplicable. Therefore, the Commanding General suggested:

- a. That Air Crew members, i.e., pilots, co-pilots, navigators, and radio operators, whose primary duty is as a member of an Air Crew, be eligible for return to the United States for permanent change of station after a period of eighteen (18) months foreign service, or after they have logged a total of one thousand (1000) hours flying time in the Central African Wing. (Minimum time on foreign service to be twelve (12) months.)
- b. That flying personnel whose principal duties are administrative, i.e., station commanders, operations officers, briefing officers, etc. be eligible for return to the States after eighteen (18) months foreign service, or upon completion of five hundred (500) hours logged and a minimum of twelve (12) months foreign service.

In a succeeding letter on the same subject to Colonel Stowell, January 11, 1944, General George recommended that, until there was developed a satisfactory program for rotating personnel of CAFW back to the U.S., he "make maximum use of intra-wing rotation, or such rotation as might be accomplished in cooperation with the North African wing."

On November 27, 1943 General George had stated that it was impossible at that time to establish a policy for rotation of ground personnel back to the U.S.

25. Ltr Gen H.L. George to CG CAFW-ATC, Jan 11, 1944, "Rotation of Air Crew and Pilot Personnel, Central African Wing," in OGS, CEAD Central Files.
26. Ltr CG ATC to CG CAFW-ATC, Jan 17, 1944, "Rotation of Personnel," in OGS, CEAD Central Files.
27. Ltr CG ATC to CG AMEW-ATC, Nov 27, 1943, "Rotation of Personnel," in OGS, CEAD Central Files.

A partial solution ^{of} the problem was made on January 31, 1944, when Colonel Stowell announced that a program of personnel rotation for enlisted men of the CAFW between wing stations would become effective immediately. ²⁸ This program was designed to take advantage of the great variety offered by the areas through which the CAFW was operating in order to relieve the monotony of long continued duty assignment in any single locality.

However, there was to be no mass shifting of personnel. Recommendations would be made whenever it became apparent that an individual, through long or otherwise overly-fatiguing services at a particular station, would definitely benefit from a change of surroundings. Exchange of personnel was to be made, as far as possible, among men of equal rank with similar training and ability.

On March 8, 1944, ground personnel were happy to be informed of a plan of rotation to the States. The CAFW was authorized by General George to return four officers and twenty enlisted men per month, effective as of the above date. In the selection of personnel the period of overseas service would be the dominating factor. ²⁹

The leave policy of the CAFW was the same as that of the CAS: namely, all personnel were eligible on the recommendation of their respective commanding officers to go to a rest center. It was pointed out that these camps were rest centers, and not convalescent centers and therefore, one did not have to be sick or wounded to be eligible. Another gratifying

28. Ltr Col James Stowell to COS, All Stations, CAFW-ATC, Jan 11, 1944, "Rotation of Enlisted Men among Stations of CAFW." See Appendix III.
29. Ltr Gen H.L. George to CO CAFW-ATC, March 8, 1944, "Rotation of Personnel Other than Air Crew Members," in OOB CEAD Central Files.

policy was that the time spent at the centers had no direct bearing on regular passes or furloughs, since such personnel were declared on Detached Service.

By the end of 1943, rest camps were established at the following places: Accra, Gold Coast; Dakar, Senegal; Jos, Nigeria; Casablanca, Andir, Marrakech, French Morocco; Nirobi, Kenya; Cairo, Egypt; Alexandria, Egypt; Tel Aviv, Palestine; and Lima, Eritrea. On February 14, 1944, a new rest center for enlisted men was opened at Asmara, Eritrea. 30

It was arranged, where possible, to have personnel sent to a camp located at a station other than their assigned station. Thus enlisted men from Accra, Nirobi, Lagos, Accra, and Roberts Field went to the Dakar rest camp; the officers were accommodated at Nirobi, Kenya. The Alexandria rest camp was established for personnel assigned to Cairo, Khartoum, Aden, Djibouti, Mairah, El Fasher, El Geneina, Suva, and Gera. In addition to rotation and leaves, furloughs also played a major part in relieving the morale of CAF's personnel. All officers and men were eligible for a two-week furlough at the recommendation of their respective commanding officers. Like leaves, furloughs were taken in places an appreciable distance from the home bases of the officers and men. For instance, personnel stationed east of Addis spent their furloughs in Alexandria, and those from Roberts Field went to Andir, French Morocco.

D. Activities of the Medical Section.

During the first six months of 1944, medical supplies were generally adequate throughout CAFM. Supplying agencies were cooperative in trying to maintain liaison with the base dispensaries throughout the wing. The 67th

30. Policy Ltr No. 7, CAFM-AIG, Feb 14, 1944, "Rest Center for Enlisted Men at Asmara," in 354.1, CEAF Central Files.

Station Hospital Medical Supply furnished Accra, Kano, Maiduguri, and Lagos; while the Heliopolis Medical Supply Depot at Cairo took care of the remaining stations.

At all bases in the wing an emergency procedure was drawn up for airplane crashes. One or more ambulances were kept on the line at all times. Among the items stored in each ambulance were: compass, two-way radio, extra water and gasoline, K-rations, halozone tablets, mosquito repellent, headnets, gloves, leggings, and the usual crash kits supplemented by other medical supplies. The ambulances were also used as emergency dressing stations in the jungles and desert.

By the middle of 1943 all medical officers in the CAFW were qualified flight surgeons. Three Sanitary Corps officers were assigned: an entomologist, a bacteriologist, and a sanitary engineer.

An intensified training program was established for all Medical Department enlisted men. Included among the subjects was crash drill: the men had to know all the escape hatch locations in all types of airplanes flying throughout the Wing.

Malaria and Venereal Disease (VD) were the two major problems encountered by the medical department. During 1943 the medical detachments at the various bases did their best to lower the malaria rate. In January, 1944, USAFIME shouldered the responsibility. The following table shows a comparison of the malaria rate at Accra between the first seven months of 1943 and 1944:³¹

31. History of the 1202nd Base Unit, Accra Air Base, Jan 30, 1942 to June 30, 1944, p 19, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

MALARIA RATE PER 1000 PER ANNUM AT ACCRA

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>
January.....	380.92	503
February.....	214.43	598
March.....	119.00	328
April.....	193.00	273
May.....	293.55	252
June.....	714.18	483
July.....	931.94	657

Analyzing these figures it is noticeable that the rate was higher in the first four months of 1944 than in 1943, but after that the 1944 rate was lower. The division Surgeon explained this, as well as the malaria program in general, in his annual medical report:

In analyzing the incidence of Malaria in West Africa with particular reference to Accra, we may observe several interesting facts. During the first three months of 1943, Accra was using Atabrine but not under strict supervision. In March of that year, Atabrine prophylaxis was discontinued. It may be seen that the rate in April was approximately the same as in March due to the slow rate of disappearance of the drug.

After this, the disease ran rampant reaching a high in July. Malaria control activities were increased in vigor but owing to a lack of personnel and equipment, were not satisfactory. In January of 1944, Theatre took over Malaria control activities. Their work has been very fine and although their mosquito catches are low, there are still anophelines in Accra. In August 1944, a directive was received from the Commanding General, ATC, to again institute compulsory Atabrine prophylaxis...31a

Second only to malaria in occurrence in Africa in the first six months of 1944 were venereal diseases. To fight against, or at least control the spread of syphilis and gonorrhoea, lectures, discussions, and training films were used. The Division Surgeon learned that the morally weak soldier will contract VD within four months after being overseas: "He is the 'problem child' of the Army."

After the average man has spent one year in the tropics,

31a. Annual Historical Report, 1944, Central African Division, Air Transport Command, prepared by the Division Surgeon, CEAD-ATC, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

he shows a moral break-down. This is evidenced in his letters, his appearance, his attitude towards his work, his failure to follow regulations, etc. And it also shows up in his attitude regarding the native. The popular joke about the natives becoming whiter as the months roll by is not to be scoffed at.^{31b}

The following table shows a comparison of the number of victims in AMEW, 1943 and CAFW (which became CEAD ^{after} in July), 1944.³²

AMEW and CEAD V D Rate Per 1000 Per Annum—1943-1944

Month	AMEW, 1943	CEAD, 1944
January	55	44
February	39	24
March	70	35
April	80	51
May	99	73
June	66	56
July	33	57
August	48	51
September	34	31
October	39	30
November	39	42
December	28	50

During the closing months of 1943 when Air Evacuation was inaugurated, there was much confusion, but by February, 1944, the organization was functioning smoothly. One of the earliest difficulties was the transmission of plane arrivals to the next station. For security reasons the radio operator could not call to the tower stating how many patients were aboard. This problem was solved by sending a book message to all stations stating the plane number, the class of patients aboard,

31b. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

no other pertinent data. This message went to all stations enroute, whether a stop was contemplated or not. Then in case of an unanticipated landing the Flight Surgeon could meet the plane although it was not a scheduled stop, and it was not necessary to send a message to the next stop.

The numbers of patients moved by the CAFV in each month during the first half of 1944 are listed below. The majority of these patients came from the India-China Division:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Total number of patients moved</u>
February	191
March	246
April	156
May	209
June	233
July	283
August	273

In the beginning of 1944, the Dental Corps of CAFV had five officers, one being designated as the Wing Dental Surgeon, and the other four as Base Dental surgeons. The four stations to which the latter were assigned were: Accra, Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Aden. Each Base Dental Surgeon was responsible for the dental care of personnel at other stations besides those at his own base; for example, the dentist at Aden rendered service to personnel at Aden, Balais, and Masirah Island. Those stations lacking dental clinics were serviced by traveling dental units. The dental surgeon was responsible for the operative, preventive, and minor oral surgery procedures at each station assigned to him. When any major oral surgery was required, the patient was referred to a station hospital

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

of the Army Service Forces.

Personnel of the Veterinary Corps in January 1944 consisted of two officers and seven enlisted men. Their primary responsibility lay in the securing, preparing, and shipping of sanitary beef, pork, sheep, fowl, fish, wild game, eggs, and dairy products to the various bases throughout the CAFV. Facilities for these purposes were established at Accra, Maiduguri, Kano, Kairuan and Lagos.

In order to conserve manpower throughout CAFV, it was necessary to employ native food handlers. Before a native was hired, he was given a complete physical examination which included a stool inspection. The latter was considered of most importance, as the doctors discovered that 10% of the natives had ova or parasites which were easily transmittable to man, and these natives were therefore rejected. Those individuals accepted for duty were required to have this examination repeated every month, and as a result 10% were discharged each month. The usual procedure was to refer the case to the British medical authorities, who then gave the necessary treatment. When the patient was cured, he could be re-employed as a food handler.

The natives dealt with in the CAFV were of two general racial groups: Negro and Arabic. The negro was basically clean and had no religious scruples about his bodily functions. The Arab was filthy; would wear the same clothes until they literally fell apart. After defecation he would use a stone instead of toilet paper, and the stone was always placed in the left hand. The experience was rather aptly

5. Ibid.

described in the following jingle:

Here's to the African native
 Of manners completely bereft,
 He feeds himself with his right hand,
 And sips himself with his left.

Thus the basic department was forced to maintain very strict sanitary measures in the mess halls of the stations. Since the native would not voluntarily wash his hands after visiting the latrine, it was necessary to employ special natives whose duties were to enforce the American sanitation standards.

The first six months of 1944 can best be described as a stabilizing period in the medical section. In the early days of the AEC in Africa there was a definite task to be accomplished in a short time. To accomplish it, corners were cut and routine ways and means were discarded. Great praise is due the medical officers and enlisted men of the AEC in 1942 and 1943, who worked with inadequate facilities under trying conditions and acquitted themselves nobly. The medical personnel of 1944 primarily endeavored to smooth off some of the rough edges.

3. Personal Services

The special services program of AEC, which provided for movies, USO shows, and various indoor and outdoor activities, was continued unchanged in 1944. Delivery of mail was accelerated. A brand new activity was the current events quiz which was instituted with great success at the larger stations, taking place once a week, usually in the station theater prior to the showing of the movie. At most of the bases musical associations were organized.

In addition to conducting the weekly orientation period, which consisted of a film and/or discussion, and providing war news and maps, magazines, newspapers, and books, Information and Education, a branch of Personnel Services, sponsored an elaborate off-duty education program in the CAFN. Six stations, including Accra and Khartoum, showed an immediate interest in the new project. Off-duty education is not to be confused with the correspondence courses offered by the United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI). Classes for G.I. students were held in a tent, barracks, or office building and were conducted by servicemen, most of whom were teachers or specialists who desired to retain or further their experience. In some subjects, USAFI textbooks were available, but in most cases teachers collected their materials themselves. This was later issued in mimeographed pamphlets for classroom use.

Since the "G.I. College" at Accra was the largest and most elaborately organized in the CAFN, more than mere mention of this enterprise should be made. The value of the project can best be appreciated when the background is borne in mind. The following factors helped to make the program a success:

1. A large available group of prospective students, many of them specialists and with relatively high I. S., varying degrees of education and varied tastes and ambitions.
2. An available number of teachers and specialists.
3. A "strategic" situation which was rapidly becoming stabilized. For while Station #3, CAFN-ATC in January 1944 had not reached its traffic peak, its personnel was

37. Undated report entitled "Educational Program at the ATC Base in Accra," prepared by 1st Lt. Bascom C. Ferring, in 350, CEAD Central Files.

38. Ibid.

well trained and the frenzied early days when a handful of men worked day and night to get a job done were a thing of the past.

4. A local situation which presented a minimum of off-base recreational facilities....

5. A local health situation...which necessitated bringing all enlisted personnel back to the base after dark.

However, there were also many disadvantages to the situation, among them being inadequate facilities, an almost complete lack of textual material, a high turnover in personnel, duty schedules which shifted to meet the exigencies of traffic, climatic conditions not conducive to voluntary work, and the competition of the two motion picture theaters.

In the latter part of November, 1943, the Station Special Service Officer sent to all personnel a questionnaire aimed at discovering what subjects would find most response. Of approximately 4,000 personnel contacted, 30% indicated an interest in off-duty education. The most popular subjects selected were mathematics and French; knowledge of other languages, of aviation, religion, and art was also desired by many service men. The first program was inaugurated at Accra on January 2, 1944, under the supervision of Corporal Lynn R. Talloch, consisting of nine classes divided among mathematics, French and German. As time went on, new subjects were added to the curriculum, and by the first of June, 1944, the program was firmly entrenched. Among the new subjects added were celestial navigation, theory of flight, theory of radio, applied music, and Italian. Twelve teachers were giving instruction in twenty classes which met for a total of 40 hours weekly.

39. Ibid.

The personnel section of CAFI was not plagued with the responsibilities that the same section of AEF bore, for by the time that the Central African Wing had been organized, many of the problems that faced AEF administrators had been solved, and the organization of the section had become more and more unified as a result of elimination of unnecessary procedures. The task of the CAFI personnel section, therefore, was merely to carry out existing policies, augmenting them from time to time with new methods.

CHAPTER III. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

In general, the story of CAFE I&S is uneventful: the organization set up under ACEF remained substantially unchanged, the same problems continued to recur, and except for a gradual decrease in activity, there is little of interest to report. First Lieutenant (later Captain) Carleton S. Young succeeded Captain Arthur Sherry as CAFE I & S officer and Provost Marshal ^(PM) on January 21, 1944, remaining in this office throughout the existence of CAFE. More OIC personnel were acquired, and more MPs; by January, MP companies were stationed at Aden, Khartoum, Maidaguri, Roberts, and Kano. ¹ Intelligence officers, with multiple duties, remained stationed along the Southern Route; their positions were exceptionally difficult. In June, 1944, the functions of I & S and PM were combined under Major Gerald J. Linares. ²

Second Lieutenant (later Captain) Milton P. Gore arrived on May 13, 1944, as Wing Historical Officer. He immediately instituted a historical program, publishing an important directive, which is included as an appendix. ³ The current history of CAFE was written monthly or bi-monthly after July 1, 1944.

A. Briefing and Interrogation.

Working jointly for I & S and operations, First Lieutenant Harry I. Sherry continued his duties as Route Intelligence Officer, finishing a route survey of the entire wing in March. ⁴

On January 15, 1944, a Situation Room was opened at Accra, "to fulfill

1. "Semi-Monthly Activity Report," I&S Section, CAFE-ATC, Jan 30, 1944 to Feb 5, 1944, in 319.1, C AD Central Files.
2. For a detailed account of PM functions, see Appendix ~~XX~~ XVI.
3. See Appendix XV.
4. "Weekly Activity Report," I&S Section, CAFE-ATC, Feb 27 to March 4, 1944, in 319.1, C AD Central Files.

the urgent need for a centralized source of current information on all factors contributing to CAFN Operations." The room displayed data on CAFN and ferried aircraft, supply and services, personnel and mal-assignment, and maps showing the progress of the war on all fronts. An aircraft control board was maintained, showing all CAFN routes and the position of all aircraft; a special board showed aircraft out of service. Two wall "fans" showed charts and graphs on personnel strength and mal-assignment, and other operations, supply, and traffic data. The room was kept open sixteen hours a day.

In connection with submarine sightings, the most dramatic incident was the "Battle of Takoradi." On December 9, 1943, a British Ventura sighted a U-boat forty miles south-southeast of Takoradi; a Wellington was sent out but was unable to find the submarine. On the 17th, the submarine was again reported forty-five miles southeast of Takoradi, but planes were unable to find it. On the 19th, two "M/Vs" were torpedoed; one was sunk eight-five miles east of Takoradi and thirty miles south of Accra, and the other between Kotokou and Aso. Since the sinkings occurred 120 miles apart within a four-hour period, there were evidently two submarines. Attacks and contacts by the Navy indicated that the submarines were escaping to the southeast, and on the 24th, an "M" reported that it had two days previously attacked a surfaced U-boat 120 miles southeast of Accra. On the 25th, a ship was sunk well to the west of the area, indicating that the submarine was out of range, and the hunt was abandoned.

5. Ltr Capt J. F. Shea, CAFN, Statistical Officer, to Col H. J. Smith, Deputy Wing Commander, July 5, 1944, "CAFN Situation Room." See Appendix XII.
6. Appendix "U" to 208 Wing (CAF) Intelligence Summary of the Period 1st to 15th January 1944, in 317.1, CEAD Central Files.

B. Security Activities

On January 21, 1944, Captain Arthur H. Sherry completed a survey of all wing stations except Asmar, Roberts, and the Southern Route. The purpose of the trip was to investigate security procedures and personnel, and the general conclusion was that no security problems were prevalent that had not always existed, and that there was a great improvement in security in general. However, Captain Sherry noted that the fact that no sabotage had occurred probably resulted not from precautions taken, but from the circumstance that all stations were in friendly territory. Since this document contained detailed comments on security throughout the wing, a copy of it is included in the appendix.⁷

Although many security directives were issued, they need not be described, since they concerned the same subjects as those published by AEW: guarding of aircraft, safeguarding of medical kits, and similar matters. A letter of April 6th concerning violations of censorship⁸ listed such violations, and an important letter of June 12th described indoctrination in safeguarding military information in the wing.⁹

An important security problem arose in connection with the movement of B-29s across Africa, beginning in March, 1944. On April 2nd, a lieutenant disclosed his destination, and such information and mis-information¹⁰ about B-29 performance, in the presence of two officers and a civilian. Contributing to such security violations was the fact that B-29 personnel

7. Ltr Capt A. H. Sherry, CAFW I&S Officer, to CC CAFW-ATC, Jan 21, 1944, "Survey of Wing Stations." See Appendix X.
8. Ltr CC CAFW-ATC to COs all stations, Apr 6, 1944, "Violations of AF 380-5," in 380.01, CEAD Central Files.
9. Ltr A-2 CAFW-ATC to A-2 AAF, June 12, 1944, "Indoctrination in SMI." See Appendix XI.

were often delayed, were not quartered separately from other personnel,
 and were frequently pointed out as "marked men" by ATC officers. ¹¹ A
 letter written in April directed special security measures in transient
 quarters, and a special briefing on security for transients by the I & S
 officer; posters were to be displayed. ¹² And in May, a letter from ATC
 headquarters stated that the Inspector General had investigated security
 violations of the recent B-29 movement, including disclosure of Top Secret
 information. It was found that the ATC had contributed to the compromise
 by underclassification of documents, loose handling of manifests for
 B-29 crews and cargo, requesting information on destinations and organiza-
 tions of crews, discussing XI Bomber Command movements with unauthorized
 personnel, and in general exploiting too much inquisitiveness about XI
 Bomber Command activities. ¹³

The CIC continued making investigations, uncovering, for example,
 some employees of the Accra PI who combined lucratively prostitution
 and espionage. A directive stating the duties of CIC personnel is in-
 cluded as an appendix. ¹⁴

No other problems of particular interest occurred, nor were any
 significant policies established. I & S in CAFW adequately accomplished
 its mission, by means which have been described in the account of AEF
 I & S, and there is little to be said about it.

11. Ltr I&S Officer ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, May 9, 1944, "Investigation of Security--B-29 Project," in I&S Files, COMD Central Files.
12. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CO Station #3, Apr 24, 1944, "Safeguarding Military Information," in I&S Files, COMD Central Files.
13. Ltr CO ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, May 31, 1944, "Security Survey Document and Method of Operation," in I&S Files, COMD Central Files.
14. See Appendix XV

CHAPTER IV: OPERATIONS

The story of GAFN operations may be told briefly, since for the most part, procedures and policies instituted by A-25 and GAF-425 were continued. When GAFN was inaugurated, the pioneering days and period of expansion, accompanied by operational procedures which were often trial-and-error, were over. The installation of radio ranges, beacons, communications and other facilities was complete; air traffic control and briefing procedures were established; control systems and policies for maintenance and other phases of operations were in effect and had been proved by experience.

A letter written February, 1944, immediately prior to the beginning of C-40 operations, presented a survey of operational facilities and problems in the light of anticipated operations. The filling of present personnel deficiencies would solve most maintenance problems. Sufficient engineering effort was familiar with the C-40, but considerable amount of effort would be necessary for the change-over. Flight control facilities were adequate, and briefing facilities sufficient except that the re-arranged printing equipment had not yet arrived. Weather and communications facilities were adequate. In training, the chief problem was the inferior quality of replacement pilots; otherwise the situation was good; the shortage of navigators, however, interfered with the program for briefing. There was still a shortage of equipment for air-sea rescue; another P-51 and more rescue boats were needed.

It is evident, then, that the operational establishment was well

1. HQ CC GAFN-425 to CC A-25, Feb 12, 1944, "Study of Future Activities," in GAFN Central Files.

organized and running smoothly. The chief problem during CAFW's history resulted from the introduction of C-46 aircraft, which threw a monkey-wrench into this well-oiled machinery. First operated in February, the C-46 by March was the major component of the transport fleet. This resulted in numerous maintenance and training difficulties, and operational efficiency suffered a severe decline. Full scale night operations were not undertaken with this aircraft until June, by which time many of the difficulties had been resolved, and operations were again proceeding fairly smoothly.

The only special mission flown by CAFW was the "cocoa" run to Chabua and Calcutta, inaugurated on June 15, 1944. This was through movement of high priority cargo flown by C-46s of the CAFW, from Accra to Karachi, and thence to Calcutta and the Assam valley. Orders were given to expedite the movement in every possible way. Since the mission continued until the fall of 1944, further description is unnecessary here. This supplemented the J-87 "Fireball" run, flown by the 14th Ferrying Group since November 1943, from India to India.

In summary, it may be said that the first six months of 1944 constituted a period of chaotic and generally reduced operations, with inadequate facilities, and governed by well-worn, old and tested systems and policies. Most CAFW operational policies were simply re-statements of those of AAF and CAA.

A. Flight Operations.

1. Transport Operations.

During January and February, 1944, CAFW transport hours flown

2. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #69.02, June 10, 1944, "Maintenance Througha Operation to Chabua and Calcutta," in 273, CEAD Central Files.

remained at a high level, being second only to ICA in the whole ATC. In January, 6,401:33 transport hours were flown, compared to CAF's 5,552:12 hours; in February, the CAF total declined to 7,697:36 hours, while CAF's increased to 6,642:36 hours.

A letter from AIC Headquarters in February, 1944, recognized that CAF's operations with C-47s had been outstanding success, and stated that AIC Headquarters was aware that the replacement by C-46s could give rise to many problems. However, the letter stated; since CAF had been requested to take over ICA's services in North Africa, it was necessary to transfer thirty more C-47s to ICA from CAF, and from now on only C-46s would be supplied ^{to} CAF. To alleviate these difficulties, an experienced C-46 pilot was being sent to ICA to help in training, and better-trained replacement pilots (with a minimum of 675 transport hours) would in future be sent. In March, almost half the hours flown were logged by C-46s.

After the introduction of the C-46, CAF operations declined rapidly both in volume and in efficiency, while ICA continued its weekly round expansion. In March, CAF flew 6,642:36 transport hours, while ICA totals increased to 7,671:36 hours; in April, CAF declined to 5,171:36 hours, while ICA logged 8,641:12. The trend continued in May; CAF flew 4,451:12 hours to CAF's 5,193:30. Night operations with C-46 aircraft were begun on May 1, but on a restricted basis: landings, but not takeoffs, could be made at night, and flights were to be made only under contact weather conditions. The transition period ended on June 15, when the C-46s

3. "Monthly Report of Transport Operations, Jan and Feb. 1944, Stat Control Div, ATC, in ATC Statistical Files.
4. Ltr CG ATC to CG CAF, ATC, Feb 21, 1944, "C-46 Operation," in 492.1, CEAD Central Files.
5. "Monthly Report of Transport Operations," Statistical Control Division, ATC, For March, April and May, 1944, in ATC Statistical Files.
6. Ltr, CG CAF-AIC to CGs all Stations, Apr 27, 1944, "Night Operation of C-46 Type Aircraft," in 373, CEAD Central Files.

were placed on twenty-four hour operation. In June, the necessary readjustments had been made, and most problems solved; as C-46s were placed on twenty-four hour schedules, hours flown rose again, although CAFW still eclipsed CAFM operations in magnitude. In June, the total flying time for CAFW was 8,249:2 hours; of the 5,161:5 hours of this flown by C-46s, 24% were flown at night. (These figures for total flying time are not comparable with those for preceding months, which represent transport hours).

Criteria of operational efficiency show a similar trend. In January and February, CAFM had the highest load factor of any ATC wing (86% and 84%). After the introduction of C-46s, the load factor dropped to 80% in March (third among ATC wings), and to 75% (fifth) in April. By May, the factor increased to 73%, as the C-46s were assimilated. Through the first six months of 1944, CAFM led all ATC wings in average number of hours flown per assigned aircraft daily, though a distinct falling off appeared during the period of transition to C-46 operations from March through May. This average daily hours per assigned aircraft dropped from 5:22 in February to 3:47 in March, increasing to 4:00 in May, and continuing the increase thereafter.

3. Ferrying Operations.

From January 1 to June 30, 1944, 3,792 transport and tactical aircraft were ferried through AET or were en route through the wing on the latter date. Of these, 3,676, or 97.2%, were delivered; 59, or 1.04%,

7. "Report of Operations and Traffic," CAFM-ATC, CAFW Stat Control Unit, June 1944, in Statistical Files, COMAD Central Files.
8. "Monthly Report of Transport Operations," Stat Control Div., ATC, for months cited in ATC Statistical Files.
9. "Monthly Summary Aircraft Assigned and Hours Flown," ATC For Jan-June, 1944, ATC Stat Control Div, in ATC Statistical Files.

were on route on June 30; 25, or .67%, were temporarily delayed due to mechanical trouble; and 12, or .35%, were cracked up, salvaged or lost. ¹⁰

The number of ferries increased during the first three months: in January, 22 tactical aircraft were en route at the beginning of the month, 389 arrived and 367 were delivered during the month, two cracked up or were lost, and 42 were en route at the month's end. In the same month, 51 transport aircraft were en route on December 31, 1943, 205 arrived and 213 were delivered during January, one was cracked up or lost, and 20 were en route on January 31st. This represented an increase of 57% in arrivals and 62% in deliveries over December, 1943. All totals steadily rose during February and March; in April, however, the downward trend began, arrivals decreasing 14% and deliveries 19% from the March totals. After a slight increase in May, by June the decline was more sharply marked: arrivals decreased 70% and deliveries 61% from those ¹¹ for May. No fighter aircraft were ferried through CAFW, and the proportion of transport ~~ferries~~ ¹² to tactical ferries was larger than in AEF.

9. Operational Policies.

As has been previously mentioned, CAFW inaugurated few new policies, most of its operational directives being re-statements of AEF and CAS policies. However, there is an interesting series of memoranda dealing with the employment and training of pilots. The policies outlined, while basically the same as those of AEF, show some innovation and additional refinements. For operational purposes, CAFW was separated into four

divisions: 1) Accra to Maiduguri and Dakar; 2) Maiduguri to Khartoum;

10. "Report of Aircraft Ferried Through the C.A.F.W. for the Month of June 1944." See Appendix XVIII.
11. "Report of Aircraft Ferried Through the C.A.F.W. for the Month of June 1944," same reports for January and April, 1944.
12. See Appendices XXI and XXII. Appendices ^{XVI} through XXII present statistics on CAFW transport and ferry operations.

3) Khartoum to Cairo and Aden; 4) Aden to Karachi. Flight crews were based at each of the division points (Accra, Maiduguri, Khartoum and Aden), under the supervision of a division chief pilot at each point. The four division chief pilots, under the supervision of the wing chief pilot, scheduled crews, checked their proficiency, selected co-pilots for first pilot training, and recommended promotions. Overall control of flight operations was a function of wing operations; station operations were limited to routine local matters.¹³ As in AMEW, the purpose of this centralized control was to provide greater flexibility of operation and coordination.

A letter written in April distinguished between the duties of Chief pilots and those of operations officer. Chief pilots worked closely with operations officers, but were primarily concerned with the training and scheduling of pilots under their control; they had complete control of all matters pertaining to pilots, including disciplinary action and recommendations for promotions and awards. On other matters directly concerned with flying, such as traffic control and emergency procedures, they made recommendations to the operations officer.¹⁴

Procedure for new pilots coming into CAFW was as follows: first they were interviewed by the Wing Chief Pilot; next the Flight Training School gave them a flight check, reporting in writing on their performance; on the basis of the check and interview, they were then assigned by the Wing Chief Pilot. Normally they were assigned to co-pilot duty; after at least 300 hours in multi-engine aircraft, if considered qualified, they were sent

13. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #20.01, Feb 21, 1944, "Organization of Wing and Stations," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
14. Ltr CCAFW-ATC to COs, and Division Chief Pilots, Stations 3,4,10, 12, CAFW, April 5, 1944, "Policy Letter #10; *Wing Organizations-- Division Chief Pilots," in 211, CEAD Central Files.

back to the Flight Training School; after completing the course, and passing a final check by the Wing Chief Pilot, they were assigned as first pilots.¹⁵

A memorandum appearing in March prescribed regulations to prevent flying when pilots were fatigued or in poor physical conditions. The pilot was to be the aircraft commander, regardless of rank, unless check pilot or command pilot was a member of the crew. The pilot was equally responsible with the operations officer for clearance; pilots should not fly unless they were in good physical condition; transient pilots were to be especially careful about this. A crew of two pilots was limited to 12 hours flying in 24; a crew of three to 18 hours out of 24 (with re-stationing in 413 regulation). Crews were to be given a rest of at least eight hours between flights. Pilots were not to log over 300 hours flying time in any 90-day period, nor 1200 hours in a year. The only exception to these rules was that the Alaska-Arctic route might be flown without crew rest, although the average flying time was slightly over twelve hours.¹⁶

Another bulletin emphasized the Pilot's Narrative Trip Report form, which was to be used by transient pilots for criticism, comments and suggestions on their trips through CAPW. It was to be more widely distributed, and its use encouraged.¹⁷

Although little information is available on contract carrier operations in CAPW, an interesting and vitriolic letter commenting on the inferiority

15. CAPW Operations Manual Bulletin #50.70, Feb 22, 1944, "Training/Pilot Training and Technique," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
16. CAPW Operations Manual Bulletin #37.51, March 18, 1944, "Personnel/Aircraft Control/Flight Time Limitations," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
17. CAPW Operations Manual Bulletin #15.20, March 21, 1944, "Forms: Pilots' Narrative Trip Report," in 373, CEAD Central Files.

of Pan-American pilots to CAFM pilots deserves mention. The letter was motivated by criticisms by PAAF pilots of CAFM facilities and weather forecasts. Referring ~~on~~ the general inertia of PAAF pilots, and their unwillingness to do the kind of flying that ATC pilots did constantly, the letter referred to their criticism of the "inadequacy" of the Accra radio range and of the dimness of the runway lights; also of the fact that there were no lead-in lights nor visual markers for the 2 3/10 mile distance from the range station to the end of the runway. Although these criticisms provoked much airith among CAFM pilots, and although no ATC pilots had ever, in all their months of operations, made any of the criticisms, such visual markers were installed. The criticism of Accra's weather forecasts to Accension's is apparently motivated by a desire to find some excuse to avoid flying into Accra at night. PAAF pilots were unable, or unwilling, to use the radio range; CAFM gave them some instruction, and suggested that they work the range on every landing, for practice, but with little response. It is worth noting, though, it proves nothing, that PAF transports suffered two major accidents during the period under consideration. This letter implies ~~is~~ a mixture of petty feelings; PAAF pilots had flown in Africa before there were any navigational aids, and visual markers and lead-in lights are very important in night flying, especially to PAAF pilots who were not familiar with the field.

18. Ltr CG CAFM-ATC, to CG ATC, May 27, 1944, "Background Material on Pan-American Africa-Orient Division Operations in CAFM," in 373 CEAD Central Files.
19. V. infra., pp 63-64
20. Opinion expressed by Major Charles W. Bent. See Appendix VIII to History of the Air Transport Command in Central Africa and Middle-East, Part II, History of the Africa-Middle-East Wing, Vol II, "Operations," forwarded to CG AAF through CG/ATC, Dec 28, 1945.

B. Air Traffic Control

A letter written in February, 1944, to ATC organizations and contract carriers concerned, outlined CAFW air traffic control.

Air traffic control...is considered to mean the control of all air traffic by radio and by assigned altitudes of flight to insure adequate separation of aircraft at all times of poor visibility and/or low ceilings either by difference in flight levels or by time intervals between planes enroute.

Poor visibility and/or low ceiling was defined as visibility of three miles or less, and/or ceilings of 1,000 feet or less, otherwise called "Instrument weather conditions." Under such conditions a trained flying officer, or ground operations officer if no flying officer was available, ~~was~~ ^{had to} be present to advise and assist both AOC plane-ground radio and control tower radio. These radios had absolute control of all traffic; planes would not enter the control zone (twenty-five mile radius of station) until cleared to do so. In addition to these regulations, each station had its own rules. ²¹ An operations manual bulletin published in April gave further details of the control system. ²² Since the system was practically identical with that under effect in AEB, it is not necessary to describe it.

In May appeared a letter directing commanding officers of all stations to formulate in writing procedures to be followed in emergencies, governing traffic control, holding procedures, crash procedures, coordination between weather and operations, and similar matters. ²³ Another bulletin duplicated AEBW instructions on low flying and "buzzing," and gave route

21. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC, to Pan-Am. Africa-Orient Division, Accra: American Airlines, Accra: Liaison Officer, 4th Ferrying Group, Accra: COs ATC, Ascension and Natal, Feb 26, 1944, "Air Traffic Control," See Appendix XXIV.
22. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #60.20, April 1, 1944, "Flying/Flying Regulations--Airways Traffic Control," in 379, CEAD Central Files.
23. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs all stations, CAFW, May 29, 1944, "Emergency Procedures," in 360.1 CEAD Central Files.

regulations: check points were to be passed and reported at assigned altitudes, as there was to be reported immediately after landing; other details of traffic control en route were prescribed.

C. Navigation and Briefing.

The CAFM briefing office at Accra continued to serve both CAFM and RAFM during the period under consideration, and the excellent organization set up under AOCB was continued. Lieutenant Harry Gilhavy, Route Intelligence Officer, traveled throughout the wing, obtaining briefing information. A great deal of printing, principally Pilot's Handbooks, was done for both CAFM and RAFM; these handbooks were reprinted by Washington, and corrected by CAFM. In December, 1943, Washington had re-loaded CAFM Accra-Marrakech, Accra-Chartoum, and Chartoum-Cairo handbooks; CAFM completed a Marrakech-United Kingdom handbook in January. In May, a North Africa-Mediterranean and Italy handbook was completed for RAFM.

In January and February, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Bowling, a Washington Reserve who conferred with CAFM briefing officers on the printing and use of the Washington handbooks, wrote a series of dispatches which give a good picture of the briefing organization at that time. At Accra, Captain W. W. Woodfield was, in January, 1944, just promoted a Captain and was acting as the Navigation and Briefing Officer. Captain Woodfield was a Senior Pilot, and his assistants all navigators. Colonel Bowling was told that attempts had been made to get printing machinery from Washington since May, 1943; some was received in December, but was not complete. The briefing officers said that if they received complete equipment, they could do all printing for CAFM as well as RAFM. Meanwhile, a number of handbooks issued

- 24. CAFM Operations Manual Bulletin #60.00, March 1, 1944 "Flying/ Flying Regulations," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
- 25. Sources for all these statements, "Weekly Report of Navigation and Briefing Office," for dates concerned, in 219.1, CEAD Central Files.

by Accra were given to Colonel Bolling for printing by Washington. The work of the Route Intelligence Officer, Colonel Bolling found, was proving valuable both for I&S and for briefing. The station briefing office was separate from the wing briefing office: the senior station briefing officer, Lieutenant M. J. Finselson, a navigator, stated that the two main runs from Accra were those to Khartoum and to Dakar. Six officers staffed the station briefing office, and in addition all navigators were attached to the briefing office when assigned to CAMF, and were under the supervision of the Wing Briefing Officer. The route to Khartoum was used slightly more by ferried aircraft than by scheduled transports. The southern route was flown about twice a week (to Elisabethville, ending at Khartoum).²⁶

At Khartoum there were three navigators assigned as briefing officers, and the main briefing job was the Karachi route; particular emphasis was laid upon check points. The briefing on the route to Cairo was simple, because most of the route paralleled the Nile river.²⁷ In addition to the briefing offices at Accra and Khartoum, there was a briefing office at Roberts Field, Liberia; briefing policies laid down by CAMF guidelines²⁸ were similar to those of AEF.

Film briefing, inaugurated throughout the AEC by Major Paul Lorentz, drew in for more wing attention. The first film, covering the route from Accra to Roberts, was shown in December, 1943, and was considered very good except for the unfortunate fact that it showed the rarely-used coastwise route. In March, the briefing office was attempting to get film equipment

26. "Dispatch #9," Accra, undated, but probably about Feb 2, 1944, by Lt Col R. H. Bolling. See Appendix **XXV**.
27. "Dispatch #8," Wadi Seidna South (Khartoum), January 29, 1944, by Lt Col R. H. Bolling. See Appendix **XXV**.
28. CAMF Operations Manual Bulletin #58.10, March 2, 1944, "Operations/Briefing Policies and Procedures," in 573, CEAD Central Files.

and audiotapes for all stations, for the increased showing of briefing files. It had been decided not to use the sound tracks, but to have briefing officers make verbal comments instead.

D. Communications

There is little of significance to report in connection with CAFW communications policies or problems. Ranges, beacons, and other communications facilities had been installed under AEM; in January, 1944, ranges were being installed at minor stations on the route from Khartoum to Karachi (Lydda, Habbaniyah, Asoedan, Bahrain, Sharjah).²⁹ First Lieutenant Julius L. Levy was the original communications officer.

Most CAFW communications memoranda and bulletins duplicate AEM directives, and need not be mentioned here. All flight radio operators were trained as flight clerks, in addition to their principal duty. A uniform training program for communications personnel was instituted in April.³¹ Two radio maintenance shops were in operation, one at Accra, which handled all third and fourth echelon maintenance for the Wing, and one at Khartoum, which was authorized to perform third echelon maintenance.³²

E. Training

Training for aircraft maintenance personnel continued as established under AEM. The school was at Accra, where 50% of the first and second echelon maintenance for the wing was done; crew chiefs were given a week in each specialty shop. A rotation program for mechanics was in effect, bringing

29. "Weekly Summary of Activities, Navigation and Briefing Office," Dec 24, 1943, and March 18, 1944, in 319.1, CEAD Central Files.
30. "Dispatch #9," Hadi Seidna South (Khartoum), Jan 29, 1944, by Lt Col R. H. Bolling. See Appendix XXV.
31. "Communications Section Monthly Report for April, 1944," in 319.1 CEAD Central Files.
32. Ibid., for Feb 1944.

then back to Accra after several months on the line, in order to give them additional training and a chance for advancement. An elaborate program was unnecessary, since 73% of the maintenance personnel had been in CAFW more than one year.

A letter written in April, 1944, outlined all operations training. Minimum training was being given, because the C-46 transition period left little time for it; a program was planned after operations became stabilized. Maintenance training was mainly on-the-job, with the seven officers and three enlisted men who had had factory training on the C-46 instructing others. Flight radio operators were required to complete a three-week course at Accra before being assigned, and radio mechanics were trained on the job in the Accra maintenance shop. It was planned to assign an engineering officer as Chief Maintenance Training Officer, to set up a training program including rotation among specialties, lectures and movies. A program for training operations officers would be set up if a competent officer could be obtained and equipment furnished.

The Flight Training School at Accra continued to function, with Major W. B. Garner as Director, succeeded on May 27 by Major R. B. Dixon. On January 24, a revised program of checking out first pilots was adopted, based on basic instruction on ground subjects. Two classes per month, of ~~sixteen~~ ^{sixteen} students each, were scheduled; the students were selected on a quota basis, four from each operating division. Three C-46s and one DC-3 were

- 33. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, Jan 25, 1944, "Training of Aircraft and Engine Mechanics," in 353, CEAD Central Files.
- 34. Ltr CO CAFW to CG ATC, April 24, 1944, "CAFW Training Program-- Operations Personnel," in 353, CEAD Central Files.
- 35. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COS CAFW, Accra, Maiduguri, Khartoum, Aden, January 10, 1944, "Revised Flight Training School Program," in 353, CEAD Central Files.

assigned to the school daily.

F. Maintenance

Except for the problems caused by the introduction of the C-46, CAFM maintenance activities may be summarized as a smooth and highly efficient carrying out of the excellent policies and procedures instituted under AASH and CAS. Major W. D. Werten was wing engineering officer throughout the period.

An additional refinement to the AFM maintenance and inspection control system was inaugurated by CAFM. This was an elaborate visual control system, operated in conjunction with the Situation Room; its purpose was to increase utilization of maintenance facilities and distribute the work load evenly among the various stations. Work load criteria were drawn up, the basic unit being the twenty-five hour inspection which could normally be performed by six men in eight hours; the work load capacity of each station was then determined in terms of this unit. The system was operated by means of the aircraft movement and control board, which showed at all times the location of each CAFM plane. Careful attention was kept of the flight hours on each aircraft, and inspectors were assigned to various stations according to their work load capacity; the stations were advised by radio of inspections to be performed by them. The system substantially eliminated congestion of maintenance work at any one station, and distributed the work load evenly.

An office of aircraft maintenance inspection control was established in March, 1944, to supervise this system; in addition to its other functions, the system was to prevent

36. Ltr CG CAFM-AMC to CG Station #3, May 12, 1944, "Allocation of Aircraft for Flight Training," in 452.1, GMD Central Files.

37. Ltr unsigned, undated, "Maintenance and Inspection Control System," in 319.1 GMD Central Files.

CAF's aircraft arriving at stations outside the wing with 100-hour or more checks due.³⁸

The efficiency of the CAF's maintenance organization was indicated by a few statistics: on January 23, 1944, the average operating factor for the past six weeks was 72.24%, with an average of 12:01 hours daily flown per active aircraft.³⁹ From January 1, 1944, to September 30, 1944, 4,559 aircraft were ferried through CAFs; the attrition rate was 0.2%, as compared with the attrition rate of 1.3% for ferried aircraft in 1943.⁴⁰

The transition to C-46 aircraft, from March through May, caused a drastic loss of efficiency: the fleet became less productive, and additional personnel were required for maintenance. The first C-46s were assigned in February; by March, they had become the dominant aircraft, and were assigned in increasing numbers until July. The transition period was not ended until June 15, when C-46 aircraft were placed on 24-hour schedules, and even after this the 1942 C-46As continued to give trouble because of fuel leaks in their riveted fuel tanks.⁴¹ A tank repair shop was built, and a method of pressure checking instituted to discover and prevent leaks.⁴²

When the special transport service to India, called "Comet", was inaugurated on June 15, maintenance for these C-46 aircraft was given priority

38. CAF Operations Manual Collection 07.77, March 17, 1944, "Maintenance/Maintenance Inspections and Control," in 375, CEAD Central Files.
39. Ltr CG CAFS-ATC, Jan 26, 1944, "Training of Aircraft and Engine Mechanics," in 353, CEAD Central Files.
40. Ltr Maj W.D. Herren to CG CEAD, Oct 12, 1944, "Summary of Maintenance Activities in the Central African Division," See Appendix III to History of the Air Transport Command in Central Africa and the Middle East, Part II, History of the Africa-India-East Line, Vol II, "Operations," forwarded to CG/AF through CG/ATC, Dec 29, 1945.
41. "CEAD-ATC Statistical Summary/ Operations and Traffic/ Flying Safety/ Comet History/ January 1944 through April 1945," CEAD Statistical Control section, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
42. Maj W.D. Herren, op. cit.

over other maintenance, and special maintenance procedures were set up to expedite the movement.⁴³

G. Weather

Headquarters of the Southern Sector of the 19th Weather Region remained at Accra during CAPW's history; in January, Major H. A. Mooney was Senior Control Officer.^{43a} In May, arrangements were made for long range weather forecasts from Cairo and all stations east to be made available at Accra for briefing purposes.⁴⁴ Weather considerations played an important part in the transfer of AIC facilities from Enea Field, Rafiqsue to Yof Field, Dakar, on June 1, 1944.⁴⁵ Otherwise, the weather organization and procedures set up under AEW functioned unchanged under CAPW.

Criticism of CAPW facilities, including weather service, by contract carrier pilots has previously been mentioned. A letter written in reply by the Liaison Officer of the 19th Weather Region is of interest. The criticism of the commercial pilots had been that Accra terminal forecasts to Ascension had in many cases indicated that Accra terminal weather was below the minimum when it was not, and that 75% of the aircraft overnighing at Ascension during one week had done so unnecessarily because of the inadequacy of the Accra forecast. The Liaison Officer replied that Accra forecasts had not indicated that overnighing was necessary, and that Ascension, or the

43. CAPW Operations Manual Bulletin #69.02, June 13, 1944, "Maintenance/Through Operations to Casbah and Calcutta," in 373, OAD Central Files.

43a. "Dispatch #9," Accra, undated, by Lt Col R. H. Belling. See Appendix XXV.

44. "Weekly Report Navigation and Briefing Office," May 28, 1944, in 319.1 OAD Central Files.

45. Ibid., June 16, 1944.

pilots, had either misunderstood the weather code or deliberately misconstrued it because of unwillingness to fly into Accra at night. Subsequent correspondence clarified the matter, and permissible minimum weather for Accra night landings was agreed upon.

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H. Aircraft Accidents, Search and Rescue.

1. Policies

On July 29, 1944, Colonel Nelson, Commanding Officer of CAFW, proudly sent the following radio:

Fingers crossed and knuckles bruised from knocking on wood, we take pride in telling you CAFW's regular transport operation today rounded out one full year without a single fatal accident....Record believed unmatched anywhere else in the ATC particularly since it was accompanied by an efficiency of operation in day and night flying, which we also believe leads your league.

All stations were congratulated and urged to keep up the good work, with the warning, "the price of safety is eternal vigilance."

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Further evidence of CAFW's success in preventing accidents is contained in an ATC statistical report, showing that for the first seven months of 1944, CAFW had the lowest percentage of accidents due to carelessness, disobedience or negligence of any ATC division; the percentage of such accidents in CAFW was 5%, as compared with the average of 15% for ATC as a whole. It is worth noting that ATC's percentage of such accidents was fairly high, (19%), as compared with the average rate for ATC of 17% for the same period (July 1942 through December 1943).

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- 46. Ltr Maj R.C. Ross, Liaison Officer, 19th Weather Region, to A-3, CAFW-ATC, Feb 23, 1944, "Accra Terminal Weather Forecasts During the Period 14-20 February Inclusive," in 360.11, CEAD Central Files.
- 47. Msg 40779 CG CAFW-ATC to CG ATC and CG WAFB-ATC, July 29, 1944, in 360.33, CEAD Central Files.
- 48. "Aircraft Accidents in ATC Operations, July 1942--July 1944," Research Report #2, Stat Control Div, ATC, in ATC Statistical Files.

CAFW bulletins on safety precautions, emergency procedures, reports and flying safety duplicated, for the most part, AEW directives. A bulletin of February, 1944, established geographical areas to be controlled by Accra, Roberts, Maiduguri, Khartoum, and Aden for accident reporting. This control was necessary because of the lack of experienced pilots at such stations, and the commanding officers of the designated stations were authorized to appoint aircraft accident boards for all accidents in their areas. In

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March a bulletin appeared directing that the pilot of each non-CAFW aircraft fill out a Missing Aircrew report upon entering the wing (at Accra or Roberts); within 48 hours after the plane was officially reported missing, the commanding officer of the station of entry must complete the report.

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Other bulletins dealt with specific safety precautions and with details of procedure in case of overdue or missing aircraft. In January, a bulletin directed that safety precautions to prevent ground accidents be adhered to, pointing out that there had been laxity in the past: planes were to be grounded while in hangars or being serviced; control locks were to be checked and used; cabin doors were to be closed during run-ups; fire and crash trucks were to be properly maintained.

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A letter from the Commanding Officer, CAFW, in May, 1944, pointed out the prerogatives of Aircraft Accident Boards: to summon and cross-examine witnesses, reject testimony if necessary, and similar matters. It was noted that the findings of such boards were not to be used

49. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #62.140, Feb 23, 1944, "Flying Safety/ Establishment of Aircraft Accident Boards," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
50. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #62.11, March 2, 1944, "Flying Safety/ Missing Air Crew Report," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
51. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #65.0103, Jan 7, 1944, "Safety Precautions," in 373, CEAD Central Files.

as a basis for disciplinary action, and that therefore there was no need to "cover up." The reports, the letter stated, often indicated that these prerogatives had not been exercised: there was frequently no cross-examination and the reports were generally not thorough.

Intelligence officers were required to make a separate report on all accidents in which sabotage was possible or suspected, or when the cause was undetermined; although numerous reports were made, no case of sabotage was ever discovered.

3. Air Sea Rescue.

An Air-Sea rescue unit was based at Accra, under a Wing Rescue Officer. A PBX-5A, with all necessary equipment, was available 24 hours a day, and close liaison was maintained with the RAF and Royal Navy, whose facilities were used in emergency. In March, expansion of the unit was expected. The RAF sea rescue unit at Takoradi had one 62-foot boat, and another 20-foot motor launch; crews were always available, and could be under way in five minutes after notification. The boats were equipped with radio and D/F.

4. Transport Accidents.

Aside from the central fact that there were no fatalities, CAFW's transport accident record was astonishingly good. Four major transport

52. Ltr CO CAFW-MTC to COs all Stations, May 29, 44 "Aircraft Accident Reporting--Additional Instructions", in 360.32 CEAD Central Files.
53. Ltr CO CAFW-MTC to COs all stations, Dec 21, 1943, "Aircraft Accident Reports by Intelligence Officers," in 319.1, CEAD Central Files.
54. CAFW Operations Manual Bulletin #62.07, March 25, 1944, "Flying Safety/Air-Sea Rescue," in 373, CEAD Central Files.
55. Ltr Capt G. W. Ewell, CAFW-MTC QM Office to CO CAFW-MTC, "Report of Trip to Takoradi 15 May-17 May 1944," in 319.1, CEAD Central Files.

accidents occurred, each resulting in destruction of the aircraft, and in minor injury or none to occupants.

On January 30, at Wadi Ssidna, Khartoum, C-87 #43-30576 caught fire in the air because of engine failure; a successful emergency landing was made, in which occupants escaped with minor injuries, but the aircraft burned.

At Aden, Arabia, on May 29, 1944, C-47A #42-108929 lost an engine on takeoff. A successful forced landing was made, with minor injuries; the plane caught fire and burned. The cause was mechanical failure.

A similar accident occurred at Balala on June 3, 1944, when C-47 #3340 suffered engine failure on takeoff, immediately after becoming airborne. Occupants escaped without injury; the aircraft burned. The cause was mechanical failure, and also pilot error in that the pilot should have let down as soon as the engine trouble was detected.

The pilot of UC-78 #42-58192 on March 9, 1944, was buzzing the Nile river near Wadi Ssidna; the prop caught the water and the plane crashed, a safe landing was made, checking the plane but not injuring the pilot. The board, inexplicably, found th^{at} the cause was structural failure.

Nine minor accidents occurred to transport aircraft. Two were takeoff accidents, three landing, two involved fire on the ground, and two were forced landings.

56. The same definition of "major" and "minor" accident is here used as that explained in the account of AEF accidents, and the same caution as to the questionable validity of accident statistics based on files which may be incomplete should be borne in mind. All accidents herein discussed are to be found in 360.33, CEAD Central Files, in folders identified by the aircraft number, date and place of the accident. Postnotes will therefore not be given for each.

a. Landing Accidents

On December 31, 1943, at Asmara, Eritrea, the pilot of C-47 #41-18400 landed holding his left wing down to correct for crosswind. The power was chopped off while still in this attitude; the plane stalled and landed heavily on the left wheel and wing tip. No injuries were sustained, and minor damage; the cause was pilot error.

At El Fasher on April 16, 1944, C-46A #42-60958, after a normal landing, struck a native who had wandered onto the runway, breaking his leg. The fault was the native's.

As C-46A #42-3681 was landing on June 18, 1944 at Maiduguri, a gusty wind picked it up and caused it to stall. No injury, and minor damage, resulted. The cause was weather.

b. Takeoff Accidents.

The pilot of C-46A #42-61035, taking off from Kano on May 27, 1944, lost directional control before he became airborne, running into some other planes and then into an embankment. Minor damage resulted, and no injury. The cause was pilot error.

On June 5, 1944, at Salala, the nose gear of C-37A #41-24159 collapsed on takeoff, resulting in minor injury, and minor damage. The cause was the condition of the runway, and possible structural failure of the nose gear.

c. Fire on the Ground

At Kano on January 3, 1944, one engine of C-53 #0103 caught fire immediately after landing; it was extinguished with minor damage. The cause was mechanical failure.

C-53 #41-20110 while taxiing at Wadi Seidna, April 16, 1944, caught fire in one engine, because of mechanical failure. Minor damage resulted.

d. Forced Landings

On January 16, 1944, an engine failed on C-47A #42-100579 near Roberts Field. All equipment was jettisoned, causing some damage to the aircraft, and a safe landing was made. The cause was structural failure.

At El Geneina on January 22, 1944, C-47A #1595 made an emergency landing after engine failure caused by pilot error. No injury, but extensive damage resulted.

4. Non-CAFW Transports.

Two major accidents occurred to Pan-American aircraft in CAFW. The crash of C-54A #42-37292 at Accra on January 26, 1944, resulting in the deaths of seven PAA crew members and twenty-eight passengers, was one of the most tragic accidents ever to occur in Africa. The plane made a normal takeoff, on a flight to Ascension; it then crashed about two miles from the airport. Some witnesses said that it caught fire in the air; others said that it did not catch fire until after it had crashed. The medical officer's opinion was that all the occupants were killed by the impact rather than the fire, in any case. Since the plane burned completely, it was impossible to determine the cause. The accident was doubly tragic because most of the twenty-eight passengers were members of combat crews on their way home from the CBI. The crew, all PAA employees, consisted of J. H. Kroeger, P. T. Smith, J. G. Clement, H. S. Bennett, P. L. Wigginton, J. R. Fitzgerald, and R. H. Sawyer. Passengers were as follows:

Maj J. Svenningesen	Capt J. Groendal	S/Sgt J. Montanis
Maj J. E. Jones	Lt A. Koshishian	S/Sgt J.R.A. Leveque
Capt R. T. Rose	Sgt. A. J. Rosini	S/Sgt R. E. Truitt
Capt J. V. Wilke	T/Sgt G. Atchley	S/Sgt J. M. Wilson
Lt J. W. Shure, Jr.	T/Sgt E. A. Vasseur	S/Sgt C.W. Silvester
Lt F. Keith	S/Sgt F. E. Ullman	S/Sgt P.E. Wigginton
Lt M. P. Fox	S/Sgt W. H. Smith	
Lt P. S. Connor	S/Sgt S. Shaw	
Lt J. A. Baldanza	S/Sgt A. L. Rawlings	
Lt K. R. McManon	S/Sgt S. R. Patesel	
Lt H. C. Adkins	T/Sgt J. W. O'Brien	

At Masirah Island on April 22, 1944, PAA C-54 #7304 crashed in the sea on its final landing approach, in about fifty feet of water. The cause was pilot error, in that he misjudged his distance. The plane floated for some time, and all occupants escaped with minor injuries. A number of courier pouches and a sum of Chinese currency were aboard; deep sea divers were unable to remove them from the plane after it sank, so depth charges were dropped on it.

Another fatal accident occurred on April 5, 1944, at Aden. C-87 #4-107456, after a normal takeoff, settled back down beyond the runway; hitting tail first, it crashed and burned. The navigator, 2nd Lt. P. A. Fagot, was trapped, and by the time he was pulled out through the astrodome, had received fatal injuries; the rest of the crew received minor injuries. There was evidence that the fire-fighting equipment was not as good as it should have been, and the fire truck carried no first aid kit. The cause of the accident was stated to be pilot error, in failing to maintain a constant-club attitude and in turning off the landing lights too soon.

At Allahabad, India, on January 29, 1944, C-87 #5052 encountered trouble in the air, and the crew parachuted safely. No information is available in C-AD files about this accident, which was evidently in ICA's jurisdiction.

5. Accidents to Ferried Tactical Aircraft

a. Twin-engine Bombers

1. Major Accidents.

Two fatal accidents occurred to ferried twin-engine bombers in CAPM. At Roberts Field on February 7, 1944, B-25 #43-3641 crashed on take-off, from undetermined causes. The crash occurred about four miles from the field, under unfavorable weather conditions: visibility two miles, ceiling

1,100 feet. The crew of five were killed: 2nd Lts Victor Vargoux and L. S. Zukowski, S/Sgt M. B. Wood, and Sgts F. G. Kauffman and R. B. North.

At Maiduguri on April 15, 1944, the pilot of A-20G #43021524 made too steep a landing approach; the landing gear collapsed, the belly tank burst, and the plane burned killing both occupants, 2nd Lts D.K. Foley and J. M. Deutch. A CIC report on the accident indicated that the fire-fighting equipment and personnel were not too good. The cause was pilot error.

Two aircraft were missing at sea on flights from Ascension Island to CAFW; although these were not under CAFW jurisdiction, they will be described because searches were carried out by CAFW boats and planes. On February 20, 1944, B-26 #42-96130 was lost on a flight from Ascension to Roberts. Severe thunderstorms were reported in the area, accompanying the intertropical front. A three-day search by ATC and RAF planes disclosed no signs of the plane. The crew members, all Ninth Air Force, were 2nd Lts A. V. Fischer and K. A. Winblade, F/O D. C. Paule, and Sgts D. I. Meenan and W.O. Keith.

Flying from Ascension to Accra on May 9, 1944, B-5 #4274 was lost at sea. A C-46 crew said that they saw smoke about 150 miles from Accra, but the PRY from Accra and British launches from Takoradi could find no signs of the plane. Crew members are not listed in CEAD files.

Three other major accidents occurred, all of them resulting in destruction of the aircraft, two with minor injury or none to occupants, one with major injury. On December 31, 1943, northeast of Lagos, B-25C #41-12951 force-landed in a lagoon because of engine failure. At Asmara, Eritrea on

March 4, 1944, B-25D (P-10) #41-27930 was landing when the engine failed because of pilot error. Fifty miles northeast of Port Lamy, on May 14, 1944, bird hit the propeller of A-20G #43-21678, causing engine failure. In the fire resulting from the crash landing, both occupants suffered major burns. The fact that the belly tank used on A-20s was not droppable was responsible for the fire, as it was in the case of A-20G #43-21524, previously described. The board recommended that the tanks on A-20s should be made droppable.

2. Minor Accidents.

Ten minor accidents occurred to twin-engine bombers. Four were taxiing accidents, four landings, and two ground accidents.

Taxiing

All four taxiing accidents occurred at Roberts Field. On December 25, 1943, B-26 #42-75776 suffered minor damage when an unmarked water main was hit in taxiing. On January 12, B-26B #42-95806 was slightly damaged in taxiing, because of congestion of the area and pilot error. On January 12, B-26B #42-95951 taxied into another plane because of brake failure and pilot error. On January 15, B-26 #5630 suffered minor damage in taxiing.

Landing

On February 4, 1944, at Masirah Island, B-25H #43-4628 made a belly landing because of structural failure. At Wadi Seidna on February 22, B-25H #43-4390 was damaged in landing because the brakes locked, and pilot error contributed. On March 30, 1944, at El Ghehar, B-25H #43-4399 was damaged in landing because of pilot error. The pilot of A-20G #42-21929, landing at El Gheina on June 8, 1944, ran off the runway and collapsed his nose wheel; the cause was pilot error and faulty instructions from the control tower.

Ground

On December 21, 1943, at Roberts Field, a ground mechanic let the landing gear on B-26 #42-95778 collapse, damaging the plane. At Aden on January 25, 1944, the nose gear of B-25 33609 collapsed from undetermined causes during the run-up.

b. Four-engine Bombers

Three major accidents occurred to four-engine bombers. One was fatal: that occurring to B-24J #42-100245 on January 21, 1944, at Aden, Arabia. The engine failed just after takeoff; the pilot put the gear back down, then decided to raise it; it had not retracted completely when the plane hit the ground just beyond the field, and caused it to nose over and flip over on its back. The cause was believed to be the crew's lack of rest; they had commented on the speed with which they had been rushed through the division, and the board recommended that crews be allowed a full day's layover somewhere along the route. This recommendation no doubt helped motivate the bulletin prescribing rules to prevent crews from flying when not in good physical condition.

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Five of the occupants were killed: 2d Lts N. B. LeBullion, B. E. Watson and A. J. Mitchin; 1/Sgt Arthur Schofield, and Sgt T. W. LaFournise. Two occupants received major injuries, and three minor. On May 3, 1944, near Krafifi on the Ivory Coast, B-17F #41-24504 force-landed because of engine failure, landing in the water just off shore. Occupants escaped with minor injuries. Since all four engines failed at once, either the fuel supply was low or the pilot was in error.

The one accident occurring to a B-29 took place on June 17, 1944, to B-29 #6383, 135 miles southeast of Roberts Field. The plane ran out of gas after being told to go to Roberts since Accra was closed in. The crew

landed safely in the ocean, and were picked up by the PBV. A guard was mounted over the wreckage, and the secret equipment demolished. The cause of the accident was pilot error, with weather which interfered with the use of navigational aids and the unreliable and ambiguous messages sent by Accra as contributory causes.

The only minor accident occurring to a four-engine bomber took place on April 4, 1944, at Kano, to B-24E #41-29083. The nose gear collapsed on takeoff, because of pilot error, and minor damage resulted.

c. Miscellaneous aircraft

Two accidents occurred to miscellaneous aircraft. Navy PV-1 #34989 at Conakry, French Guinea, on December 22, 1943, lost an engine and crashed in attempting a single engine landing. The crew were uninjured, the plane wrecked. Causes were mechanical failure, weather, and pilot error.

On June 27, 1944, AT-6C #42-4329 ground looped on landing at Accra, and the landing gear collapsed, resulting in damage to the plane. The cause was pilot error.

In conclusion, it may be said that the excellence of CAFM's accident record is the best proof of the smartness and efficiency with which the whole operational organization functioned.

I. Schedule Changes during CAFM.

No major changes were made in routes or schedules. The majority of the traffic to Karachi was still handled by contract carriers and Ferrying Division planes. Effective December 15, 1943, a schedule was published by Air Transport Command Headquarters outlining this Far Eastern service. American Airlines ran a daily C-87 service from Natal to Accra, and Pan American Airlines still conducted a Miami-Karachi service using C-54s, as well as an Accra-Natal shuttle. It is worth noting that Pan American

Airways was the only contract carrier flying the run to Karachi.

On December 20, 1943, the South Atlantic Wing asked CAFW to suggest an alternate route for delivering heavy bombers to North Africa, in order to avoid congestion on the Natal-Dakar-Marrakech run. After some discussion, it was decided to eliminate Dakar, and CAFW recommended a route Natal-Ascension-Accra-Kano nonstop to Tripoli. This nonstop distance of 1,600 miles was feasible for four-engine bombers; the route had been mapped, and the weather was better than over the existing route. On January 6, 1944, ATC approved this route, but on January 9, CAFW informed ATC that Marrakech could not handle the volume of aircraft, so it was decided not to use the new route. However, after sending a survey flight over the Kano-Tripoli route, CAFW concluded that it was much better than the existing one, because the nonstop distance was less than the Natal-Dakar overwater flight, with three emergency strips for landing, and the weather was consistently better than that over the Dakar-Marrakech route, where weather over and beyond the Atlas mountains was always a hazard. There is, however, no record of this route ever being used.

Further route information is available until March 16, 1944, when a letter from CAFW Headquarters to Cairo (Station #7, CAFW), gave a summary of scheduled operations then in effect in the Central African Wing:

58. Ltr CO ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, Jan 11, 1944, "Schedules for Caribbean-South Atlantic-Central African Routes," in 555.1 CMAF Central Files.
59. Undated, unsigned document, "Background of Kano-Tripoli Route Survey," and Ltr CO CAFW to CO ATC, Feb 7, 1944, "Flight Survey of Kano-Tripoli Alternate Route for Delivery of 4-Engine Bombers to North Africa." See Appendix ~~XXXX~~ to V-11-11-44
60. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CO Station #7 CAFW-ATC, March 16, 1944, "Summary of CAFW and Contract Carrier Flights Through CAFW," in 585.1 CMAF Central Files.

CAFV PLANES

Accra to Cairo.....5 planes per week
 Accra to Karachi.....21 planes per week
 Accra to Dakar.....1 ship per week. (Few CAFV ships are routed North because of the ever present backlog at this station of high priority material).
 Accra to Southern Route.....A ship leaves Accra every second Monday, going via Southern Route to Nairobi, and from there to Khartoum. The return trip is Khartoum to Accra via the mainline route....

COMMERCIAL SHIPS

Accra to Karachi.....7 trips per week

AFRICA FERRY SHIPS

Accra to Karachi or Chabos.....3 trips per week

This letter is interesting, as appended to the bottom is the following statement:

It should be noted that in most cases there is no regular schedule in operation. However, the figures represent a fairly consistent average of flights through the King.

Thus, it is evident that schedules were still dependent on the same factors that made impossible their effectiveness during the preceding periods.

..... sometime during February, 1944, service was started to Asmara, Brittan, for the purpose of transporting personnel destined for the rest center in down-town Asmara. This service was titled the "Comuter," but no starting dates are available nor is the schedule of operations to this

61. Ibid.

62

installation to be found.

The only other new schedule was the "Comet" run to Karschi inaugurated on June 15, 1944, which has already been discussed.

63

62. Undated report entitled "Chronology of New Routes and Services from the United States through Africa to the Middle East," prepared by 1st Lt. Daniel W. Rohrbough, Asst Div Hist Officer, CEAD-ATC, forwarded to CG/AAF through CG/ATC.

63. Ibid. V. supra, p 48

CHAPTER V. PRIORITIES AND TRAFFIC

Priorities and Traffic activities of the Air Transport Command concern a wide variety of duties and responsibilities. These range from the responsibility of determining the need for transport services on the routes operated or to be operated by the ATC and the allocation of planes to the actual ticketing and manifesting of passengers and manifesting and waybilling of cargo and mail. Priorities and Traffic also determines how much ATC Service is required and between what points, by periodic contact with the users; i. e., Theater Commanders, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, (OPD/AGS), Air Staff, Government agencies; Army Service Forces and Air Technical Service Command, and by the approval of allocation to routes of number and type of aircraft suitable to traffic requirements, subject to operational practicability.

The effect of the foregoing should be to render it possible for the ATC to carry out more efficiently the duties imposed on it, but each division of function carries with it the necessity for close liaison and joint decision on certain matters. These matters in which joint decision are necessary are: capacity needed, and planes to be designated, housing and messing of transient passengers both within areas of concentration and at stations in the wing; physical layout of buildings in which both Supply and Services and P & T will perform the ground functions assigned to them in connection with the handling of passengers at an airport, and daily and continual agreement on the number of passengers receivable within an area or at a station where S & S is to house and mess such passengers, with any difference of opinion to be settled by higher authority.

Operations is concerned with flight operations, including the assign-

ment of crew members, dispatch of aircraft, in-flight control and maintenance and safety of aircraft. Priorities and Traffic of GAPP decided, within the limitations set by Operations, what passengers, cargo and mail would move; loaded the aircraft; tied-down where necessary; and briefed the passengers regarding contact while in flight. Thus close cooperation between the two sections was always necessary in order to best utilize space aboard aircraft and to distribute the distribution of operations of flights. The regulations governing cooperation between the PAT section and the Operations section were set forth in GAD Memorandum 39-1, January 25, 1944, as follows:

Priorities and Traffic is responsible for determining (1) the route between which services is required, (2) the volume and/or frequency thereof, and (3) the selection of traffic (i.e., passenger, cargo, and/or mail) to be carried; and shall maintain records, reports and contact sheets. Priorities and Traffic is also responsible for keeping Operations constantly informed of traffic requirements, whether involving special services, additional or non-regular traffic, etc.

It is the responsibility of Operations to determine the nature and volume of traffic to be received through the utilization of regular transport planes, and to coordinate the loading and capacity thereof. Operations shall be advised of the status of services to be received and of necessary work such as training; and Priorities and Traffic shall be advised of the requirements of the regions of an aircraft which is assigned to a flight, in the judgment of Operations, in order that its other duties. The aircraft commander shall be advised of traffic requirements and of the status of the services of Operations for the use of that aircraft with Priorities and Traffic. In all cases, procedures must be established so that Priorities and Traffic in Operations will keep each other informed of action being taken.

4. **Special Traffic Procedures**

In the rapid transportation by air of military cargo, all manner of

1. ATO msg 39-1, Jan 25, 1944, "Relationship between Priorities and Traffic and Operations," in GAD Central Files.

numerous problems were encountered in the Central African Wing. It was the responsibility of PAF officers to exercise judgment and ingenuity in the use of every means at their disposal to insure that no cargo could not be delayed. PAF officers had to discover methods of repacking, resecuring or partial dis-assembly with a view to a safe over-charge or too heavy shipments to be moved. In a word, however, certain weight limitations carried the acceptance of cargo which had to be observed as a policy. Some of these limitations were necessary for reasons of safety, and others because of the structural and dimensional limitations of the aircraft. Chief among these limitations were the handling of prohibitive materials such as acids, corrosives, liquids, and explosives, which were either prohibited or carried only in accordance with certain regulations.

It was also the responsibility of the PAF officials to monitor carefully the packing of cargo accepted for transportation at the air stations. Whenever possible, they had to advise shipper of these limitations. In cases where the shipper had packed cargo wrong, he had to be notified that it was necessary, but insisted that it was not necessarily possible for the carrier to accept his cargo; it was the responsibility of the PAF department to do so. Such was the case also when shipping containers were damaged enroute.

During the year from March, 1943, to March, 1944, there were developed many and diverse methods to bring about modifications to interested parties in the theater of consignments to them by air from the United States on air freight or command aircraft. Consignees and theater agencies on the one hand had a variety of agencies in the United States on the other,

Including the technical services supplying the theaters and water ports of embarkation, all at one time or another felt either a need to be notified or a responsibility to notify.

Officially, the technical services in the United States supplying cargo for air shipment to Africa could notify the theater of anticipated arrival of the cargo after receiving authority from the Air Transport Command. So far as could be ascertained as of March, 1944, no such technical services gave such notification nor did the Air Service Command. Unofficially, the water ports of embarkation evidenced interest and indicated that they had a responsibility in notifying theater consignees of all prospective air shipments to the theater, so far as material supplied by the Army Service Forces was concerned. Both the Air Service Command and water ports of embarkation desired not only information as to the time a shipment of air cargo was airwaybilled at a port of aerial embarkation, which was when it arrived there, but also when it was actually lifted. In the future (from March 1, 1944) it was planned to forward the shipper's copy of the airwaybill to the Air Service Command, in the case of supplies shipped by it, and in the case of all other Army supplies, to the water port of embarkation which would then notify the consignee and transmit the shipper's copy to the actual technical service which made the shipment. The main question to be resolved was whether the airwaybill would be forwarded by ATC at the time the cargo was airwaybilled or after the cargo had departed.

2. Ltr CE ATC to CG CAFV-ATC, March 25, 1944, "Notification to Theater Consignees - Shipments by ATC Outbound from the U.S.," in 583, CEAD Central Files.
3. Ibid.

A corollary problem was raised by the requirement that a copy of the airwaybill made out at the port of aerial embarkation be sent to the theater. As of March 1, 1944, such copy was only transmitted concurrently with the actual lifting of the cargo out of the port of embarkation. In addition, its exact routing had been the subject of previous discussions between ATC Headquarters and CAFI, and the resultant answers seemed to indicate not only little uniformity of suggested procedure but, in addition, raised doubts as to the usefulness of the whole practice. On the basis of past experience, it seemed desirable that actual consignees receive this theater copy of the airwaybill so that, in conjunction with messages received from the ABC or the water port of embarkation, they could insure that anticipated cargo had arrived and was available for them.

One of the strongest reasons for existing the theater agencies in this respect was that there had grown up in the Africa-Middle East Theater certain methods whereby the same complete information conveyed by the theater copy of the airwaybill was being mailed by certain of the shipping agencies in the United States. This duplication of effort could only be eliminated if the theater had interested consignees, were made aware of this entire procedure, and given understanding of the manner in which the theater airwaybill copies were to be routed and the information they contained.

ATC Headquarters therefore requested CAFI to contact the theater agency through which traffic originated from the United States was screened, and also contact the agency agencies transmitting the requisitions for air shipment, in order to clarify the whole subject. In connection with this,

AFC Headquarters desired to be informed of the following:

1. Whether the notification procedure to be given by the ALC after ports of embarkation should be given 48 hours in advance of the port of embarkation and in air-rail or after the cargo is air-railled but actually departed.
2. Whether the theater copy of the air-rail should be transmitted at the time the cargo is received at the port of embarkation and air-railled or concurrently with its departure.
3. Whether the ALC, in reply, concerning the information furnished by you, will submit a copy of the air-rail which will be distributed to the ALC selected with the knowledge of their interested parties so that no other reports will be necessary.

For the information and guidance of the ALC, it was noted in AFC Headquarters in respect to the problems raised was that notice should be given by the ALC of the cargo port of embarkation at the time the cargo is received at the port of embarkation, so that it would reach the theater before the ALC the dispatch a greater possibility of being alerted to expedite arrival.

In response to the inquiries of AFC Headquarters, discussions were held with the representatives involved in the ALC area. The principal representatives involved were the Chief of the Air Service, 1st AF, the 1st AF Liaison Section, 1st AF Liaison Section and under the supervision of the ALC, the theater area, and the 1st AF Liaison Section and under Headquarters, ALC, Greenville, North Carolina. These representative agencies agreed to the following:

4. Lead.
5. Lead.
6. 1st AF, CC 3AF-AFC to CC AFC, Apr 21, 1944, to Ltr CC AFC to CC 3AF-AFC, 4 Feb 25, 1944, "Notification to Theater Consulate--Shipments by ALC Outbound from the U.S.," in 303 3242 Central Files.

1. Notification given by IBC or water part of embarkation should be sent at the time cargo is received at the port of aerial embarkation and is airwaybilled.
2. Taster copy of the airwaybill should be forwarded at the time the cargo is received at the port of aerial embarkation.
3. The transmission of a radiogram and the forwarding of the master copy of the airwaybill will provide adequate advance notice of air shipment. They have agreed to notify the actual consignee when the consignee is other than one of these branches so that the consignee may be alerted well in advance of the arrival of the shipment.

Although we are ready and reluctant to discontinue the present notification procedure, it was agreed to try out the procedure recommended by GANT (attached) and report on the results in a few days.

As a report of the information received from GANT and other IBC units, IBC headquarters reported that all units except one of the units outlined below:

1. Ledger Receipt Method with the Airwaybill number, consignee of shipment, destination, weight, and other pertinent information on the receipt.
2. Cargo Receipt card which provided space for the ledger receipt number and the branch's permanent record of delivery in the files of the consignee or consignee's agent.

The attached Ledger Receipt Method, which was put into effect on April 15, 1944, was found to have been using a Ledger Receipt Form which was directed to be revised to conform with the uniform forms being planned for use all over the wing.

7. IBC to IBC to CC GANT, Apr 1, 1944, "Record of Delivery of Cargo to Consignee," in SAC, GANT Central Files.
8. IBC to CC GANT-IBC to COM all IBC units, Apr 7, 1944, "Record of Delivery of Cargo to Consignee." See Appendix XXVII

1. Transportation of Animals by Air

During the existence of ACP, the practice of carrying on board various types of live animals such as rodents to both air PVT and air Headquarters (PT), to include 14, 1943, ACP Headquarters definitely prohibited the transportation by air of live animals, birds, or reptiles. This was necessary mainly because the animals brought from foreign quarters to the United States are usually carriers, reservoirs or vectors of numerous infectious diseases, and serve as insect vectors of such diseases. The only exceptions to this directive were in cases where such animals were being brought to the United States for purposes of research or other governmental purposes. As with other such directives, this one was lifted on February 1, 1944, when ACP Headquarters advised that henceforwardly they were being dispensed where necessary and in the United States from abroad according to the ACP's policies, and as the ACP's new instructions were modified from those to the United States, the responsibility for such animals rested with the local office of the concerned office (St. Louis office of ACP). Details of this change are contained in the ACP's office of records:

On 2/1/44, the Director at Station 25, PVT office at St. Louis, advised that basic traffic policy that no live animals shall be permitted to board any plane accompanied by a live pet of any kind. It is believed that this policy has not been fully implemented and since all westbound passengers undergo a baggage inspection at this Station, it would seem difficult to smuggle live pets aboard airplanes.

9. Ltr CG ACP to CG CAPA-ATC, Apr 22, 1944, "Transportation of Animals by Air." See Appendix XXVIII

10. 2nd Ltr, CG CAPA-ATC to CG ACP, May 1, 1944, to Ltr CG ACP to CG CAPA-ATC, Apr 22, 1944, "Transportation of Animals by Air." See Appendix XXVIII

Upon further investigation, CAFW headquarters wrote to ATC headquarters that investigations seemed to reveal no instances of either passengers or crew members boarding planes in CAFW with live pets in their possession.

Captain Reynolds reported a little too soon, however, for a few days later, on May 18, 1944, he reported that on the preceding day a case where a passenger was carrying a pet had come to his attention. ¹¹
~~Lt~~ ^{Lieutenant} G. E. Williams, a B-24 pilot enroute to an overseas assignment, on arriving at Accra was found carrying a small water spaniel. He told Captain Reynolds that he had been given permission in the United States to carry the dog, although he could present no written evidence. However, the dog had been inoculated against rabies and distemper and the fact that the dog was on the plane appeared to be at least "prima facie" evidence that the lieutenant had not been prevented from carrying him. As Captain Reynolds had received no instructions to offload pets that had not been offloaded prior to leaving the States, he permitted Lieutenant Williams to carry the dog. A similar instance occurred on May 27, 1944, when ~~Lt~~ ^{Lieutenant} J. R. Specht arrived at Accra carrying a small black-and-white terrier. He also stated that he had received permission from Miami to carry the dog on the condition that the dog had been inoculated against rabies and distemper.

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In view of these two occurrences, Captain Reynolds stated:

The P&T Officer at this Station has not received authorization for either the destruction of, or maintenance of live pets which are taken from passengers. This makes it quite difficult to

11. Ltr Capt. Douglas H. Reynolds to CO CAFW-ATC, May 18, 1944, "Transportation of Pets." See Appendix XXIX.
12. Ltr Capt. Douglas Reynolds to CO CAFW-ATC, May 28, 1944, "Transportation of Animals by Air." See Appendix XXX.

abide by ATC directives. Furthermore, to prevent a passenger at this Station from onward carriage of a pet which he has been permitted to transport from the States, would serve to create a condition of ill-will and strained passenger relations, directly negating the program of passenger service which has been emphasized so much in recent months. Instructions from higher headquarters are requested on how this Station shall act in the event of similar occurrences in the future. Request also that action be taken to coordinate the subject ATC regulation with all stations between here and the States.

The South Atlantic Wing was immediately notified and asked to cooperate in abiding by the directive prohibiting the carrying of pets. As the pets were permitted to be carried from the States via SATW Stations, the Central African Wing had no jurisdiction over their arriving at Accra. The only solution was to have SATW prohibit the carrying of pets, thus making it unnecessary for CAFW to take them away from eastbound passengers.

13

Regarding the transportation of pets within the borders of CAFW and the transportation of them to the States, the wing on June 8, 1944, notified all CAFW Stations that the transportation of animal pets of any kind was prohibited and commanding officers of the stations were directed to dispose of any such pets found. In cases where the transportation of pets for scientific purpose was encountered, the final decision rested with wing headquarters and not with the stations.

14

B. Analysis of Priority and Traffic Problems

The following are summaries of some of the problems that faced CAFW Priorities and Traffic officials in the successful accomplishment of their mission. It is not feasible to summarize each irregularity, as most of them

13. Ibid.

14. Circular #27, CAFW-ATC, June 8, 1944. See Appendix XXXI

were due not to inefficiency of officials but to irregularities in the directives themselves, each station was guilty of errors, and the errors made totaled hundreds. The irregularities mentioned merely illustrate how, through a pooling of information, a study of preceding irregularities and the intelligence thus gained, the CAFW P&T Section was able to increase its efficiency.

Plane number 8584 arrived at Maiduguri on June 16, 1944, with 1363 pounds reserved for Colonel Kerr and his party, who were at Maiduguri awaiting transportation. Space was reserved at Accra, but Kano ignored the reservation and over-loaded the plane through Maiduguri with Priority 4 RAF stores destined for Cairo, which had to be pulled at Maiduguri to accommodate the party of Colonel Kerr. The reason for the irregularity was that Kano assumed that the flight would be contact day operation to El Geneina, which would allow a 6600 pound payload from Maiduguri to El Geneina. The load on the plane through Maiduguri after adding the RAF cargo at Kano was 5144 pounds, plus 1363 pounds reserved for Colonel Kerr at Maiduguri, making a total payload of 6507 pounds or 93 pounds under the contact day operation payload. However, when the plane departed from Maiduguri, an instrument gas load was carried, thus making the plane over-loaded and necessitating the removal of cargo, which was loaded at Kano, and at Maiduguri. To prevent a recurrence of such incidents it was recommended that when loading trans-African aircraft the instrument gas load should be taken into consideration and enough allowable poundage left to care for any increase¹⁵ weight.

15. AMEW Form TR-6 1st Lt. George B. Smith to CAFW Traffic Officer, June 17, 1944, in 583, CEAD Central Files.

Plane number 3662 arrived at Kano on June 26, 1944, with 29 pounds of cargo from Cairo and 3 pounds of mail from Khartoum which were all manifested to Kano but were not shown on the PLC when coming from Maiduguri to Kano. The total load on board was shown as 672 pounds, but should have been 704 pounds with 32 pounds for Kano and 672 for Accra. Maiduguri was at fault, and for this error all stations were reminded to use a little less speed and a little more thoroughness in the future. ¹⁶

Plane number 3676 arrived at Khartoum on July 7, 1944, with the manifest showing 177 pounds of blankets destined for Khartoum. When the plane arrived at Khartoum, however, there were only 77 pounds of blankets aboard. Investigation discovered that the 177 pounds of blankets were loaded when the plane left Accra; this was remembered especially by the sergeant who supervised the loading of the plane, as he had no blankets to give the passengers for their comfort. At the time Wing P&T was trying to secure more blankets to place on planes for passengers. On receipt of what was left of the cargo, Khartoum sent out tracers to locate the missing 100 pounds of blankets and a reply was received from Maiduguri stating that the blankets were scattered, and it appeared that the passengers had opened the cargo of blankets and had used them. All radio operators were warned against allowing this practice, and informed that P&T would soon have sufficient blankets to place on all planes for passengers. ¹⁷

When plane number 3654 arrived at Maiduguri from Accra, it was found necessary to unload 1300 pounds of cargo to find 40 pounds of baggage belonging to a passenger whose destination was Maiduguri. His bag was loaded

16. AMEW Form TR-6 Lt. Robert F. Schragle to CAFW Traffic Officer, June 26, 1944, in 583, CEAD Central Files.
17. AMEW Form TR-6, Capt Donald A. Noltmeyer to CAFW Traffic Officer, July 7, 1944, in 583, CEAD Central Files.

in the very bottom and rear of the belly compartment, with other baggage on top of it. This type of loading was apt to cause undue delays at stations like Maiduguri, where ground time was only 30 minutes. Loading crews were advised to check manifests carefully to place baggage in order of departure from the aircraft.

Plane number 0095 arrived at Accra from Benson Field on January 17, 1944, and the mail manifest from Benson failed to list two pieces of Diplomatic Mail from Washington to Chungking and one piece of Diplomatic Mail from Washington to Afghanistan. The manifest also listed 4 pieces of mail to Jerusalem and 6 pieces to Karachi when 5 pieces of each were received, the tags having been incorrectly affixed at Benson. It was thus seen that greater care was necessary in the preparation of mails from Benson Field. The reason for the error was that since there was no Postal Officer at Benson the mail was requested for carriage by ATC, by PAA operating clippers under Naval contract, Benson had nothing to do with the mail except fill out the manifest from the form handed them by PAA. To prevent a recurrence of this it was necessary to have a Postal Officer at Benson, but this was not practicable due to the size of the station. The only thing to do was to advise PAA to use greater care in preparing mail for shipment by ATC.

Reports received by CAFW headquarters in the early part of January, 1944, from the Inspector General's Office indicated that there was a very heavy increase in the loss of government property by ferrying pilots, tactical crew members and other military personnel through various stations over the CAFW route. These losses had steadily increased in spite of previous instructions issued during the existence of AMEW. Inspections and reports of

18. AMEW Form TR-6, Lt. George B. Smith to CAFW Traffic Officer, July 10, 1944, in 583 CEAD Central Files.
19. AMEW Form TR-6, 1st Lt. E. B. Kane to CAFW Traffic Officer, January 17, 1944, in 583 CEAD Central Files.

survey indicated that these losses were a direct result of continuous wanton carelessness on the part of the various military personnel charged with the custody of this property, and also lack of positive control and security measures at many stations. In view of this, CAFW headquarters directed that station commanders take the necessary action to provide a secure system for the safeguarding of all government and personal property in the custody of military personnel traveling through the wing. In addition, at all stations in the wing, a check room was provided and operated so that transient personnel could check valuable (not restricted) government and personal property, and be given a receipt or check for such property. 20

At Accra, the largest station in the Wing, the procedure was as follows:

1. A representative of Operations met all arriving tactical aircraft. At the time of briefing the crew as to billeting procedure, ETD, malarial precautions, etc., the arriving crew was advised as to the existence and location of the checkroom in the Terminal Building.
2. Operations then transported crew and baggage to the Transient Camp Office.
3. Transient Service representative registers the crew, assigned billets, and handled the checking of whatever equipment and baggage there was to be safeguarded.

As explained in the P&T Chapter of the History of the Africa-Middle East Wing, ATC had established definite limits for the amount of baggage to be carried on transport flights. This was done to make it possible not only to load the aircraft efficiently but also to prevent excess, ^{and} needless baggage from being carried. However, USAFIME was not completely in favor of this plan, as where orders directing the travel of personnel made no provisions for an excess baggage allowance, the shipment of baggage over the ^{fifty-five} 55 pound maximum had to be accomplished by land or water facilities, often resulting in

20. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, Jan 7, 1944, "Baggage and Equipment Check Room." See Appendix XXXII.

inordinate delays in delivery to personnel concerned. In order to alleviate the situation, USAFIME stated on January 21, 1944, that it would be their policy in the future, where a considerable hardship was imposed due to baggage limitation, to authorize an excess baggage allowance of not to exceed 125 pounds in travel orders that stated a change of station. This was in direct contradiction to War Department Circular 110, which CAFW was adhering to. Therefore, CAFW Headquarters stated in a letter to ATC Headquarters that since CAFW adhered to the 55 pound baggage limitation, there was no reason why USAFIME could not follow the same practice. It was later decided that this was to be the procedure.

C. Division of Weight and Balance Responsibilities

There were clearly defined responsibilities between Operations and Priorities and Traffic for the loading of aircraft on which cargo, mail, and passengers were carried; the distribution of the load aboard the aircraft, the weight and balance of the aircraft, and the jurisdiction of Weight and Balance Officers. Operations was responsible for the clearance and en route control of aircraft, for safety in flight, for specifying the maximum allowable payload, for the final certification and approval of load distribution, and the completion and approval of Weight and Balance Clearance Forms. Priorities and Traffic was responsible for the loading, handling, storage, distribution and tie-down of all material within the aircraft so as to meet the requirements of maximum allowable payload and correct weight and

- 21. Ltr CG USAFIME to CG WASC, Jan 21, 1944, "Shipment of Baggage."
See Appendix XXXIII.
- 22. Ltr CG CAFW-ATC to CG, ATC, Feb 18, 1944, "Shipment of Baggage."
See Appendix XXXIV.

balance. Priorities and Traffic was also responsible for the completion of Weight and Balance forms pertaining to the distribution of load by weight before final approval by Operations. Weight and Balance Officers were assigned to Operations, which exercised full jurisdiction over their functions. As can be seen from the above outline, close liaison had to be maintained between the two sections at all times with respect to all phases of loading, distribution, tie-down, and weight and balance in order that the work could be facilitated with a minimum of personnel and overlapping of functions.

In April, 1944, there was considerable confusion relative to loading equipment needed by and to be supplied to CAFW. From the 1943 production of the Plane Loader, Fork Lift, three units of this equipment were to be delivered to CAFW stations - two to Accra and one to Khartoum. The remaining units asked for were to go to the North African Wing. The Wing had requested more but because of the excessive requirements by various Air Forces, it was impossible to send more units. Also, CAFW asked for 20 units of high lift attachments for 6x6 trucks and for the same reason as mentioned before, was impossible to supply them. ATC headquarters finally decided to send only 5 units out of the requested 20, or 25 percent. However, it was possible for CAFW to augment their 1944 requirements for Plane Loaders, Fork Lift, of which they had asked for 20 to 31 units of this equipment, believed sufficient to efficiently handle operations. In view of the urgency of delivery to other wings and the other loading aids developed in the CAFW to assist forklifts,

23. ATC Memo, Feb 23, 1944, "Division of Weight and Balance Responsibility," in Publications Files, COMAD Central Files.

24. Ltr CG ATC to CO CAFW-ATS, Apr 8, 1944, "Plane Loading Equipment." See Appendix XXXV.

CAFW wrote to ATC Headquarters that they could operate satisfactorily on 18 Plane Loaders, Fork Lift and 5 high lift attachments for 6x6 trucks. As three of the Plane Loaders, Fork Lift, had already been provided for in the 1943 production schedule, it was thus necessary to send only 15 units out of the 1944 production. This solution to the problem was agreeable to ATC Headquarters, which on May 3, 1944 stated in a letter to CAFW:

Confirming request in preceding letter, fifteen (15) units of subject equipment are to be allocated to your Wing out of the 1944 production...shipping instructions have been issued for seven (7) units of subject equipment to be shipped to Accra....Contacts with the Army Service Forces indicate that the equipment has already departed from their depot and estimated transit time to Accra is approximately sixty (60) days. Present schedules indicate that the remaining eight units will come off the production line this month.

Another problem met during 1944 was the use of cargo tie-down chains on C-46 aircraft. When CAFW P&T Report Number 9, April 8, 1944, arrived in Washington, it was noticed that a priority had been recommended for thirty-seven Evans Tie-Down Kits for C-46 aircraft, together with an additional 1,000 pounds of cargo-tie-down chains. ATC headquarters recognized that there were occasions when the use of chain was necessary, but when certain pieces of wheeled equipment were transported, it was possible to secure the cargo with the skid chains which were a part of the material included with those types of equipment. Therefore, ATC headquarters desired to know if these chains would become an integral part of the Evans Kits or would be retained as station equipment to be used as the necessity arose. ATC headquarters believed that if CAFW could show conclusive proof that this amount of chain was necessary, then it was entirely possible that it could be included as a more or less standard item with the Evans Tie-Down Kits for use in all ATC Wings.

25. 2nd Ind., CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, May 3, 1944 to Ltr CG ATC, to CG CAFW-ATC, "Plane Loading Equipment," See Appendix XXXX

26. Ltr CO ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, Apr 25, 1944, "Shipping Information in Regard to Air Cargo Tie-Down Equipment." in 583.5, CEAD Central Files.

CAFW felt that there was a definite need for these chains throughout CAFW, as they would greatly simplify the task of loading and offloading of aircraft. They also could be used for the tying-down of certain items of heavy equipment, as demonstrated in the instruction manual for use of Evans equipment. They would be issued as station equipment and not as an integral part of the Kits, as their use would depend solely on the type of cargo to be handled. Following CAFW recommendations, ATC Headquarters authorized the use of chains.

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D. Mail Organization and Related Problems.

The function of the Army Courier Service was the safe and speedy transmission by officer courier of Secret and Confidential documents and material and of all classes of cryptographic material. During the first three months of 1944, the volume of matter transported by the ACS on ATC airplanes had reached such proportions that unless use of such service was limited to the absolute minimum, delays would result in the transmission of highly important urgent matter. Effective April 14, 1944, new rulings were issued to all CAFW stations that no Top Secret, Secret or Confidential matter, other than cryptographic material and aircraft manifests, presented to the ACS, would be dispatched by air unless it was indorsed "Air Service Required" and signed by either the Commanding Officer of CAFW, or the commanding officer of a station. Station Commanders were also reminded that if air transportation was not absolutely required surface transportation could handle the Courier Mail destined to points outside the Africa-Middle East Theater.

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As mail carried by the Army Courier Service was classified, extreme care had to be taken in case planes carrying such mail were forced down and

27. 1st Ind, CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, May 4, 1944, to ltr CG, ATC, to CO CAFW-ATC, Apr 25, 1944, "Shipping Information in Regard to Air Cargo Tie-Down Equipment," in 583.5 CEAD Central Files.
28. Ltr CG, USAFME to CO CAFW-ATC, Apr 14, 1944, "Army Courier Service." See Appendix XIV//.

partially destroyed, since it was necessary either to salvage the mail or to destroy it completely to prevent it falling into the hands of unauthorized persons. Such a case occurred in CAFW during 1944, when a C-54 airplane carrying 26 pouches of courier mail fell into about 50 feet of water approximately one mile off shore near Masirah Island, Arabia. Attempts were immediately made to salvage the plane and its contents, but proved futile. Therefore, CAFW asked permission from ATC headquarters in early May to destroy the remains of the plane by bombing, as the plane was disintegrating due to the monsoon weather conditions. ATC headquarters, however, had no authority to approve such action, as all cases of this kind were under the authority of the War Department General Staff. The case was referred to the WDGS, which stated:

The Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, interposes no objection to the suggestion...provided extreme caution is exercised to properly safeguard, salvage, or destroy any classified material which may be blasted loose in the operation.

CAFW was informed as to the decision, and the bombing operation was successfully carried out. Similar instances occurred during CAFW, and they are treated in the accident report section of the CAFW, History of Operations. The above incident is noteworthy in that it again shows the extreme necessity for close cooperation between the various sections of the wing organization. P&T had overall charge of the cargo, Intelligence and Security had the responsibility for providing security, and had the responsibility for seeing

- 29. Ltr CG ATC to WDGS, May 10, 1944, "Destruction of Courier Mail." See Appendix XXIV
- 30. 1st Ind., WDGS to CG ATC, May 12, 1944, to ltr CG ATC to WDGS, May 10, 1944, "Destruction of Courier Mail." See Appendix XXIV

that the task of destroying the plane was accomplished.

Not only was it of paramount importance to make sure that in cases of crashed planes the confidential information was either destroyed or salvaged, but also of prime importance was the protection of mail from pilferage. During the first four months of 1944, several instances of suspected thievery were discovered in the wing, and on May 31, 1944, the station commanding officers were directed to take whatever steps were necessary to assure that theft of mail or cargo would not occur at their stations. ³¹ These necessary steps included the placing of an armed guard on every transport aircraft while it was on the ground, establishing a better and more secure method of warehousing, offloading originating, or transit, mail or cargo awaiting air transportation, establishing more adequate supervision over those persons, including native personnel, who had access to the mail storeroom or to the loaded aircraft while it was on the ground, and instructing radio operators to make a visual check of mail pouches while in flight for evidence of pilfering. Station P&T Officers were also directed to make an immediate and complete visual check of all mail pouches as soon as the planes arrived at a station. This inspection was to be made immediately prior to the departure of the aircraft. All stations were directed to make periodic reports to wing headquarters outlining the procedures that were taken to assure the adequate protection of mail. On June 12, 1944, Station Number Three, Accra ³² Airbase reported as directed:

Within the past few months several instances of theft and pilferage have been reported by the Air Freight Depot at this Station. The instances reported were thefts and pilfering of small shipments of PX watches, GI watches, cigarette lighters, and other PX shipments. The general

31. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, May 31, 1944, "Protection of Mail." See Appendix XXXVIII.
32. Ltr Capt Douglas H. Reynolds to CO CAFW-ATC, June 12, 1944, "Suggested Action for Prevention of Pilfering of Small, Valuable Cargo Shipments." See Appendix XXXIX.

nature of all these instances indicates that the thief watches for light weight shipments which are indicated on the airwaybill to have contents of a relatively high intrinsic value and readily saleable in the black market... Each instance of theft and pilferage has been reported to the Base Provost Marshal but efforts to apprehend the perpetrator of these crimes have been unsuccessful.

From the evidence in cases of this kind, it could naturally be assumed that someone in a relatively responsible position was the criminal, as native personnel had little opportunity to study the contents of all shipments and with the system of gate security would have an even harder time secreting the articles and carrying them off the post. However, with adequate protection by armed guards of shipments of mail and cargo known to be relatively saleable, the number of instances of this kind was reduced.

That the problem was of theater-wide importance was made evident when on July 21, 1944, USAFIME Headquarters wrote to CAFW Headquarters about the security of mail. In their letter, USAFIME stated:

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Every effort is being made by the Army Postal Service in the command to insure protection of registered mails and prevent any recurrence of the deprecations that have been reported at various times in the past year. In most instances deprecations have been committed by cutting a slit in registered mail pouches with a sheaf knife or a similar instrument and then extracting small parcels, refilling them of their contents, and then replacing the wrappers or containers in the pouches. It is considered that fixing responsibility upon one individual at all times is necessary for the complete protection of registered mail during the period such is in custody of the carrier. This requires the giving and taking of hand receipts when registered mail is turned over to the carrier; and thereafter at every transfer in the same manner as prescribed for handling courier mail... The adoption of a courier receipt system by the ATC for safeguarding registered mail is desired in this theater to supplement the efforts of the Army Postal Service. Such a system should be rigidly enforced at all stations and should cover transmission by tactical aircraft carrying mail.

In their reply, ATC officials in Africa stated that registered mail

33. Ltr CG USAFIME to CO CAFW-ATC, July 21, 1944, "Registered Mail."
See Appendix XE.

pouches were receipted for at point of origin by a station Postal Officer or in his absence by a representative of the P&T Director. Also, as a security measure, each station placed an armed guard on every transport aircraft while it was on the ground. He was present when mail was off-loaded and accompanied it between the plane and the warehouse, where a guard was maintained at all times. ³⁴

It is gratifying to note that from the time the security program was stepped-up on June 1, 1944, until the end of July, 1944, there were no depredations of mail reported in the wing. Mailing procedures had been changed in order to expedite the delivery of official correspondence and to provide security by removing from Army Courier Service Channels all Top Secret and cryptographic mail. Such correspondence was mailed in CAFW sealed pouches: these canvas pouches were made by the 8th ADG at Accra and were distributed to all stations in the wing. ³⁵

E. P&T Responsibilities for Passenger Comfort.

In order to alleviate hardship to crews and passengers on long ATC flights, caused by lack of hot beverages and food in flight, ATC Headquarters directed the wing on November 1, 1943 to institute immediately a program for providing in-flight meals at all stations where combat aircraft or transport aircraft were serviced and operated. These in-flight lunches were to be provided on all flights anticipated to be of five hours duration or more and for each successive period of five hours. Meals were

34. 1st Ind., CO CAFW-ATC to CG USAFIME, August 13, 1944, to ltr CG USAFIME to CO CAFW-ATC, July 21, 1945, "Registered Mail." See Appendix XL.
35. Monthly Historical Report, CAFW-ATC, ^{for} July 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

furnished in the form of Army rations or box lunches and included five ounces of hot coffee or other hot beverage and fifteen ounces of fresh water or fruit-flavored water per person. In the event that stops were made on a flight where adequate messing facilities were available, however, no in-flight lunches were to be provided. As an additional passenger comfort and safety measure no passengers were permitted to embark on a flight totaling five hours or more unless provisions had been made for the in-flight lunches.

In the main, in-flight lunches were to be procured from government messes. However, in the event they were procured from caterers, it was the duty of the purchasing officer to pay the caterer for such lunches. If the government provided the lunches, appropriate deductions were made from any per diem prescribed in accordance with Army Regulations. Those passengers for whom no per diem was prescribed, the agency issuing travel orders was to make the necessary provisions in such orders for furnishing meals en route. The Priorities and Traffic Section was responsible for the following: that portable liquid containers on incoming aircraft be checked against the pilot's records and delivered to the Service Officer, that emergency rations and water supply on incoming aircraft be checked at once upon arrival, that deficiencies be remedied and that rations be checked again immediately before departure, that the Service Officer be notified of the scheduled time of departure of all aircraft, of the number of passengers and crew members and of the probable flight duration involved in sufficient

36. ATC Reg #75-3, Nov 1, 1945, "In-Flight Meals," in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.

time to permit the preparation and delivery of in-flight meals. The Service Officer was responsible for seeing that portable liquid containers of incoming aircraft received from the P&T Officer be properly cleaned and safety stored until next use, that portable liquid containers be properly prepared, filled and delivered to the P&T Officer shortly before the departure of aircraft, that the required payments for in-flight meals be collected prior to departure of aircraft and deposited with the Mess Officer or Post Exchange Officer for payment to the agency supplying food. The close cooperation necessary between the P&T Section and the Service Section of S&S thus can be seen. If the officer in charge of the respective section failed to meet his responsibilities in connection with in-flight lunches, there was a strong possibility that such lunches would not be provided.

On April 18, 1944, additional instructions were issued by wing headquarters on in-flight meal procedure. Hot coffee was to be carried on all flights of CAFW planes and contract carriers. The coffee was to be black, with sugar and milk separate. This differed from earlier procedure in that it provided liquid refreshment for all flights, regardless of duration. The in-flight meals themselves were to be served on the following CAFW transport flights:

Roberts Field to Ascension	Maiduguri to Wadi
Roberts Field to Natal	Seidna (non-stop)
Accra to Ascension	Wadi Seidna to Maidu-
Accra to Leopoldville	guri (non-stop)
Accra to Maiduguri (non-stop)	Wadi Seidna to Nairobi
Kano to El Geneina (non-stop)	Wadi Seidna to Cairo
Maiduguri to Accra (non-stop)	Aden, eastbound
	Masirah, westbound
	(K ration)

In order to insure the smooth and efficient handling of in-flight meals and beverages, certain CAFW staff sections were given definite

37. Ibid.

28. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, Apr 18, 1944, "In-Flight Meal Procedure." See Appendix XII.

responsibilities. The P&T Officer was to notify the Service Officer in writing of the number of in-flight meals required for both crews and passengers of transport planes. He was to notify the Service Officer far enough in advance to permit proper preparation of such meals. The Operations Officer was to notify the Service Officer of the number of in-flight meals required for ferry crews and for combat crews. In the planes themselves, the radio operator would perform the duties of flight traffic clerk for transport flights. It was his duty not only to make sure that in-flight meals were on the plane but also to distribute in-flight meals and police the refuse after the meals had been finished, to eliminate any possible fire hazard arising from scattered waste. The Service Officer had charge of preparing the meals and also collecting the charge of twenty-five cents from each passenger, with the exception of enlisted men, who received their meals gratis if provisions were so made on their travel orders. The control of the thermos containers was placed in the hands of the radio operator during flight, and he was obligated to sign a receipt for it before leaving the ground. On arrival at a station, he was to turn the containers over to the Service Officer and in turn would receive a receipt for the delivery. However, this was not the case at turn-around stations such as Cairo, Dakar and Karachi. At these stations the radio operator would retain control of the thermos containers and would merely make certain that they were filled for the return trip. This detailed procedure was found to work excellently in the CAFW, and the occasions were rare when passengers did not have the benefits of hot beverages and in-flight meals during their journeys across the air routes of Africa.

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As had been seen in the development of the in-flight lunch program, close coordination was necessary between the staff sections of Operations,

Priorities and Traffic, and Supply and Services to adequately provide for efficient service. This was also true in a more general manner in the relations of P&T to other sections, in fulfilling the mission of the Command. Priorities and Traffic had the continuous responsibility for all phases of passenger traffic movement on ATC flights from the time priority was established until the passenger's final ATC destination was reached, but it also had the responsibility of coordinating with each organization of the command concerning the traffic phases of their responsibilities, to the end that close working relationship be maintained. P&T worked with the communications section of operations with respect to traffic messages, such as the arrival and departure of VIPs, close cooperation was maintained with the maintenance section of operations with respect to changes in the design of the interior of aircraft which affected passengers, such as seats, litters, laboratories, heaters, etc., and in the maintenance of such equipment. ⁴⁰ Operations was contacted with respect to the placement of passengers in the cabin, governed by weight and balance consideration, and in the scheduling or diversion of flights and use of equipment. Liaison was maintained with supply and services with respect to processing of passengers, holding them in staging areas, and messing, billeting, and transportation of passengers laying over at stations en route, and the accurate loading of fuel to determine the load to be carried by the airplane. In addition, P&T controlled the arrival of ATC passengers at ATC stations in accordance with the traffic schedules and capacity available for processing and handling as reported by S&S. P&T informed S&S as to when passengers were to be told to report to S&S for the processing assigned to that section, and when they were going to be turned

40. ATC Reg #15-6, Jan 11, 1944, "P&T Passenger Responsibilities," in CEAD Central Files.

over to P&T for such processing as was to be done by P&T, and for loading. P&T was responsible for the ticketing and manifesting, including the weighing of baggage, which had originally been checked for limitations by S&S, and they were also responsible for supervising clearance through Customs, Immigration, Bureaus of Public Health, and for clearing with intelligence agencies. Too, P&T acted as a clearing house for passenger complaints and recommendations, and steered those complaints and recommendations to the section that was concerned with them. Thus, P&T, although a separate section, was dependent on the efficient functioning of each other section for efficient operations of its own.

One of the important responsibilities of P&T was determining the number of persons to be carried in ATC transport type aircraft. It was difficult to set definite standards, as the normal operating standards for flight were subject to change due to emergencies. However, it was possible to establish standards for normal operating conditions, and on March 22, 1944, this was accomplished:⁴² The C-54 series of aircraft were to have a normal passenger load of thirty (30); the C-87 series twenty (20) passengers; the C-46 series, twenty-four (24) passengers; and the C-47 series, twenty-four (24) passengers. Exceptions to the limitations specified could only be made by wing commanders in the case of urgent military necessity. In no case would exceptions be made for the purpose of relieving routine backlog. As was mentioned, emergencies might arise when these standards would have to be changed. Four definite rules were that the authorized gross weight of the aircraft was not to be exceeded, sufficient emergency supplies and equipment were to be provided for, appropriate

41. Ibid.

42. ATC Memo #56.7, March 3, 1943, "Number of Persons to be Carried in ATC Transport Type Aircraft, in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.

to the terrain and geographical area, to accommodate the full number of persons aboard; provisions were to be made for a seat and seat belt for each person aboard the aircraft, and established priorities were to be considered. However, in most instances it was found possible to conform to established standards without too much difficulty.

F. Procedure for Return by Air of Individuals to the United States.

On January 1, 1944, instructions were issued by the War Department relative to the procedures to be adopted for returning individuals to the United States by ATC aircraft. For the most part, the instructions were consistent with established priority practices in use by CAFW, but of special interest were paragraphs 5e and 7, which would possibly be misinterpreted by P&T officers. Paragraph 5e is quoted below:

5. The selection of individuals to be returned to the United States will be governed by the following War Department policies:

- e. Individuals other than in categories above will be selected by overseas commanders for return by air in accordance with priorities established by agreement between overseas commanders and the theater representative of the Air Transport Command.

The categories mentioned in the above paragraph included ferrying personnel, individuals returning as tactical crew members, individuals returned for the purpose of furlough or leave of absence upon authorization, and individuals directed by name by the War Department to return by air in connection with special missions. Paragraph 7, gave instructions for making arrangements for air transportation for those not covered above. For these individuals air transportation was to be furnished only to the extent that through passage could be accomplished without reasonable delay en route, or

43. Ltr CG ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, Jan 15, 1944, "Procedure for Return by Air of Individuals to the United States," in 584.6, CEAD Central Files.

otherwise to those enroute points outside the continental United States from which adequate water transportation was available. Also, such air transportation was to be furnished only to the extent that space might be available after other military requirements were accommodated.

The fear that these two paragraphs, 5e and 7, might possibly be misinterpreted, arose from the fact that undesirable situations might arise at CAFW stations along the route and especially at points beyond which the amount of airplane space accommodation was materially reduced. It was the responsibility of P&T officers of the wing to ascertain the movement and backlog situation along the routes and to advise the overseas commander as to what space was available. To do this, the P&T officer at originating points of the wing had to receive certain minimum information from control stations at the critical portions of the return route and other strategic points. P&T officers of the wing, therefore, were encouraged to exchange information and make arrangements with adjacent wings to obtain and receive information regarding backlogs and passenger space available, and act according to the information, so that commitments for through space to the United States could be made without undue delays and unreasonable backlogs of traffic en route. It was also suggested by wing headquarters that the P&T officers at stations adjacent or near water ports become familiar with the availability of surface transportation and advise originating stations, when asked for such information, as to what air-water transportation could be effected expeditiously.

Procedures were also necessary for passengers traveling from the United States to overseas destinations. In June, 1944, an agreement was drawn up between the NDGS, the Department of State, and the Air Transport Command which required that all requests for civilian air travel from the United States be screened through the Department of State, except for employees of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the War and Navy Departments, or officials traveling on official business at the specific request of these departments. ⁴⁴ Although the agreement stated that the State Department would screen priority requests to Africa or through Africa, where this was considered desirable, it was recognized that in some instances overseas theaters would desire that priority air transportation be granted to specific individuals the need for whose services in the theater was known to be essential to the war effort, and the need for whose services was known to be so urgent and immediate that their prompt transportation by air from the United States to the theater was necessary. In such cases, the theater priority board could establish priority. However, theaters should refuse to grant priority for other than those individuals mentioned above, in order to avoid embarrassing and confusing situations such as had arisen in the past. A case had occurred when a priority for air travel was refused in the United States after careful investigation of the need for such travel, only to have such subsequently authorized by the theater priorities board in response to an application submitted in the theater. Such a case occurred in Africa in June, 1943, when government officials in Cairo had the habit of requesting priorities for civilians to enter the United States for conferences and the like. Several times embarrassing situations arose, as the State Department refused to grant priority, after the individuals had travelled many miles to Cairo, in the belief that air transportation awaited them at that point. ⁴⁵

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G. Traffic Statistics for CAFW.

The following figures show the monthly traffic handled by CAFW from December, 1943, to June, 1944. As can readily be seen, there was no great increase in the number of passengers carried, the amount of cargo carried, or the amount of mail carried over the Central African routes. In fact,

44. Ltr CG ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, June 26, 1944, "Civilian Air Travel to Overseas Destinations," in 584.6, CEAD Central Files.

45. Ibid.

46. The figures tabulated in the following ^{101-117,} pages were taken from "Operations and Traffic Reports of CAFW", in Statistical Control Files, CEAD Central Files.

while passengers and cargo carried fluctuated only slightly, the amount of mail carried over CAFW routes decreased well over 100% from December to June. There were 4,534 passengers carried in December, 1943, and 4,575 carried in June, 1944; an increase of only 41 passengers. There was 1,490,140 pounds of cargo carried in December, 1943, and 1,734,751 pounds carried in June, 1944; an increase of 244,611 pounds, but a decrease under the May, 1944, total of 1,855,168 pounds. The total figures also show how slight the actual gain in traffic for CAFW was, as in December, 1943, the total passengers, cargo, and mail carried totaled 2,921,968 pounds, while in June, 1944, the total was 2,950,472 pounds, an increase of 28,504 pounds, or only .0093% of the December, 1943, total.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>MAIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
December 1943	4,534	1,490,140	385,287	2,921,968
January 1944	4,499	1,407,140	271,879	2,738,853
February 1944	4,830	1,318,696	265,629	2,714,123
March 1944	5,014	1,147,463	236,958	3,099,506
April 1944	3,409	1,501,501	104,528	2,356,776
May 1944	5,049	1,855,168	176,595	3,132,086
June 1944	4,575	1,734,751	154,933	2,950,472
Totals	31,920	10,455,522	1,595,809	19,913,784

The greatest amount of traffic carried over CAFW routes was on the route from Accra to Khartoum to Karachi. From Accra, traffic also was carried north to the NAFW station at Dakar, and south from Accra to the Belgian Congo and Nairobi, Kenya. From Khartoum, routes went to Cairo, also under the jurisdiction of NAFW, and south to Nairobi. For the most part, outbound traffic exceeded inbound traffic; however, for June, 1944, the traffic coming west exceeded the traffic going east. The following is a monthly recapitulation of both inbound and outbound traffic at Accra, the focal point of the wing. Complete figures were not available for April, 1944, but enough material was present for this month to adequately show the extent of CAFW operations.

December 1943Total Traffic

<u>Outbound</u>	<u>No. Pax</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Accra-Khartoum	1,028	474,580	117,964	843,295
Khartoum-Cairo	327	30,064	17,512	118,595
Asmara-Cairo		17,180		17,180
Khartoum-Karachi	358	215,229	52,864	352,261
Khartoum-Nairobi	5	130	5	1,212
Accra-Nairobi	44	2,180	1,677	13,349
Accra-Dakar	538	108,823	85,427	327,739
Karachi-Points East	20	1,068	4,250	10,185
Total Outbound	2,320	849,254	279,699	1,683,816
<u>Inbound</u>	<u>No. Pax</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Khartoum-Accra	828	299,402	34,796	518,942
Cairo-Khartoum**				
Karachi-Khartoum	1,132	283,848	50,750	589,921
Nairobi-Khartoum	33	1,235	20	8,741
Nairobi-Accra	32	4,018		10,622
Dakar-Accra	170	41,000	18,223	91,444
Points East-Karachi	19	11,383	1,799	18,442
**NAFW Figures				
Total Inbound	2,214	640,886	105,588	1,238,152
Total All Routes	4,534	1,490,140	385,287	2,921,968

Of the total passengers outbound carried in December, 59.7% were on the Accra-Karachi route, 14% on the Khartoum-Cairo route and 23.1% on the Accra-Dakar route. Of the outbound cargo carried, 81% went from Accra to Karachi, 3.5% went from Khartoum to Cairo, and 12.6% went from Accra to Dakar. Approximately 62% of the outbound mail went from Accra to Karachi, 6.2% went from Khartoum to Cairo, and 30.6% went from Accra to Dakar. These three outbound routes carried 96.8% of the total passengers, 97% of the cargo and 98.8% of the mail over CAFW routes for December, 1943.

<u>January 1944</u>		<u>Total Traffic</u>		
<u>Outbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Accra-Khartoum	1,428	358,269	108,759	820,512
Khartoum-Cairo	257	43,883	11,602	111,232
Asmara-Cairo		16,081	316	16,398
Khartoum-Karachi	423	118,599	27,104	246,085
Khartoum-Nairobi	6	3,212	116	4,680
Accra-Nairobi	33	1,438	163	8,792
Accra-Dakar	351	115,374	18,510	215,898
Total Outbound	2,498	656,857	166,570	1,423,597
<u>Inbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Khartoum-Accra	763	240,699	38,021	458,770
Cairo-Khartoum**				
Nairobi-Khartoum	36	178		8,000
Karachi-Khartoum	1,081	464,143	61,798	770,836
Nairobi-Accra	39	4,477	110	13,576
Dakar-Accra	82	41,439	5,380	64,074
Total Inbound	2,001	750,936	105,309	1,315,256
**NAFW Took credit for loading at Cairo				
Total All Routes	4,499	1,407,793	271,879	2,738,853

There was a .0077% decrease in the number of passengers carried in January under that of December. The amount of cargo carried decreased .055% from that of December and mail decreased 29% from that of December. Again the three largest channels were Accra-Karachi, Accra-Dakar and Khartoum-Cairo, although inbound figures from Cairo were not available since NAFW handled the complete cargo loading and statistical operation at this station.

<u>February 1944</u>		<u>Total Traffic</u>		
<u>Outbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Accra-Khartoum	1,640	454,076	95,061	942,720
Khartoum-Cairo	229	18,392	14,424	82,270
Khartoum-Karachi	368	92,583	18,230	197,461
Nairobi-Khartoum	6			1,275
Accra-Nairobi	3	2,247	239	3,130
Accra-Dakar	309	83,570	15,643	170,549
Total Outbound	2,555	650,868	143,597	1,397,405

<u>Inbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Khartoum-Accra	961	269,399	36,641	533,462
Cairo-Khartoum**				
Karachi-Khartoum	1,205	364,829	80,500	722,186
Nairobi-Khartoum	19	95	136	4,429
Nairobi-Accra	3	2,600	81	3,341
Dakar-Accra	87	30,905	4,674	53,300
Total Inbound	2,275	667,828	122,032	1,316,718
**NAFW took credit for loading at Cairo				
Total All Routes	4,830	1,318,696	265,629	2,714,123

There was an .068% increase in the number of passengers carried from January to February, an .063% decrease in cargo carried, and an .022% in mail carried.

March 1944Total Traffic

<u>Outbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Accra-Khartoum	1,864	668,397	89,273	1,216,061
Khartoum-Cairo	214	41,485	5,947	99,161
Karachi-Khartoum	376	101,630	20,660	200,862
Accra-Nairobi	23	4,070	1,476	10,705
Accra-Dakar	203	78,915	25,544	154,041
Total Outbound	2,680	894,497	142,900	1,680,830
<u>Inbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Khartoum-Accra	740	363,485	19,928	544,855
Cairo-Khartoum**				
Karachi-Khartoum	1,498	422,045	69,860	814,082
Nairobi-Khartoum	20	3,132	220	7,469
Nairobi-Accra	2	450	21	926
Dakar-Accra	74	31,476	4,029	51,344
Total Inbound	2,334	820,588	94,058	1,418,676
Total All Routes	5,014	1,715,085	236,958	3,099,506

There was an .036% increase in passengers carried in March over that of February, and an .0230% increase in cargo, but mail poundage fell off 28,671 pounds for a decrease of .107%.

Complete figures for inbound and outbound flow of traffic by channels is not available for April, 1944, but figures available are given and show

the totals for both inbound and outbound traffic and the grand total of both inbound and outbound.

April 1944

<u>Outbound</u>		<u>Inbound</u>		<u>Total All Routes</u>
Passengers	1,699	Passengers	1,710	3,409
Cargo	806,940	Cargo	694,561	1,501,501
Mail	80,343	Mail	24,185	104,528
<u>Total Outbound</u>		<u>Total Inbound</u>		<u>2,356,776</u>

There was a .319% decrease in passengers carried in April from the figure for March, a .125% decrease in cargo carried and a .506% decrease in mail. These figures show that April was the first month of CAFW operations in which all three branches showed a decrease. This average decrease for all three branches was 31.66%, the greatest of any month.

May 1944

<u>Outbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Total Traffic</u>		
		<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Accra-Khartoum	1,293	600,202	61,393	954,912
Khartoum-Cairo	119	34,219	10,829	72,233
Khartoum-Karachi	344	148,199	11,014	229,909
Accra-Nairobi	38	5,380	2,018	16,614
Accra-Dakar	257	111,503	9,016	183,242
<u>Total Outbound</u>	<u>2,051</u>	<u>899,423</u>	<u>94,270</u>	<u>1,456,910</u>

Inbound

Khartoum-Accra	960	479,922	16,494	700,821
Cairo-Khartoum**				
Karachi-Khartoum	1,837	446,684	62,834	894,780
Nairobi-Khartoum	10	1,048	112	3,688
Dakar-Accra	191	28,091	2,885	75,887

Total Inbound 2,998 955,745 82,325 1,675,176

**NAFW took credit for Loading At Cairo

Total All Routes 5,049 1,855,168 176,595 3,132,086

In comparing the traffic figures for April and May, 1944, it is noticeable that the number of passengers carried was the highest since the activation of CAFW. A total of 5,049 passengers was carried, 1640 more than were carried in April or 32.4%. The highest previous number of

passengers carried was in March, 1944, when 5,014 passengers flew over CAFW routes. The amount of cargo carried was also the highest, as 353,667 more pounds were carried than in April (18.9%) and 140,083 more pounds were carried than the previous high total of March, 1944. Although the amount of mail carried was 40.7% greater than that of April, it was far under the totals of all other months of CAFW. The highest total was in December, 1943, when 385,287 pounds were carried. The reason for the decline during 1944 was the fact that the North African Wing was becoming increasingly more important than the Central African Wing, and much of the mail traffic was going over the northern route.

June 1944Total Traffic

<u>Outbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Accra-Khartoum	1,754	780,295	73,718	1,270,582
Khartoum-Cairo	170	27,655	7,049	73,977
Khartoum-Karachi	440	137,560	8,323	237,380
Accra-Nairobi	26	5,191	1,157	11,964
Accra-Dakar	241	74,471	7,547	137,259
<u>Total Outbound</u>	2,361	1,027,172	97,794	1,731,162
<u>Inbound</u>	<u>No. Pax.</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Mail</u>	<u>Total</u>
Khartoum-Accra	559	250,572	11,245	380,099
Cairo-Khartoum**				
Karachi-Khartoum	1,559	409,696	51,978	777,053
Nairobi-Khartoum	13	2,409	88	5,514
Dakar-Accra	83	34,902	3,828	56,644
<u>Total Inbound</u>	2,214	697,579	67,139	1,219,310
**NAFW took credit for Loading at Cairo				
<u>Total All Routes</u>	4,575	1,724,751	154,933	2,950,472

In June the number of passengers carried dropped below the May total. This decrease was 474 passengers, or 9.3%. Cargo also fell off from the May totals when 1,855,168 pounds of cargo travelled over CAFW routes: the June cargo total was 120,417 less than that of May, or 6.5%. The drop in mail continued during June: the total was 21,642 pounds less than May, or 12.3%.

1. Monthly Totals of Cargo Loaded and Unloaded by Stations

The following figures show the breakdown of cargo loaded and unloaded at CAFW stations in order to augment the preceding statistics of cargo loaded and unloaded on the wing level. These stations' figures serve to show the following important facts: the importance of each station as contrasted with the other stations; the rise and decline of station traffic, illustrating the growing importance or decline of the station, for example, when the Rest Center was constructed and used at Asmara, the traffic totals for this station increased well over 100%; and the strain placed on the station sections, particularly Transient Services, Operations, and Priorities and Traffic. Little explanation is needed about the statistics, as only on the wing level do statistics show the importance of the wing not only in the mission of the Air Transport Command but in the successful conduct of the war as well. As was only natural, the two stations of Accra and Khartoum provided the majority of traffic figures.

Accra, besides being wing headquarters, was also the headquarters of the West African Service Command and the 8th Air Depot Group, whose missions were to provide supplies and services for the CAFW. In addition, Accra was the African terminus of much of the South Atlantic traffic destined for the Middle East and India. From this station routes extended to Dakar, where connection was made with the North African Wing of the ATC, and south to the Belgian Congo, Kenya, and South Africa.

Khartoum maintained the position of being the second most important station in the wing because of its location. At Khartoum sub-headquarters were located of both the Service Command and the Air Service Command. From here a route extended to Cairo and another south to Kenya Colony and South

47. The statistics used in the following pages were taken from Statistical Control Files, CEAD Central Files.

Africa. Through Khartoum passed the traffic destined for India from Accra and through Khartoum passed traffic destined for the United States from the Far East. The majority of the other stations were intermediate points on the Central African route with Accra and Khartoum as focal points.

Between Accra and Khartoum were Kano, Maiduguri, El Geneina, El Fasher, and between Khartoum and Karachi were Aden, Salala, Asmara, and Masirah Island. Lagos was used mainly because it was an ocean terminus, and from here the Nigerian railroad went to the stations of Kano and Maiduguri. The stations in Liberia were intermediate points between Accra and Dakar, with the exception of Benson Field, where connections were made with the trans-Atlantic service of Pan American. The stations on the Southern Route decreased in importance in the early part of 1943, but periodic flights were still made for mail service, recreation and for diplomatic reasons.

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
MONTHLY TOTAL OF CARGO LOADED AND UNLOADED BY STATION
for month ending 31 January 1944

<u>STATION</u>		<u>NO. OF PAX.</u>	<u>F & B WT.</u>	<u>CARGO WT.</u>	<u>MAIL WT.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
#3 Accra	Loaded	2,603	635,607	875,380	189,696	1,700,623
	Unloaded	2,489	594,333	770,033	182,719	1,547,085
#4 Aden	Loaded	197	45,190	96,404	5,951	147,545
	Unloaded	260	59,152	58,488	4,665	122,305
#5 El Fasher	Loaded	86	19,088	8,724	1,534	29,346
	Unloaded	90	20,155	25,694	2,381	48,230
#6 El Geneina	Loaded	59	13,120	1,478	420	15,018
	Unloaded	64	14,609	23,630	1,196	39,435
#8 Asmara	Loaded	146	33,183	59,322	5,069	97,574
	Unloaded	110	24,879	19,682	5,082	49,643
#9 Kano	Loaded	97	21,629	90,039	4,181	115,849
	Unloaded	82	18,486	21,624	5,063	45,173
#10 Khartoum	Loaded	1,063	250,454	242,669	54,437	547,560
	Unloaded	1,172	293,924	198,443	61,404	553,771
#11 Lagos	Loaded	43	9,460	14,776	17,892	42,128
	Unloaded	29	6,511	8,596	1,022	16,129
#12 Maiduguri	Loaded	171	37,765	13,267	3,768	54,800
	Unloaded	161	36,381	19,808	4,784	60,973
#13 Masira Is.	Loaded	168	35,887	30,571	314	66,772
	Unloaded	137	30,865	83,755	786	115,405
#14 Roberts	Loaded	149	32,243	50,051	3,511	85,805
	Unloaded	137	32,014	18,921	3,389	54,324
#15 Salala	Loaded	70	15,206	7,478	134	22,818
	Unloaded	68	15,312	32,451	459	48,222
Benson and Cape Palmas	Loaded	49	9,475	703	2,660	12,838
	Unloaded	37	6,343	5,557	219	12,119
Southern Route Stations	Loaded	84	18,775	4,680	110	23,565
	Unloaded	56	12,272	5,703	282	18,257
TOTAL CAFW	Loaded	4,985	1,177,082	1,495,542	289,677	2,962,301
	Unloaded	4,892	1,165,236	1,292,385	273,451	2,731,072
TOTAL HANDLED		9,877	2,342,318	2,787,927	563,128	5,693,373

~~SECRET~~
 CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
 TOTAL TRAFFIC LOADED
 AND OFFLOADED BY STATION
 MONTH ENDING 29 FEBRUARY 1944

<u>STATION</u>		<u>NO. OF PAX.</u>	<u>P & B WT.</u>	<u>CARGO WT.</u>	<u>MAIL WT.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3 Accra	Loaded	2,733	654,583	889,040	186,978	1,730,601
	Unloaded	2,485	597,557	899,883	218,107	1,715,507
4 Aden	Loaded	177	39,450	47,757	4,451	91,658
	Unloaded	251	59,011	55,767	4,646	119,424
5 El Fasher	Loaded	87	20,609	7,278	328	28,215
	Unloaded	99	23,828	16,812	777	41,417
6 El Geneina	Loaded	99	24,502	5,992	1,875	32,369
	Unloaded	107	26,117	30,805	2,297	59,219
8 Asmara	Loaded	143	34,922	23,398	2,304	60,624
	Unloaded	150	30,446	25,165	5,806	61,417
9 Kano	Loaded	117	25,443	97,513	6,256	129,212
	Unloaded	153	34,654	28,181	6,432	69,267
10 Khartoum	Loaded	1,125	265,161	214,495	54,103	533,759
	Unloaded	1,048	244,181	202,452	53,211	499,844
11 Lagos	Loaded	33	7,458	16,484	3,060	27,002
	Unloaded	50	11,139	8,661	783	20,583
12 Maiduguri	Loaded	180	39,222	35,950	4,755	79,927
	Unloaded	206	51,661	40,903	3,202	95,766
13 Masira Is.	Loaded	161	23,817	23,551	243	58,611
	Unloaded	112	25,163	103,495	621	129,279
14 Roberts	Loaded	175	37,538	38,286	5,371	81,195
	Unloaded	94	22,446	24,066	3,177	49,689
15 Salala	Loaded	44	10,536	4,681	105	15,322
	Unloaded	46	11,678	35,193	370	47,241
(Benson and Cape Palmas)	Loaded	53	10,405	5,942	1,704	18,051
	Unloaded	61	10,886	4,365	360	15,611
(Southern Route Stations)	Loaded	22	4,858	2,695	217	7,770
	Unloaded	9	1,919	2,247	236	4,402
TOTAL CAFW	Loaded	5,159	1,209,504	1,413,062	271,750	2,894,316
	Unloaded	4,871	1,150,686	1,477,955	300,025	2,928,666
TOTAL HANDLED		10,030	2,360,190	2,891,017	571,775	5,822,982

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
TOTAL TRAFFIC LOADED
AND OFFLOADED BY STATION
MONTH ENDING 31 MARCH 1944

STATION		NO OF FAX.	P & B WT.	CARGO WT.	MAIL WT.	TOTAL
3 Accra	Loaded	2,627	643,355	1,081,892	160,964	1,886,211
	Unloaded	2,593	611,543	983,807	160,562	1,755,915
4 Aden	Loaded	224	48,020	78,782	5,579	132,381
	Unloaded	204	45,471	68,005	6,939	120,415
5 El Fasher	Loaded	77	16,414	18,354	355	35,123
	Unloaded	73	15,833	67,097	1,143	84,073
6 El Geneina	Loaded	60	13,245	5,091	301	18,637
	Unloaded	51	10,976	50,809	913	62,698
8 Asmara	Loaded	407	81,067	40,375	2,953	124,396
	Unloaded	371	73,051	9,921	6,615	89,587
9 Kano	Loaded	132	28,771	102,098	4,357	135,226
	Unloaded	110	23,990	23,974	4,919	53,883
10 Khartoum	Loaded	880	196,426	287,039	35,690	519,155
	Unloaded	835	182,254	255,082	35,933	473,269
11 Lagos	Loaded	55	11,811	75,599	4,132	90,542
	Unloaded	60	12,228	16,408	1,128	29,764
12 Maiduguri	Loaded	202	45,179	29,285	3,542	87,024
	Unloaded	211	47,133	44,980	4,494	96,607
13 Masira Is.	Loaded	124	26,482	11,673	225	36,380
	Unloaded	116	23,293	75,561	839	99,693
14 Roberts	Loaded	102	23,318	49,402	2,776	75,496
	Unloaded	103	23,302	33,317	4,258	60,877
15 Selala	Loaded	34	7,314	12,303	209	19,826
	Unloaded	37	8,208	33,606	603	42,417
(Benson and Cape Palmas)	Loaded	33	6,196	2,042	2,426	10,664
	Unloaded	33	6,525	4,825	166	11,516
(Southern Route Stations)	Loaded	32	6,609	5,272	750	12,631
	Unloaded	13	3,122	2,380	724	6,226
TOTAL CAFW	Loaded	4,991	1,152,225	1,798,207	224,259	3,174,691
		4,810	1,086,931	1,669,772	229,237	2,895,940
TOTAL HANDLED		9,801	2,239,156	3,467,979	453,496	6,160,631

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
TOTAL TRAFFIC LOADED
AND OFFLOADED BY STATION
FOR MONTH ENDING 30 APRIL 1944

<u>STATION</u>		<u>NO. OF PAX</u>	<u>P & B WT.</u>	<u>CARGO WT.</u>	<u>MAIL WT.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3 Accra	Loaded	1,999	476,622	1,119,675	102,094	1,598,431
	Unloaded	1,729	398,716	1,019,021	105,175	1,522,912
4 Aden	Loaded	181	38,170	87,421	3,795	129,386
	Unloaded	185	38,855	82,912	4,942	126,709
5 El Fasher	Loaded	56	12,423	7,235	369	20,127
	Unloaded	60	13,043	99,914	1,047	114,004
6 El Geneina	Loaded	35	7,261	8,563	711	16,535
	Unloaded	48	10,038	96,408	1,099	107,545
8 Asmara	Loaded	451	90,408	32,637	2,027	125,072
	Unloaded	407	79,388	14,467	5,307	99,162
9 Kano	Loaded	203	44,175	91,532	2,928	138,635
	Unloaded	174	37,017	25,335	2,768	65,120
10 Khartoum	Loaded	685	144,544	341,247	27,518	513,309
	Unloaded	669	144,901	228,102	32,399	405,402
11 Lagos	Loaded	27	6,120	66,160	4,260	76,540
	Unloaded	44	9,716	33,884	1,941	45,541
12 Maiduguri	Loaded	272	58,671	37,153	2,472	98,296
	Unloaded	245	53,446	57,856	2,999	114,301
13 Masira Is	Loaded	148	29,661	14,323	233	44,217
	Unloaded	92	19,815	108,646	602	129,063
14 Roberts	Loaded	89	21,332	55,254	7,577	84,163
	Unloaded	86	17,312	35,726	3,952	56,990
15 Salala	Loaded	29	6,166	6,642	75	12,883
	Unloaded	25	5,165	34,054	420	39,639
(Benson and Cape Palmas)	Loaded	58	8,311	7,233	140	15,684
	Unloaded	32	4,634	2,079	129	6,842
(Southern Route Stations)	Loaded	30	6,490	9,665	956	17,111
	Unloaded	26	5,757	2,522	1,213	9,492
TOTAL CAFW Loaded		4,263	950,394	1,884,840	155,155	2,990,389
Unloaded		3,822	837,803	1,788,197	163,993	2,842,722
TOTAL HANDLED		8,085	1,788,197	3,725,766	319,148	5,833,111

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
TOTAL TRAFFIC LOADED
AND OFFLOADED BY STATION
FOR MONTH ENDING 31 MAY 1944

<u>STATION</u>		<u>NO. OF PAX.</u>	<u>P & B WT.</u>	<u>CARGO WT.</u>	<u>MAIL WT.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3 Accra	Loaded	2,852	662,390	1,023,730	98,238	1,784,358
	Unloaded	2,705	610,892	929,312	103,405	1,643,609
4 Aden	Loaded	168	34,739	69,048	3,361	100,148
	Unloaded	232	49,639	78,190	4,271	132,100
5 El Fasher	Loaded	73	14,664	19,753	357	34,774
	Unloaded	76	15,880	58,089	1,239	75,208
6 El Geneina	Loaded	53	11,290	7,556	391	19,237
	Unloaded	46	9,521	49,931	923	60,375
8 Asmara	Loaded	411	79,734	25,686	2,748	108,168
	Unloaded	404	77,486	29,954	5,327	112,767
9 Kano	Loaded	164	35,386	53,258	2,050	90,694
	Unloaded	151	32,144	35,512	2,331	69,987
10 Khertoum	Loaded	960	204,433	293,424	29,032	526,889
	Unloaded	909	195,200	274,326	29,089	498,615
11 Lagos	Loaded	57	11,727	65,064	4,873	81,664
	Unloaded	83	17,647	30,230	2,422	50,307
12 Maiduguri	Loaded	212	43,904	37,796	2,590	84,290
	Unloaded	181	39,974	248,753	2,446	291,173
13 Masira Is	Loaded	176	37,273	19,824	282	57,379
	Unloaded	102	20,614	145,420	834	166,868
14 Roberts	Loaded	223	53,105	35,080	3,342	91,572
	Unloaded	105	23,125	51,179	3,801	78,105
15 Salsia	Loaded	38	8,124	7,668	91	15,883
	Unloaded	41	8,570	42,256	431	51,527
(Benson & Cape Palmas)	Loaded	14	2,707	657	78	3,442
	Unloaded	27	4,431	5,445	71	9,947
(Southern Routes Stations)	Loaded	30	6,677	4,561	673	11,911
	Unloaded	23	5,473	1,465	1,073	8,011
TOTAL CAFW Loaded		5,431	1,206,153	1,656,105	148,106	3,010,364
Unloaded		5,085	1,110,596	1,980,070	157,663	3,248,329
TOTAL HANDLED		10,516	2,316,749	3,636,175	305,769	6,258,693

CENTRAL AFRICAN DIVISION
TOTAL TRAFFIC LOADED
AND OFFLOADED BY STATION
FOR MONTH ENDING 30 JUNE 1944

<u>STATION</u>		<u>NO. OF PAX.</u>	<u>P & B WT.</u>	<u>CARGO WT.</u>	<u>MAIL T.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3 Accra	Loaded	2,842	653,891	1,087,193	95,797	1,836,881
	Unloaded	2,327	513,764	1,330,080	95,527	1,639,371
4 Aden	Loaded	233	48,676	46,960	3,559	99,331
	Unloaded	217	46,669	89,629	4,438	140,936
5 El Fasher	Loaded	98	22,163	24,833	1,164	48,160
	Unloaded	115	25,071	50,532	1,706	95,310
6 El Geneina	Loaded	53	11,880	4,296	279	16,773
	Unloaded	63	14,237	50,046	675	64,758
8 Asmara	Loaded	405	78,334	24,759	2,517	105,610
	Unloaded	387	74,272	24,442	4,175	102,909
9 Kano	Loaded	141	29,736	66,405	1,320	97,461
	Unloaded	124	25,578	56,110	1,725	83,413
10 Khartoum	Loaded	677	143,339	41,027	21,051	405,417
	Unloaded	651	140,300	262,165	23,065	425,536
11 Lagos	Loaded	43	9,668	66,050	1,553	77,271
	Unloaded	45	9,280	41,579	2,635	53,494
12 Maiduguri	Loaded	243	53,173	34,962	2,823	90,959
	Unloaded	193	44,343	127,506	3,116	174,965
13 Masirah Is	Loaded	157	32,058	23,777	281	56,118
	Unloaded	143	29,646	99,207	965	129,818
14 Roberts	Loaded	106	22,455	38,135	3,967	64,557
	Unloaded	100	21,147	37,479	3,043	61,669
15 Salala	Loaded	62	14,372	6,058	46	20,476
	Unloaded	53	11,138	41,222	400	52,760
(Benson & Cape Palmas)	Loaded	32	6,721	1,503	277	8,504
	Unloaded	34	6,241	3,220	140	9,601
(Southern Route Stations)	Loaded	21	4,689	6,691	666	12,046
	Unloaded	28	6,162	2,334	1,146	9,642
TOTAL CAFW Loaded		5,113	1,131,159	1,672,951	135,454	2,939,564
Unloaded		4,480	967,854	1,933,572	142,956	3,044,382
TOTAL HANDLED		<u>9,593</u>	<u>2,099,013</u>	<u>3,706,523</u>	<u>278,410</u>	<u>5,983,946</u>

2. Backlog Statistics of CAFW

The following statistics are backlog records of the two principal stations in the Central African wing. The following conclusions may be drawn from these records. During a five-months period, February 1944 through June 1944, the largest passenger backlog at Accra was on March 15, 1944, when 441 passengers were on the list. The average Accra passenger backlog was 145.6, with a high of 441 and a low of 4 passengers on June 1, 1944. The average tonnage backlog at Accra was 60.8 tones, with a high of 131 tons on March 15, 1944, and a low of 17 tons on April 20, 1944. The average Khartoum passenger backlog was 29 during the four months period of March through June, with a high of 75 on May 25, 1944, and a low of 14 on May 15, 1944. The average tonnage backlog at Khartoum was 21 tones, with a high of 40 tons on March 15, 1944, and a low of 4 tons on June 5, 1944.

ACCRA - STATION THREE

BACKLOG RECORD

February 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Feb	1	125	52
	5	95	63
	10	94	48
	15	127	92
	20	215	115
	25	130	103
	29	140	83

March 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
March	1	101	75
	5	137	77
	10	325	120
	15	441	131
	20	235	65
	25	175	91
	30	140	53

April 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
April	1	160	52
	5	250	68
	10	140	44
	15	75	28
	20	20	17
	25	145	50
	30	70	28

May 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
May	1	90	49
	5	260	62
	10	235	47
	15	180	38
	20	80	45
	25	55	35
	30	175	57

June 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
June	1	4	20
	5	170	34
	10	310	69
	15	170	41
	20	97	22
	25	98	40
	30	50	45

KHARTOUM - STATION TEN

BACKLOG RECORD

March 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
March	1	35	15
	5	25	24
	10	52	40
	15	24	23
	20	45	8
	25	24	10
	30	29	24

April 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
April	1	20	28
	5	21	13
	10	23	23
	15	25	19
	20	20	17
	25	19	13
	30	36	8

May 1944

		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
May	1	20	8
	5	60	15
	10	25	7
	15	14	17
	20	22	16
	25	75	23
	30	30	8

~~RESTRICTED~~
June 1944

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		<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Tons</u>
June	1	26	7
	5	20	4
	10	21	12
	15	29	15
	20	33	24
	25	18	16
	30	28	9

CHAPTER VI. SUPPLY AND SERVICES

The period of tremendous activity in the Supply and Services section of the Air Transport Command in Central Africa was over by the time CAFW was activated on December 15, 1943. During the existence of the preceding organizations, ACFC and AMEW, the problems and activities of S&S assumed gigantic proportions as airfields were built and runways, hangars, fuel installations, barracks, offices, and warehouses were constructed. Not only was the building program huge, but the problems of coordination with theater agencies and the Air Service Command were ones that demanded constant attention.

It would be false to say that the organization of S&S during CAFW was more efficient because it was more mature. Naturally, many of the mistakes had been eliminated and many of the problems had been solved with the division of AMEW into two separate organizations, but balancing this was the fact that new tasks took their place in the S&S organization that had heretofore been either relegated to a minor role or had been non-existent. As an example of this, consider the Transient Services section of S&S. There were no provisions made for such a section during AMEW and it was not until January 1, 1944, when the CAFW S&S Plan became effective, that a comprehensive plan was presented.

The chief reason for the harmonious functioning of all the sections grouped under S&S was the aforementioned S&S Plan. Its prime value was that it eliminated many of the unnecessary errors due to ignorance of supply procedures, and it was therefore especially valuable to freshmen supply officers in orientation work.

There has been a complete lack of material suitable for compiling a section on construction for this narrative. This is unfortunate, as it is known that some construction was accomplished, but where, by whom, and for whom are questions that are unanswerable. Information is available on projected plans of AMEW for the construction of additional facilities that carries over into the early part of 1944, but these estimates are valueless without proof that the plans were executed.

A. Relations with the Theater on Supply Matters

CAFW operated through the territory of only one theater organization: USAFIME. This was fortunate, as problems arising from coordination between the various theaters and sub-theaters, such as arose during the period of AMEW, were minimized. In 1944, USAFIME was the only "wholesaler" and CAFW was one of the "retailers." Based upon understandings with USAFIME, that organization assumed the responsibilities of obtaining supplies from the United States and the delivery of them to CAFW stations, with the exception of Air Corps Supplies which were furnished by the 8th Air Depot Group at Accra.¹ Two sub-theaters of USAFIME, the West African Service Command (WASC) and the Middle East Service Command (MESC), were the points of actual contact on general supply matters. The only exception to this was the supplying of Roberts Field, Liberia. Roberts Field depended on United States Army Forces in Liberia (USAFIL) for supplies provided by a theater organization.² The following charts show the relations of the theater organizations in supply³ CAFW stations.

1. CAFW Supply and Service Plan, prepared by the Supply and Service Section, AMEW-ATC, effective Jan 1, 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.
2. Ibid.

CLASS I SUPPLIES - SUBSISTENCE

<u>STATION</u>	<u>STOCK LEVEL</u>	<u>REQN PERIOD</u>	<u>DATE REQN</u>	<u>REQN SENT TO</u>	<u>METHOD SHIPMENT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Roberts	None	---	---	---	All supplies from USAFIL Qm	Reserve stocks and operating stocks maintained by USAFIL
Accra	120 days reserve plus 90 days of working stock	Quarterly	Dec 10; Mar 10; June 10; Sept 10	QM WASC	Boat to Takoradi, rail or truck to Accra	---
Lagos	"	"	"	"	Boat	---
Kano	"	"	"	"	Boat to Lagos and rail to Kano	---
Maiduguri	"	"	"	"	Boat to Lagos; rail to Bukuru; truck or air to Maiduguri	---
El Geneina	"	"	"	QM Wadi S@dna	Truck, rail, or air from Wadi S@dna	---
El Fasher	"	"	"	"	"	---
Wadi S@dna	"	"	"	Heliopolis QM Depot	Boat to Port Sudan; rail or truck to Khartoum	Wadi S@dna ordered for El Geneina and El Fasher
Aden	"	"	"	"	Boat	---
Salala	"	"	"	QM Karachi CBI	Boat or Air	---
Marirah	"	"	"	"	"	---

CLASS II SUPPLIES - GENERAL SUPPLIES AND CLOTHING

<u>Station</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Railhead</u>	<u>Transportation</u>	<u>Stock Level</u>	<u>Reqn. Period</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Roberts	QM-USAFIL	Roberts	Truck	None	Special	Roberts Field attached to Liberian Task Force for Supply
Accra	QM-WASC	Accra	Truck	120 days reserve plus 90 days working stock	Quarterly	Reserve supply based on combined strengths of Accra, Maiduguri and Lagos, and Kano
Lagos	Accra	Lagos	Water or Air	None	Monthly	
Kano	Accra	Kano	Rail from Lagos or Air	None	"	
Maiduguri	Accra	Bukuru	Air-Truck	"	"	
El Geneina	Wadi Sjadna	El Obeid	"	"	"	
El Fasher	"	"	"	"	"	
Wadi Sjadna	Heliopolis QM Depot	Khartoum	Truck	120 day reserve plus 90 days working stock	Quarterly	Reserve supply based on combined strengths of Wadi Sjadna, El Geneina and El Fasher
Aden	"	Aden	Water	"	"	Stocks at Aden to be such that Salala and Masirah could be supplied in emergency
Salala	QM Karachi CBI	Salala	Water or Air	None	Monthly	All Class II except organic. equip. and stationary to be supplied by Karachi
Masirah	"	Masirah	"	"	"	"

Repeated attempts in June, 1944, on the part of the Charleston Port of Embarkation, Headquarters USAFIME, and WASC, to raise the supply levels for the CAFW area were not favorably considered by the War Department. ³ Therefore, in spite of CAFW requests for alterations, the established level of supplies was set at a minimum of 45 days, an operating level of 30 days, and a maximum level of 75 days. Because USAFIME was operating on the basis of a thirty day level of supply, CAFW was directed to prepare requisitions monthly, for thirty-day periods, indicating the month for which the supplies were intended. In addition, the order and shipping time factors were changed. These factors were as follows:

		<u>Days</u>
<u>Class I</u>	Quartermaster	90
	Medical	110
<u>Class II</u>	Signal	120
	Chemical Warfare	90
	Quartermaster	90
	Engineer	120
	Ordnance	180
<u>Class III</u>	Quartermaster	90
<u>Class IV</u>	Army Exchange Service	120
	Special Service	120
	Quartermaster	90
	Transportation Corps	120
	Engineer	120
	Signal	120
<u>Class V</u>	Chemical Warfare	90
	Ordnance	180

Chemical Warfare Equipment used by CAFW was almost entirely composed of standard items, and therefore no difficulty in procurement was

3. Ltr CO WASC to CG CAFW-ATC, June 29, 1944, "Levels and Order and Shipping Time Factors for Supply." See Appendix XL#

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron
 8th Repair Squadron
 95th Repair Squadron
 8th Supply Squadron
 89th Supply Squadron
 511th Service Squadron
 605th Ordnance Company
 408th Quartermaster Platoon
 2458th Quartermaster Truck Company (Avn)

United States Army Forces in Liberia
 Headquarters and Service Company (Composite) #5889
 899th Aviation Engineer Company
 25th Station Hospital

USAFIME Headquarters
 Army Exchange Service - Cairo
 850th Signal Service Battalion - Cairo
 Deversoir Air Depot, 26th Air Depot Group - Deversoir
 Heliopolis Quartermaster Depot

Eritrea Service Command
 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment - Asmara
 16th Field Hospital, 2nd Platoon - Wadi Seidna
 104th Station Hospital - Asmara
 850th Signal Service Bn, Company "C" - Wadi Seidna
 Gura Air Depot - Gura

Delta Service Command
 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment - Camp Huckstep

B. Post Exchanges

In activating an exchange in CAFW, no capital was required. All supplies were drawn, in such variety and in quantities as the exchange designated, from the Exchange Depot at Accra or from Quartermaster stocks. When an exchange was planned in CAFW, the Exchange Officer arranged with the Station Commander to obtain the number of enlisted men necessary to handle his sales and office duties. He often had to perform many of the duties himself because of the sheer interest which exchange work created. When the "store" was arranged with such shelves, counters, tables, and other fixtures as were required, and the merchandise was received, checked in and priced at retail, the exchange was ready to open for business.

Exchanges maintained business hours designated to provide the greatest service to the greatest number of people. In addition to the sale of essential supplies, exchanges were authorized to conduct such enterprises as barber shops, tailoring establishments, snack bars, etc. During CAFW, individual exchanges with Exchange Officers specifically trained for this work were in operation at Accra (with branches at Lagos and Takoradi), Roberts Field (a branch of the USAFIL exchange), Kano, Maiduguri, Wadi Seidna and Aden. Exchanges operating as individual exchanges with officers in charge of them in addition to other duties were located at El Geneina, El Fasher, Salala and Masirah. The exchanges at Accra, Lagos, Takoradi, Kano and Maiduguri requisitioned exchange supplies through the Exchange Depot at Accra, and those at Wadi Seidna, El Geneina and El Fasher requisitioned through the Quartermaster at Wadi Seidna. The exchanges at Aden, Salala and Masirah requisitioned through the Quartermaster at Aden. The basis of supply was figured on permanent strength plus estimated transients expected. Strength figures, on as close approximation as possible, and projected at least four months in advance, were furnished the Army Exchange Headquarters, USAFIME at the beginning of each month.⁵

By May, 1944, it was apparent that there was a growing necessity for the establishment of a uniform system of rationing of Army Exchange items and a method of registration that could be used at CAFW exchanges. Therefore, to avoid the issuance of cards to transients at each station, a uniform system was established, effective June 1, 1944. A ration card suitable for all necessary items was devised and sent to all stations:

5. CAFW Supply and Service Plan, prepared by the S&S Section, CAFW-ATC, effective Jan 1, 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

SECRETED

green cards were used for transient personnel and blue cards for permanent personnel.⁶

For permanent personnel, commanding officers of stations issued blue cards to all personnel under their command, good for one month and stamped indicating the month for which they were issued. All personnel assigned or attached and traveling through the wing used their regular monthly cards at all stations and had them renewed, if necessary, at any station en route on submission of the ration card covering the previous month.

For transients arriving at stations, a green card was issued by the transient officer, accompanied by an appropriate letter containing pertinent information concerning the specific exchange. All eastbound transients arriving at Accra received green ration cards before proceeding along CAFW routes, and it was not necessary to issue such cards at other stations unless the cards were more than ten days old. All items were rationed to conform with maintenance stocks as provided in regulations. For example, 24,000 units of beer were allowed for 1,000 men for one month. This provided twenty-four units of beer for each man. If sufficient non-beer purchases allowed for an excess of 3000 units per month, the ration could be increased to 27 units per man per month. It was also directed that cigarettes could not be sold on a basis of more than 40 packs per month. The maintenance factor in CAFW was 30.5 packs per month, but experience proved that there were sufficient non-smokers to provide for the increased allotment. Fruit juices and other easily

6. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All stations, May 9, 1944, "Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing." See Appendix XLIII.

SECRETED

concocted beverages were dispensed from bulk wherever possible and combined with concentrates to save shipping space and containers. Rationing of these items was based on supply. All other items not required frequently, such as fountain pens and lighter fluid, were sold on a basis of not more than one per month per man.⁷

In the event that a ration card, either blue or green, was lost or destroyed no replacements were allowed,^{and} it was not transferable. It would be too easy to lose a card or destroy one purposely in order to get increased rations: also, by transferring cards from one person to another the ration for all personnel could not be increased.⁸

C. Fuel Control

A world-wide agreement existed between the United States and British governments, whereby all aviation gasoline and oil supplies were pooled for the common use of all United Nations consumers. These products were allocated, purchased, and shipped upon estimates given in the reports of the Aviation Petroleum Coordinating Committee,^{The West African branch of the Committee,} which met in Lagos, Nigeria, approximately once every two months, ^{and} covered the territory,^{of} British Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa, and the Belgian Congo. The Middle East Committee met in Cairo approximately once every month and covered the territory,^{of} East Africa, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Aden, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf area. Several sub-committees acted under the Middle East committee; of these only the Sudan sub-committee affected the CAFW. This committee met in Khartoum once a month

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

and was concerned with the allocation of tankage and transportation facilities within the Sudan.⁹

Fuel Control in the Central African Wing, according to the S&S Plan (mentioned previously in the AMEW History), was responsible for supplying sufficient gasoline and oil to the airports; planning and coordinating the requisition of sufficient petroleum facilities and refueling equipment; handling, storage, and delivery of aviation fuel to the refueling trucks at airports controlled by the United States Army. This included operation of airport storage facilities, but not the operation of refueling trucks or actual refueling of aircraft, which was an Operations function; operation of the fuel control laboratory and establishment of a systematic sampling procedure to assure the use of safe products, and minimize the loss of fuel because of deterioration in long storage; accounting for aviation fuel supplies from the time they became the property of the United States Government until consumed, and administration and supervision of the work of SVOC.¹⁰

Minimum levels based on a sixty-day supply were established for each CAFW station. When stocks dropped below this level, the unit was to immediately notify the Division Fuel Control Section. Stations in the area from El Geneina through El Fasher sent copies of any such notification to Khartoum as well as to wing headquarters.¹¹ Minimum levels varied

9. Ltr Lt Col James V. Harding to CO CAFD-ATC, Sept 23, 1944, "Aviation Gasoline and Oil Supply Procedures," in 463.7 CEAD Central Files.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

11a

according to the size of the installations:

Liberia - An installation owned by the United States Government was located at Marshall. The fuel was supplied by a marine pipeline and was capable of handling 2,940,000 gallons at one time. The responsibility for the installation at Marshall was the ATC, handled through SVOC. At Roberts Field there was 50,000 gallon underground storage located at the airport. Emergency stocks were placed in drums by boat from other West African ports or the United States. The minimum level kept at Roberts was 800,000 gallons of gasoline and 24,000 gallons of oil.

Gold Coast - At Takoradi 30,000 barrels of United States owned tankage was integrated with installations owned by Oil Storage Company of West Africa. SVOC acted as U.S. Army agents in all relations with the Oil Storage Company. At Accra airport 175,000 gallons of underground tankage connected by pipeline to port. Fuel also brought from Takoradi in ten rail tank cars. Minimum level at Accra was 1,600,000 gallons of gasoline and 48,000 gallons of oil.

Nigeria - At Lagos there were 3,990,000 gallons in above ground tanks supplied from tanker. At Port Harcourt there was the 1,680,000 gallons above ground tankage supplied by tanker. At Bukuru there was 220,000 gallons supplied by rail from Lagos and Port Harcourt. At Kano there was 630,000 gallons supplied by rail tank car from Lagos or Port Harcourt. The installation at Lagos was operated by the Oil Storage Company and SVOC represented U.S. Army. At Port Harcourt the installation was entirely handled by the U.S. Army through SVOC. The installation at Kano and at Bukuru were handled by SVOC for the U.S. Army. At Kano 100,000 gallons of oil. The minimum level at Maiduguri was 500,000 gallons of gasoline and 15,000 gallons of oil. In addition, a drum manufacturing plant was located at Lagos. Full drums were shipped to Kano or Bukuru by rail and then by truck to Maiduguri.

Anglo Egyptian Sudan - At Port Sudan there was above ground storage supplied by tanker of 5,065,200 gallons of fuel. Khartoum City Terminal stored 630,000 gallons as did the Wadi Siedna terminal and the El Obeid terminal. At Port Sudan the operation was handled by the RAF through the Shell Company. At Khartoum City terminal SVOC handled the fuel for the U.S. Army. SVOC also handled the facilities at Wadi Siedna and El Obeid. The airport at Wadi Siedna maintained a minimum level of 11,200,000 gallons. At El Fasher a minimum level was maintained of 350,000 gallons while at El Geneina a minimum level was maintained of 350,000 gallons.

Aden - Aden supplied from tanker to shore tanks holding 3,360,000 gallons. The RAF operated the facilities. The minimum level at Aden airport was 700,000 gallons.

Salala - Gasoline supplied in drums from boat. RAF handled the facilities. Minimum level by the end of May, 1944 was 150,000 gallons.

Mesirah - Fuel supplied in drums from boat. RAF handled the facilities. Minimum level by the end of May, 1944 was 1,600,000 gallons.

Fuel Cost and Consumption at CAFW Stations - January through May 1944¹²

Station	JANUARY			FEBRUARY		
	Fuel Issued (Gallons)	Fuel Cost	Planes	Fuel Issued (Gallons)	Fuel Cost	Planes
Accra	697,888	\$161,421	711	700,455	\$162,015	767
Kano	249,061	\$75,291	523	302,988	\$91,595	626
Maiduguri	194,088	\$67,989	567	255,648	\$89,553	635
ElGeneina	37,945	\$27,699	125	23,641	\$17,257	101
ElFasher	82,226	\$53,446	243	77,349	\$50,276	280
Khartoum	379,566	\$113,528	484	401,523	\$120,095	530
Asmara	8,383	\$2,507	35	7,136	\$2,134	35
Aden	232,294	\$42,300	353	246,749	\$44,932	405
Salala	29,935	\$6,687	105	23,540	\$5,258	86
Masirah	115,355	\$25,770	299	149,284	\$33,350	351
Roberts	311,807	\$72,120	489	276,280	\$63,903	385
Benson	6,902	\$1,725	18	17,289	\$4,322	30
Lagos	1,837	\$424	25	5,665	\$1,310	40
	<u>MARCH</u>			<u>APRIL</u>		
Accra	798,290	\$184,644	830	769,361	\$177,953	723
Kano	293,900	\$88,845	580	267,880	\$80,980	529
Maiduguri	318,246	\$111,481	666	272,675	\$95,518	530
ElGeneina	18,635	\$13,603	77	14,324	\$10,456	55
ElFasher	93,806	\$60,973	243	109,086	\$70,705	262
Khartoum	479,398	\$143,387	525	476,318	\$142,466	484
Asmara	9,153	\$2,737	50	35,002	\$10,469	54
Aden	305,866	\$55,698	412	244,104	\$44,451	349
Salala	33,225	\$7,422	69	34,175	\$7,364	80
Masirah	175,054	\$39,107	316	155,993	\$34,848	268
Roberts	332,951	\$77,011	644	330,113	\$76,355	538
Benson	15,807	\$3,951	24	26,909	\$6,727	42
Lagos	2,708	\$480	30	2,851	\$659	24
	<u>MAY</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>		
Accra	634,919	\$146,856	829	3,600,913	\$832,891	3,860
Kano	204,704	\$61,882	518	1,318,543	\$398,595	2,776
Maiduguri	243,211	\$85,196	607	1,283,868	\$449,738	3,005
ElGeneina	12,183	\$8,893	68	106,728	\$77,911	426
ElFasher	105,267	\$68,423	270	467,734	\$304,027	1,298
Khartoum	341,434	\$102,122	547	2,078,239	\$621,601	2,570
Asmara	35,160	\$10,516	59	94,834	\$28,364	233
Aden	239,340	\$43,583	397	1,268,353	\$230,967	1,916
Salala	17,328	\$3,871	69	138,203	\$30,874	409
Masirah	131,185	\$29,306	311	726,871	\$162,382	1,545
Roberts	268,137	\$62,020	559	1,519,288	\$351,411	2,615
Benson	21,355	\$5,338	20	88,262	\$22,065	134
Lagos	586	\$293	10	13,017	\$3,168	129
	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>					
<u>Month</u>	<u>Fuel Issued</u>	<u>Fuel Cost</u>	<u>Planes</u>			
January	2,347,287	\$650,913	3,977			
February	2,487,557	\$686,007	4,271			
March	2,876,409	\$789,346	4,466			
April	2,738,791	\$759,426	3,938			
May	2,254,809	\$628,305	4,264			
	12,704,853	\$3,513,999	20,916			

12. "Analysis of Fuel Costs and Consumption at CAFW Stations January to May 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Section, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.

13

VOLUME OF AVIATION GASOLINE AS REPRESENTED BY SAMPLES TESTED AT THE WING FUEL LABORATORY OF THE CAFW-ATC
FROM JANUARY FIRST TO JUNE THIRTIETH INCLUSIVE 1944

ORIGIN OF SAMPLES		JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE
Accra	V** S**	86,056 6	1,782,626 7	1,643,544 8	223,321 8	2,700 1	529,914 4
Aden	V S	— 0	— 2	— 4	220,500 6	280,000 10	280,000 7
Asmara	V S	— 0	2,545 2	5,218 2	33,209 9	24,660 6	11,538 5
Bassa Point	V S	— 0	1,405,004 4	— 0	— 0	702,502 2	— 0
Bakuru	V S	55,491 6	243,593 4	72,706 3	83,773 4	103,395 5	121,644 2
El Fasher	V S	— 1	318,000 6	— 0	135,700 3	159,000 3	318,000 6
El Geneina	V S	— 2	— 0	— 1	222,600 4	174,900 3	159,000 3
Kano	V S	56,975 3	467,123 10	— 0	54,661 3	317,268 10	69,317 2
Wadi Siedna	V S	— 0	1,050,279 10	69,220 4	69,475 2	540,080 6	221,900 8
Lagos	V S	1,077,718 6	630,676 6	2,112,131 9	5,455,405 16	115,510 1	1,683,957 7
Maiduguri	V S	442,357 15	244,114 31	89,170 8	51,620 5	322,558 15	228,176 25
Masirah Island	V S	104,400 1	271,133 6	1,985,665 30	2,244,686 42	1,184,555 17	455,400 9

13. Undated report entitled "The Testing and Reclamation of Aviation Gasoline in the Central African Division, Air Transport Command, prepared by 1st Lt. Hilton P. Goss, Division Historical Officer, CAFW-ATC. IN HISTORICAL FILES, GRAF Central Files.

VOLUME OF AVIATION GASOLINE AS REPRESENTED BY SAMPLES TESTED AT THE WING FUEL LABORATORY OF THE CAPW-ATC¹⁴
 FROM JANUARY FIRST TO JUNE THIRTIETH INCLUSIVE 1944

<u>ORIGIN OF SAMPLES</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Roberts field V	—	86,799	58,032	482,769	107,378	101,633
S	0	7	7	10	3	2
Salala, Oman V	—	54,000	—	424,800	650,000	—
S	0	1	0	13	7	0
Royal Air Force V	176,324	1,118,780	466,587	472,971	465,879	3,508,860
S	6	5	9	14	3	10
NAFD-ATC*** V	—	—	30,210	—	—	2,625,235
S	0	0	4	0	0	4
Miscellaneous V	—	—	872,407	1,515,040	—	3,699,198
S	0	0	5	4	0	7
TOTALS V	1,999,321	7,674,874	7,404,868	11,720,654	5,150,385	1,388,543
S	46	102	94	144	92	96

* VOLUME IN UNITED STATES GALLONS

** SAMPLES RECEIVED AND TESTED

*** THE FIGURES FOR NAFD ARE REPEATED IN THE MISCELLANEOUS COLUMNS. THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE TOTALS FOR EACH MONTH.

The Fuel Laboratory at Accra assumed control of and responsibility for reclaiming aviation fuel stored at bases throughout the AMEW (as it was known then), in November, 1943, one month before CAFW was activated. On the initiative of Captain Herbert Blair, Fuel Laboratory Officer, an investigation was started to find if portable filtering equipment could be obtained from the United States. When the reply came that six to nine months would be required for shipment of the filters, a search was made for equipment in Africa. At Lagos, Nigeria, a stationary filter press was put into repair and used for the reclamation program there. A portable four-unit filter was obtained from the Socony Vacuum Oil Company, equipped with two Marlowe pumps and shipped at once to Maiduguri, Nigeria. Supplies of inhibitors were obtained from the States by air and additional laboratory personnel were secured.¹⁵

With this as a beginning, a complete survey was made of all questionable stocks of aviation fuel in the wing. After laboratory tests had indicated the steps necessary in reclaiming disapproved gasoline, a laboratory representative was usually sent to the particular station with full equipment for reclamation. There the technician supervised the work, which was performed by station personnel, according to the methods prescribed by CAFW Headquarters. In the few cases where no direct supervision was necessary, the work was handled through correspondence.

As fuel was reclaimed, samples were sent to the Fuel Laboratory for retesting. Approved fuel was put into current consumption stocks and used, as recommended, within thirty, sixty, or ninety days. If unused

15. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

at the expiration of the directed time limit, samples were again submitted to the laboratory and the appropriate action, based on the results of a filter test, was directed. Condemned fuel was diverted for use in motor vehicles.

Numberous examples of the extent and value of the reclamations are available. At Lagos, in December, 1943, approximately 780,000 gallons of 100-octane fuel which had previously been condemned were processed for reclamation. In spite of the fact that this gasoline had been written off as stock unavailable for use, by mutual agreement between SVOC and the Wing Fuel Control Officer, the total gallonage was reclaimed with a final loss through condemnation of only 5.63% of the fuel. This represented a saving of some 639,335 gallons of fuel previously considered beyond salvage for aviation use. The laboratory tested samples of this fuel six months after it was processed and it was found still suitable for ninety days' storage.

In March, 1944, the approved stocks at Masirah Island, the wing's easternmost station, off the coast of Oman, Arabia, consisted of less than two weeks' supply. Through the efforts of the fuel laboratory staff and the wing's Eastern Area fuel control representative, fuel was reclaimed at that base in sufficient quantities to provide for current needs. And an additional reserve stock was then made available for the oncoming monsoon season, when for six months it would be impossible to off-load fuel from ships to the island. At Roberts Field, Liberia, it was possible, on another occasion, to reclaim disapproved stocks so that current and reserve quantities could be maintained until the arrival of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

a tanker with requisitioned fuel.

From such examples as these, it may be seen that the reclamation program had immediate practical value to the mission of the wing; for, next to the planes themselves, it was axiomatic that the fuel necessary to keep them flying had to be on hand in sufficient quantity and in acceptable quality at all times.¹⁶

The following chart indicates how the various stations of the Central African Wing were supplied Gasoline and Oil by non-Wing agencies as presented in the Supply and Service Plan of CAFW:

16. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

CLASS THREE SUPPLIES - GASOLINE AND OIL¹⁷

<u>Station</u>	<u>Reserve Stock Level</u>	<u>Reqn Period</u>	<u>Requisition To</u>	<u>Sources of Supply</u>
Roberts	None	---	---	All supplies from QM USAFIL
Acera	120 days reserve plus 90 days working stock	Quarterly	SVOC by QM WASC	SVOC or POE via Takoradi
Lagos	"	"	"	SVOC or POE
Kano	"	"	"	SVOC or POE via Lagos
Maiduguri	"	"	"	"
El Gensina	RAF level	"	RAF El Gensina	RAF El Gensina
El Fasher	"	"	RAF El Fasher	RAF El Fasher
Wadi Siedna	"	"	RAF Wadi Siedna	RAF Wadi Siedna
Aden	"	"	RAF Aden	RAF Aden
Salala	Maximum 365 days	"	Submit estimates to S&S Officer at Wadi Siedna	RAF Aden
Masirah	"	"	"	Abadan through RAF

17. CAFW Supply and Service Plan, prepared by the Supply and Service Section, AMEN-ATC, effective January 1, 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

D. Reverse Land Lease Procedures

In the area of CAFW, wherever possible, the reverse lend lease principle was utilized. Equipment, facilities, services and information were obtained from the governments of those countries whose defense was termed vital to the defense of the United States. The furnishing of such aid acted as a credit against the account being accumulated for aid given them by the United States.¹⁸ To implement these procedures, CAFW instructed all purchasing and contracting officers on April 26, 1944, to make written requests of local authorities for the procurement of all anticipated needs which were not already being furnished.¹⁹ Except in cases of extreme emergency, purchase orders or obligating instruments would not be forwarded to finance officers for payment without certification to the fact that the items could not be obtained as Reciprocal Aid (RA).

The areas mentioned above were all those areas through which CAFW operated, with the exceptions of Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon. In those countries the United States had accepted liability of payment for all local requirements involving expenditure of local currency with the exception of fuel supplies, but even in these countries supplies were obtained from the British Army as often as possible. In connection with procurement of supplies from local vendors, purchasing and contracting officers were authorized to conduct such transactions. Competition among vendors was to be developed to the highest possible extent throughout the widest

18. Supply and Service Plan, prepared by the Supply and Service Section, AMEW-ATC, effective Jan 1, 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

19. Circular #21, CAFW-ATC, par II, April 26, 1944, in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.

area of local supply. The advantage of this was readily seen, as lower prices could be obtained in a competitive field than if the field was restricted to chosen vendors who could establish prices equal to the demand for their products.²⁰

Lists of the items that were purchased by the ATC on reverse lend lease are not available, but a report of February 22, 1944, from the Accra area did serve to illustrate a few of the many items that were being procured. This report stated:²¹

Soap - the present Army contract with J. B. Saxel of Nsawam will be continued and the U. S. Army will provide the Director of Supplies, Secretariat, Accra with a copy of the contract and supplemental agreements. All bills submitted by Mr. Saxel will be examined, and if correct, they will be certified for settlement under Reciprocal Aid and forwarded to the Director of Supplies who will effect payment.

Charcoal - the same procedure as outlined above for soap will apply to charcoal. Mr. Saxel, should however, submit separate bills for the soap and the charcoal.

Kapok - this item may now be supplied on reverse lend-lease by the Compagnie Francaise de L'Afrique Occidentale, Accra. Estimates of requirements have been submitted calling for two tons during the first half of 1944 and up to ten tons for the second half of the year.

Fruit - All fruits now supplied under Reciprocal Aid will continue to be so supplied. In addition the Gold Coast Government will pay all certified bills for fruit procured from the farmer's group at Asebu.

The matter of re-transfers of lend lease property was not taken up until April, 1944. Up to that time any re-transfers were carried out by the British Army without reference to the United States Army or the ATC. By April, however, it was recognized that re-transfers of lend lease property must be cleared by the government of the United States. In the

20. Ibid.

21. Ltr CO WASC USAFIME to CO Station #3, CAFW-ATC, Feb 22, 1944, "Reciprocal Aid Procurement." See Appendix XLIV.

beginning, cases arising were usually allotted to the various Reciprocal Aid officers. Major John S. Marsh, Economics Officer of the West African Service Command, gave some interesting prophecies in a report to USAFIME early in April 1944, stating:²²

The future of this field is definitely seen as one of expansion as more and more military equipment outlives its usefulness and limited transport make shipments to other areas undesirable. In a similar manner, disposals of United States Army property are doubtless due to increase. There have been few such sales in the past but those that have taken place have given evidence of being improperly supervised. The establishment of policies for the disposal of surplus military property by higher levels has been started by the Surplus War Property Administration.

Under the administration of the United States Army Forces in Central Africa (USAFICA), accounting for all forms of procurement was centralized in the Fiscal Office. In December, 1943, the Fiscal Office was transferred to the CAFW and took with it the accounting functions insofar as they pertained to CAFW stations and functions. Accounting for service command activities remained a service command responsibility (WASC), but no office was designated to undertake it. It therefore devolved upon the Reciprocal Aid Officer of WASC to supervise the production of Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid vouchers and to obtain valuations. Thus the volume of accounting tended to shift from the Fiscal Office, under CAFW, to the Reciprocal Aid Officer of WASC, for WASC procurement. This division of responsibilities between CAFW and WASC continued, although there were difficulties inherent in such a situation which required considerable coordination, such as scales of prices, investigations of past issues not adequately accounted for, and the inauguration of new procedures with the addition of new

22. Undated memorandum entitled "Memorandum on History of Economics Activities in West Africa," prepared by Captain John S. Marsh, Economics Officer, WASC, USAFIME. See Appendix XLV.

items to the Reciprocal Aid list.²³

All local purchasing was centralized in the Quartermaster Office of USAFICA during that organizations's period of activity and the first days of the West African Service Command. Upon the formation of the CAFW, the Wing took over the purchasing power for its regular station procurement, leaving in WASC only the purchasing and contracting functions connected with Service Command procurement. Within WASC the purchasing and contracting functions continued under the Quartermaster. This activity steadily decreased in importance as the field of Reciprocal Aid widened. With the separation of the Reciprocal Aid Officer from the Quartermaster office, the purchasing and contracting activities were assigned to the Economics Section of WASC. In April, 1943, two officers and nine enlisted men were engaged in local procurement under USAFICA, which procured for AMEW. By April, 1944, the bulk of this work was done by the Quartermaster Depot attached to the Central African Wing.²⁴

It can readily be seen from the above information that conditions were anything but suitable. This was readily admitted not only by WASC officers but by CAFW officers as well. On account of this lack of coordination, Major Marsh, about the middle of April, 1944, made definite recommendations to improve Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid procedures.

Major Marsh stated:²⁵

From observations and experience there have become apparent certain principles which are recommended for guidance in the future. First, it is not effective to divide up the functions and parcel them out

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

here and there as additional duties to personnel who are primarily responsible for other missions. Second, sufficient and appropriate personnel should be assigned to this work to insure that it will be completely understood and correctly carried out, for the work differs from other military duties and familiarity with all phases of it requires more than a casual study. Third, there is considerable saving to the United States Army of financial expenditure involved in this work, which will pay many hundred times over the salaries of the personnel devoted to this work. Since the appointment of a Reciprocal Aid Officer in November 1943, nearly a million dollars of supplies and services have been added to the Reciprocal Aid program. In addition, there is the money to be realized from the proceeds of sales of Lend-Lease property by allied government agencies. In view of this the following recommendation is offered: that the position of WASC vis-a-vis the CAFW be clarified, especially with respect to WASC responsibility for CAFW's observance of the limitations on granting Lend-Lease, Reciprocal Aid, and Retransfer and Disposal functions in Headquarters, WASC, with authority to CAFW to carry out specific operations where requested by WASC.

By May 9, 1944, the heretofore tangled fuel control reciprocal aid policies were straightened out to a large extent. During the period of AEMW, the work that should have been accomplished was partially neglected, due to lack of a definite program, and it was not until 1944 that attempts were made to ascertain correctly the extent of reciprocal aid for fuel control.²⁶

By May 9, 1944, in Nigeria, procedures had been established and were functioning smoothly which provided for internal and numerical control of certifications of Reciprocal Aid Applications upon Socony by the British. The negotiations, retroactive in their application to September 3, 1942, the effective date of Reciprocal Aid Lend Lease Treaty in British Colonial Territory, were of necessity in considerable measure consummated by Socony representatives, but under supervision and direction of the Air Transport Command Contracting Office representative for initiating and processing of items considered to be available for cash

26. Ltr CG CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, May 9, 1944, "Reciprocal Aid Under Socony Operating Contracts." See Appendix 24-VI.

reimbursement or in kind (services, facilities, materiel, etc.). This was so of necessity in Nigeria, by reason of the fact that British Government officials and railroad executive maintained headquarters in Lagos where the ATC had no organization other than nominal operating personnel at Lagos airport. In general, not only in Nigeria, but elsewhere, it was recognized that certain general limitations set up by War Department instructions and theater circulars existed upon the scope of reciprocal aid. The following expenses were not considered eligible: pay and allowance of United States Army personnel or United States civilian employees of the War Department, administrative expenses, requirements for cash, purchases made directly from sources other than those made available by local army or government authorities, and transactions with foreign nationals as distinct from authorized representatives of foreign governments. In Nigeria major items obtained under RA (Reciprocal Aid) included railroad transportation services, local native labor payrolls, harbor terminal duties, public utilities services, and British Army or local government transport by truck or ship. In the Gold Coast the procedures were similar to those in Nigeria, except that in the initiation of new items the channel utilized wherever possible was the WASC; the same RA items were available in the Gold Coast. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan the matters of RA scope and development were the responsibility of the International Aid Division of USAFIME; only upon instructions from them were any items applied for and processed. All negotiations had been substantially completed by May, 1944, to establish precedents and the specific extent of RA were believed to be within its scope. In the event further negotiations were deemed necessary, Reciprocal Aid was intended to be governed in principle by the policy that Army representa-

tives initiate and develop its application, with SVOC accomplishing the presentation of appropriate documents and effecting collection of credit for benefit of the ATC, to be handled as reimbursable items. All of this was in line with the methods in vogue pursuant to which SVOC issued credit memos for RA items when received either as a cash reimbursement for an expenditure previously made, or on the basis of a warrant or other charge properly authenticated in lieu of a cash cost which would otherwise have been incurred by SVOC.²⁷

B. The Laundry Controversy

One of the biggest problems of the Quartermaster Section during the first six months of 1944 was the solution of the laundry situation; in particular, the problem of service charges for officers, warrant officers, nurses and authorized civilian personnel at CAFW bases. On May 17, 1944, USAFIME had directed that the exemptions from the provisions of their Circular No. 2, January 5, 1944, granted to the wing stations with fixed Quartermaster Corps laundry installations would have to be withdrawn.²⁸ Prior to this, on April 12, 1944, CAFW had originated a new directive on laundry charges and in this directive had stated:²⁹

Officers, nurses, and authorized civilian employees at their permanent station who elect to use the government laundry will be charged at the rate of \$1.00 per bundle, not to exceed \$3.00 per month, provided not more than five bundles of laundry are sent in any one month. For all bundles over five per month an additional charge of \$1.00 per bundle will be made.

27. Ibid.

28. Ltr CG USAFIME to CG CAFW-ATC, May 17, 1944, "Quartermaster Laundry Service," in 331.5, CEAD Central Files.

29. Circular #18, CAFW-ATC, April 12, 1944, in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.

However, USAFIME's letter meant that at Accra, Wadi St. Adna, and Aden the charge to these categories of personnel of three dollars a month for one bundle per week from each person would be abandoned and a piece rate charge in conformance with USAFIME Circular No. 2 instituted.

Aside from the administrative worries which the change would entail, it was felt at Accra that the schedule of piece work charges was unnecessarily high. Reorganization of office personnel to handle the additional bookkeeping would prevent the new rates from going into effect before July 1, 1944. Meanwhile, the wing asked Cairo for permission to continue the flat rate charge at Accra. USAFIME wrote on July 10, 1944, that some laundries were not complying with Circular 2, and requested information as to what was being done in the CAFW to insure compliance.³⁰ CAFW replied that the three stations involved were using piece rates as of July 1, 1944, although no decision had yet been reached by Cairo on CAFW's request to continue the flat charge.³¹ (The conclusion of this story does not fall within the period of this history, but may be found in the August history of CAFW.)

F. Chemical Warfare Program

The intensified Chemical Warfare training program instituted during the latter part of MEW was continued during CAFW. The following is a list of courses conducted at CAFW stations during the period of January, 1944, through July, 1944:³²

30. Ltr CG USAFIME to CO CAFW-ATC, July 10, 1944, "Quartermaster Laundry Service," in 331.5 QMC, CEAD Central Files.
31. History of the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, August 1944, prepared by the Historical Section, CEAD-ATC, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.
32. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, Aug 3, 1944, "Report on Status of Chemical Warfare Training in Central African Division." See Appendix XLVII

<u>Station</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Date of Course</u>	<u>Personnel Qualified</u>
Accra	2,845	29 April-21 July	25
Aden	371	20 March-1 April	24
Kano	209	3 April-13 April	12
Khartoum	778	24 January-5 February	20
Maiduguri	349	23 March-3 April	10
Masirah	168	21 February-4 March	13

This course was for unit gas officers and non-commissioned gas officers. After sufficient men were trained at a base to handle the program, courses were conducted by these men to indoctrinate all personnel of the base. These latter courses were basic courses lasting ^{few} 16 hours, and were given as follows:³³

<u>Station</u>	<u>Date of Course</u>	<u>Personnel Trained</u>
Accra (Hq)	8 July - 22 July	All Enlisted Men
El Fasher	7 June - 14 June	All Personnel
El Geneina	12 June - 15 June	All Personnel
Asmara	10 April - 12 April	All Personnel
Lagos	25 July - 27 July	All Personnel
Roberts	12 July - 14 July	All Personnel
Salela	10 March - 14 March	All Personnel

The main change in the Chemical Warfare section was the use of individual equipment. As stated in the CAFW Supply and Service Plan, certain items for individual protection were issued. However, as the war progressed during 1944, the danger of chemical attack in Africa lessened, and on June 14, 1944, USAFME issued new instructions to be followed by CAFW personnel in the use of this individual protection. Individuals in CAFW were required to have in their possession only the gas mask after July 1, 1944. All other clothing, accessories and equipment (except eye-shields) was to be recalled and shipped as soon as practicable. Central African Wing stations located in the Middle East Service Command were to

33. Ibid.

ship their surplus chemical equipment to MESC Headquarters, which in turn would ship it to the Heliopolis QM Depot; and CAFW stations in the West African Service Command were to ship their surplus equipment to WASC Headquarters at Accra, which in turn would give it to the Chemical Section of the 8th Air Depot Group. Wing personnel were allowed to retain their eye shields for use as dust shields. In the use of the gas mask, all gas masks with the diaphragm arrangement were to be turned in and replaced with service gas masks.³⁴

G. Signal Section

The Signal Section of CAFW was charged only with general signal duties, as the Signal Corps of the United States Army and the Army Airways Communications System (AACS) operated and maintained the major portion of the signal equipment. The duties of ATC Signal Officers included the installation and operation of station telephonic equipment, and the maintenance and installation of other forms of station communication such as public address systems, electrical recording devices, and inter-office communication. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the ATC Signal section was in no way responsible for the airways communication system. The ATC Signal Officer would render, however, such assistance as practicable to help airways communications personnel accomplish their mission, upon request from proper authority.³⁵

The source of supply for all stations of the CAFW was the Signal Section, Heliopolis Quartermaster Depot, at Cairo, Egypt. This applied to all Signal items with the exception of property supplied through

34. Second Supply & Service Plan, prepared by the S&S Section, CAFD-ATC, effective Sept 1, 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

35. Supply and Service Plan, prepared by the S&S Section AMEW-ATC, effective Jan 1, 1944, in Historical Files, CEAD Central Files.

[REDACTED]

Air Corps channels and peculiar to the Air Corps. The Station Signal Officers at Accra and Wadi Sidi ~~Shahna~~ maintained a 120-day reserve level of Signal Supplies, and the other stations of the wing requisitioned upon these two bases. These other stations maintained only such stocks as to assure immediate repair of common communications breakdowns. Such repairs consisted of replacement of unserviceable parts, including batteries, cords, easily accessible assemblies, and nuts, bolts, screws, and other simple mechanical fixtures. Electrical measuring equipment such as voltmeters, ammeters and similar instruments which became unserviceable or required repairs other than simple ones such as soldering ^{were} ~~was~~ shipped to the Helipolis M Depot for repair. This also applied to telephone equipment. In case articles were unserviceable, provisions were made with USAFIME to use either the requisition or direct exchange methods of obtaining replacements. This latter method was a valuable time-saver, as a part could be turned in with a certificate to that effect and a new part drawn in return: this eliminated the sending of a requisition to wing headquarters. In case requisitions were needed for new equipment, they were accompanied by a certificate stating that the articles were required to complete an authorized set, or to replace those which could not be presented for exchange.³⁶

There was no great expansion of signal facilities during the period of CAFW. As in all other departments, the duties of signal officials were mainly concerned with the improvement of present installations and the addition of new ones merely to improve the efficiency of the Command. The Signal Section worked hand in hand with Special Services to present varied radio programs, and almost all bases had public address systems

36. Ibid.

[REDACTED]

installed to present news, shortwave broadcasts, or programs of the Armed Forces Radio Service. The Station at Accra, WAGL, was operated by the Signal Corps of the United States Army, but called upon CAFW Signal for supply, and close coordination was maintained between the two organizations.

H. Transient Services

The mission of Transient Services was to provide housing, messing, and ground transportation, and to render all possible assistance and information to the transient for his welfare at ATC stations from the time of his arrival until the time for his departure. The requirements of this mission, the creation of good will toward the command and the essential spirit of service, all demanded that transients receive the utmost consideration at all CAFW stations and further demanded that there be no justifiable grounds for feeling that greater privileges and comfort in regard to messing, billeting or general care were being accorded the permanent station personnel.

The Supply and Service Plan of CAFW, effective January 1, 1944, provided for the establishment of such a section.³⁷ Over a long period of time, the Air Transport Command in dealing with transients discovered that a division of responsibilities between the various sections hampered the efficiency of the Command in providing adequate food, billets, and other essential features to ferry crew members, passengers, and especially to those considered VIPs. . Frequently, passengers missed plane connections, suffered the hardships of poor facilities, and all too often traveling by air was not considered a pleasant means of transportation. However,

37. Ibid.

with the responsibilities centered in one section, these annoyances could be corrected.

As mentioned in the P&T Chapter of the CAFW history, Transient Services had clearly defined tasks to perform, different from those performed by P&T and Operations in the handling of passengers. Among these tasks were storage of baggage, information services, arrangements for ground transportation, arrangements for laundry service, reception of medical cases, mail and message service, passenger briefing on security regulations, clearance procedure, billeting, in-flight lunches, and daily status records. The following was the procedure used in CAFW to care for transient personnel.³⁸ The deplaning passengers were met at the airplane by P&T personnel and escorted to the Passenger Terminal. They then reported to the P&T counter where their names were checked against the incoming manifest. From there the passengers were directed to the Transient Service Office. This was Transient Services' first contact with the passenger, and from here on, it was an S&S responsibility to handle these passengers until they were to report to P&T for departure.

The following forms were used by Transient Services, and are given to explain in more detail the workings of the section. The registration card was filled out upon arrival of the transient passenger and contained name, rank, organization, forwarding address, billet assigned, mess assigned, and time of arrival and departure. The billet rack was used for much the same reason as a room rack in a hotel front office, and showed all billets. Vari-colored cards were used to show status, occupied or vacant: thus at a glance available quarters could be seen.

38. Circular #22, CAFW-ATC, April 27, 1944, in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.

The release form was merely a receipt to show that the passenger had turned in all transient equipment issued to him at the station, and prevented the theft or loss of property that had been evident in the period before Transient Services was organized. Another important feature was the call service; this was merely a special service similar to the morning wakeup routine at hotels in the United States.³⁹

It was the function of the Billeting Branch under the direction of Transient Services to provide for transient personnel the cleanest and most comfortable sleeping accommodations possible in adequate quarters. It can be readily seen that as a morale-producing factor its function was of major importance. One major difficulty in the past had been the billeting of flying crew members and other passengers together. Crews on early call many times woke up passengers who did not have to be called at that time, and too, passengers who were able to sleep late in the mornings many times kept flight crews awake at night when sleep was necessary to the safe operation of the plane they were operating the next day. Thus, one of the major responsibilities was the billeting of flight crews so that they could have undisturbed rest. The procedure of handling tactical crews was the same as that used for transport passengers, except that these aircraft were to be met by Operations personnel: P&T did not enter into the picture as to the reception and handling of tactical crews.⁴⁰

Few statistics are available on the number of transient personnel handled at the various stations of CAFW. The station breakdown of passengers handled, in P&T statistics, does show the number of passengers pass-

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

ing through the stations, but these figures do not differentiate between transient personnel and permanent personnel. The only records available are the monthly utilization of available station housing statistics. From these figures the average percentage of housing utilized by each station may be derived from January through June.⁴¹

Asmara	99%
Masirah Island	83%
El Geneina	80%
Khartoum	78%
Maiduguri	74%
Roberts	73%
Accra	67%
Aden	66%
Kano	65%
El Fasher	65%
Salala	64%
Lagos	48%

Thus for the six months period the CAFW average may be determined as 78.36%. By far the leading station in this respect was Asmara: this was due to its prominence as a leave center for CAFW personnel. As soon as an old group would leave for their stations a new group would come in, keeping housing facilities always full. At the opposite extreme was Lagos, a small station with very little traffic. Its importance lay primarily in the fact that it was an ocean terminal and a distribution point for inland Nigerian stations.⁴²

As was mentioned in the forepart of this story, the lack of certain documentary material made it difficult to adequately portray the S&S program of CAFW. Although some material was available for most departments, no mention has been made of others. However, the material that has been

41. "Monthly Utilization of Available Station Housing," prepared by Statistical Control Section, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.

42. Ibid.

presented does enable an observer to gain certain impressions of this period, the most important of which are: a more unified, coordinated system between the various staff sections of CAFW in their relationships to S&S; and a more mature organization within the section, particularly with relation to the theater, and sub-theaters. These two factors, in themselves, explain adequately the evolution of S&S from the heterogeneous unit under AMEW, to the unified organization under the Central African Wing.

HISTORY

OF

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN WING, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
(December 15, 1943 - June 30, 1944)

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- XVII. "CAFW Scheduled Miles Flown Dec 1943--Dec 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Div, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XVIII. "CAFW Ton Miles and Passenger Miles Flown Dec 1943--Dec 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Div, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XIX. "CAFW Average Hours Per Plane Per Day Dec 1943--Dec 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Div, CAFW-ATC, Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XX. "CAFW Monthly Aircraft Movements by Stations, for Feb, Mar, Apr, May, June, 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Div, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XXI. "CAFW Ferried Aircraft Movement, for March, Apr, May, June, 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Div, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XXII. "Report of Aircraft Ferried Through CAFW, for Jan, Apr, June, 1944," prepared by Statistical Control Div, CAFW-ATC, in Statistical Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XXIII. Ltr, unsigned, undated, "Background of Kano-Tripoli Route Survey," in 360.4, CEAD Central Files.
- XXIV. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to PAA & American Airlines, Accra; Liaison Officer, 4th Ferrying Division, CO's ATC Natal and Ascension, Feb 26, 1944, "Air Traffic Control," in 360.11, CEAD Central Files.
- XXV. "Dispatch #8," Wadi Seidna South, Jan 29, 1944, by Lt Col R. H. Bolling, ATC Historical Files.

XXVI. "Dispatch #9," Accra, undated, by Lt Col R. H. Bolling, in ATC Historical Files.

CHAPTER V. PRIORITIES AND TRAFFIC.

- XXVII. Ltr CO CAFW to COs all Stations, April 7, 1944, "Record of Delivery of Cargo to Consignee," in 583, CEAD Central Files.
- XXVIII. Ltr CG ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, Apr 22, "Transportation of Animals by Air," in 583, CEAD Central Files.
- XXIX. Ltr Capt Douglas H. Reynolds to CO CAFW-ATC, May 18, 1944, "Transportation of Pets," in 583, CEAD Central Files.
- XXX. Ltr Capt Douglas H. Reynolds to COCAFW-ATC, May 28, 1944, "Transportation of Animals by Air," in 583, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXI. Circular #27, CAFW-ATC, June 8, 1944, in Publications Files, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXII. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, Jan 7, 1944, "Baggage and Equipment Check Room," in 524.2, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXIII. Ltr CG USAFIME to CO WASC, Jan 21, 1944, "Shipment of Baggage," in 524.2, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXIV. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, Feb 18, 1944, "Shipment of Baggage," in 524.2, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXV. Ltr CG ATC to CO CAFW-ATC, Apr 8, 1944, "Plane Loading Equipment," in 583.5, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXVI. Ltr CG USAFIME to CO CAFW-ATC, Apr 14, 1944, "Army Courier Service," in 311.4, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXVII. Ltr CG ATC to WDGS, May 10, 1944, "Destruction of Courier Mail," in 311.1, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXVIII. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, May 31, 1944, "Protection of Mail," in 311.13, CEAD Central Files.
- XXXIX. Ltr Capt Douglas H. Reynolds to CO CAFW-ATC, June 12, 1944, "Suggested Action for Prevention of Pilfering of Small, Valuable Cargo Shipments," in 311.13, CEAD Central Files.
- XL. Ltr CG USAFIME to CO CAFW-ATC, July 21, 1944, "Registered Mail," in 311.13, CEAD Central Files.
- XLI. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, Apr 18, 1944, "In Flight Meal Procedure," in 430.1, CEAD Central Files.

CHAPTER VI. SUPPLY AND SERVICES.

- XLII. Ltr CG WASC to CG [sic] CAFW-ATC, CO USAFIL, and CO Base Comd, June 29, 1944, "Levels and Order and Shipping Time Factors for Supply," in 400, CEAD Central Files.
- XLIII. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to COs All Stations, May 9, 1944, "Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing," in 331.3, CEAD Central Files.
- XLIV. Ltr CG WASC to CO Sta #3, CAFW-ATC, Feb 22, 1944, "Reciprocal Aid Procurement," in 400.3295, CEAD Central Files.
- XLV. Memo Capt J. L. Marsh, Economics Officer, WASC, to CO WASC, undated, "Memorandum on History of Economics Activities in West Africa," in 400.3295, CEAD Central Files.
- XLVI. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, May 9, 1944, "Reciprocal Aid Under Socony Operating Contracts," in 400.3295, CEAD Central Files.
- XLVII. Ltr CO CAFW-ATC to CG ATC, Aug 3, 1944, "Report on Status of Chemical Warfare Training in Central African Division," in 353, CEAD Central Files.

APPENDIX I.

Army Air Corps
HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AFRICA
Air Transport Command
Station #1

Classification Canceled or changed
to **RESTRICTED**
by authority of Commanding Officer
NAED-AIC
NAME *James R. Rohrbaugh*
GRADE *Captain, USAF*
DATE *1/8/46*
15 Postmaster,
Miami, Florida,
19 December 1943.

GENERAL ORDERS)
NO. 2)

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN WING, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, ARMY AIR FORCES. 1. Pursuant to authority contained in Letter, War Department, The Adjutant General's Office, dated 10 November 1943, subject: "Discontinuance and Establishment of Certain Air Transport Command Activities" (file: AG 322 (3 Nov 43) CG-T-1000-1), and General Orders No. 20, HQ, AMEM, AIC, dated 24 December 1943, the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command is hereby organized and established, effective 0001 GMT, 15 December 1943.

II. CENTRAL AFRICA WING, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND. 1. The Central African Wing, Air Transport Command is organized as shown below, and will consist of the Stations indicated:

<u>STATION DESIGNATION</u>	<u>FOREIGN AIRFIELD</u>	<u>WING DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Station #1 (HQ) CAW-AIC	Accra	Station #1 (HQ) CAW-AIC	Accra
Station #2 CAW-AIC	Accra	Station #2 CAW-AIC	Accra
Station #3 CAW-AIC	Aden	Station #3 CAW-AIC	Aden
Station #4 CAW-AIC	El Fasher	Station #4 CAW-AIC	El Fasher
Station #5 CAW-AIC	El Gennina	Station #5 CAW-AIC	El Gennina
Station #6 CAW-AIC	Gara	Station #6 CAW-AIC	Arsara
Station #7 CAW-AIC	Kano	Station #7 CAW-AIC	Kano
Station #8 CAW-AIC	Khartoum	Station #8 CAW-AIC	Khartoum
Station #9 CAW-AIC	Lagos	Station #9 CAW-AIC	Lagos
Station #10 CAW-AIC	Nairobi	Station #10 CAW-AIC	Nairobi
Station #11 CAW-AIC	Basirah Island	Station #11 CAW-AIC	Basirah Island
Station #12 CAW-AIC	Roberts Field	Station #12 CAW-AIC	Roberts Field
Station #13 CAW-AIC	Solea	Station #13 CAW-AIC	Solea

2. These Stations not already activated and organized as shown will remain in their present status, with personnel thereof carried as on detached service from other stations, until further orders are issued.

III. A GENERAL BOUNDARY, CENTRAL AFRICAN WING. The Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, as an area, will include that portion of the African continent lying south of a line beginning on the 10° parallel of North Latitude west of the African Continent, east to the 10° meridian of West Longitude, north to the 15° parallel of North Latitude, east to the 5° meridian of East Longitude, north to the Tropic of Cancer, thence east to a North-South line drawn one mile west of the Western boundary of Karachi, India.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS. 1. Operations: Operational activities of the Central African Wing will be in accordance with War Department Memorandum W 95-6-43, entitled "Air Transport Operations", dated 26 February 1943.

2. Strength: The Central African Wing is authorized to attain a total strength of 799 Officers, 6 Variant Officers, and 4162 Enlisted Men.

3. The authorized strength is exclusive of Medical personnel now included in the Central African wing and further excludes personnel provided by Theatre Commanders, Air Service Command, Communications and Weather Services, as of 31 December 1943.

4. Personnel: a. Station strengths as indicated in inclosure #1, herewith, and including grades as shown, will not be exceeded without authority obtained from this Headquarters.

b. Army Air Forces Forms 127-A and/or 127-B will be prepared in accordance with the provisions of AAF Regulation 15-127.

By order of Colonel BROOKS:

C. B. BRIGGS,
Captain, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General.

3 Incls.

- Incl 1. Policy ltr #1, CAFV-ATC
- Incl 2. Policy ltr #2, CAFV-ATC
(Allotment of Enlisted Grades)
- Incl 3. Ltr "Reports of Change",
H. CAFV-ATC, 16 Dec 43

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C. B. BRIGGS,
C. B. BRIGGS,
Captain, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 2 - USAFIL
- 2 - WASC
- 2 - CAW, ATC
- 2 - CARIBBEAN WG, ATC
- 2 - EUROPEAN WG, ATC
- 2 - INDIA CHINA WG, ATC
- 1 - 15th Communication Sq
- 1 - 19th Weather Sq
- 2 - 8th ADG
- 2 - All Stations - AEST
- 1 - All Staff sections
- 5 - Hq NORTH AFRICAN WING, ATC

A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. C. Oleson
THOMAS J. C. OLESON,
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX II.

Army Air Forces
Headquarters, Air Transport
Washington 25

Classification Concerned or change
to ~~RESTRICTED~~
by authority of ~~Commanding Officer~~
NAFD-ATC
NAME ~~James W. Robinson~~
GRADE ~~Captain, U.S.~~
DATE ~~4/8/46~~

19 January 1944

SUBJECT: Establishment of the Central African Wing, Air Transport
Command.

TO: Commanding Officer, Central African Wing, Air Transport
Command, APO #625, c/o Postmaster, Miami, Florida.

1. Reference is made to General Orders #2 of Headquarters
Central African Wing, Air Transport Command dated 15 December 1943
issued in compliance with letter AG 322 (3 Nov 43) OB-I-AFHPG-M dated 10
November 1943, Subject: "Discontinuance and Establishment of Certain
Air Transport Command Activities."

2. It is noted that there are certain discrepancies between
General Orders #2 and the AG letter. Specifically, the AG letter
included in the list of authorized stations:-

Station #2, (Sector Hq) CAFWATC, Khartoum
Station #7, CAFWATC, Ft. Lamy
Station #8, CAFWATC, Gura
Station #16, CAFWATC, Takoradi

These stations were not listed in General Orders #2 as being activated
as specified in AG letter. This letter must be complied with in every
instance. If it is desired to retain the station, but not to station
personnel thereat, it should nevertheless be activated with no allotment
of strength made for station complement.

3. It is further noted that Station #8 is designated in the AG
letter as Gura. General Orders #2 designated Asmara as Station #8,
where no authority exists for this action.

4. In the event that no use whatsoever will be made of a partic-
ular station or stations for any purpose, or it is desired to activate
a station at a different location from those designated in the AG letter,
request for authority to inactivate or change the station or stations
must be made to this Headquarters, where an amendment to the AG letter
will be requested. (See paragraph 5c of AG letter.) For any deviation
from the AG letter, request must be made for authority to do so.

5. With regard to paragraph 2 of General Order No. 2, it will
generally be the policy of the Air Transport Command to assign personnel
representing the permanent station complement at a given station, which
is activated, who are physically on duty at that point. This policy will
be followed without regard to the number of personnel involved. In order
that unnecessary administrative overhead will not be created at stations
where such station complement is small in number, administration of such

personnel may be accomplished from an adjacent station with adequate administrative personnel, but separate organizational records of each station will be maintained. This policy is not to be construed as prohibiting detachment of personnel from one station for a temporary period of detached service at other stations.

6. It is directed that appropriate action be taken to comply with the AF letter and that request for authority to amend this letter be made to this Headquarters pursuant to the procedure outlined above.

By command of Major General GEORGE:

Samuel E. Gates
SAMUEL E. GATES
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Organization and
Contract Supervision

A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. Coulter

THOMAS J. COULTER,
Captain, Air Corps.

C O P Y

APPENDIX IV

AFM 882,
8 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing.

TO : Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C.
(Attention: The Air Inspector).

THROUGH: Commanding Officer, C.A.F.W. and Commanding General, Air
Transport Command.

I. The subject Wing was inspected by Major General Junius W. Jones, assisted by Colonel I. B. Mearns, U. S., Lieut. Colonel Thomas J. Watson, Jr., A.C., Lieut. Colonel R. H. McCatchee, and Major O'Naghten Deak Simpson. The following listed stations were visited during the period 30 May 1944 and 6 June 1944.

Accra
Keno
Maiduguri
El Fasher
Khartoum
Asmara
Aden
Salala
Masirah

II. TYPE OF INSPECTION.

1. Lieut. Colonel A. P. Kerr, Air Inspector of the C.A.F.W., accompanied the inspection party as liaison officer. Detailed deficiencies noted at each station were given to Colonel Kerr. This report is confined to broad observations and recommendations pertaining to the Wing as a whole rather than to any particular station. Time did not permit detailed inspection of any of the stations, but each station was inspected as thoroughly as practicable.

III. FULFILLMENT OF MISSION.

1. The primary mission of the C.A.F.W. is to facilitate the safe movement of tactical and transport aircraft over its routes and to move passengers, freight, and supplies as necessary in airplanes assigned to the Wing itself. In the accomplishment of this primary mission, the Wing is rated very satisfactory. Delays of aircraft are few and aircraft accidents, while not rare, are not thought to be excessive considering the operation involved.

2. The secondary mission of the Wing is that of efficient administration of its stations and general housekeeping. The Wing is rated satisfactory in the accomplishment of this secondary mission.

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dtd 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

3. Air Inspectors had not been appointed at any stations visited. Administrative and Technical Inspectors had been appointed, and in most cases were functioning to a limited extent. Tactical Inspectors had been appointed but were functioning only at Masirah and Khartoum. Non-commissioned officers were acting as inspectors at the small stations. It is believed that it will be necessary to appoint one officer at each station whose primary duty is that of Air Inspector in order to operate inspections effectively within the Wing. Coordinating inspection under one head will result not only in more effective inspection but in better corrective action which should be the endresult of all inspections. Those stations having too few officers to appoint an Air Inspector might be inspected by the Air Inspector of a neighboring station, if necessary, but this type of operation will demand close Wing supervision.

IV. TECHNICAL INSPECTION.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. Technical inspection has been set-up within the Wing for about six months and is functioning as well as can be expected under non-commissioned officers. These men cannot be very effective until they report through a station Air Inspector in order to give strength to their reports.

2. A Technical Inspection of the Wing has recently been made by the Wing Technical Inspector, Major Carroll. Major Carroll's report was obtained at each station which he had inspected and used as a guide. In all cases, subsequent inspection indicated that Major Carroll was giving ratings to technical activities which were higher than conditions warranted. The usual wing rating was excellent and none were found lower than "very satisfactory". Condition of activities indicated that usual rating should be "very satisfactory", with some units definitely "unsatisfactory". Station Inspectors generally were giving ratings higher than conditions warranted but stated when questioned that they were following the lead of the Wing Inspector.

3. Each station visited had at least one complete file of Technical Orders, and deliveries of indexes and new Technical Orders appear to be adequate. Distribution of Technical Orders is made from Wing headquarters at Accra. Sufficient emphasis is not being laid on prompt delivery of new ordered Technical Orders to outlying stations.

4. Crash trucks and ambulances were inspected at each station. Equipment was usually complete but standard operating procedures to be followed in cases of crash were non-existent or so vague as to be ineffective. Some of the trucks had regularly assigned drivers and native crews, while others depended upon engineering personnel who happened to be on the line at the time of the crash. This practice prohibits proper training for crash crews, because the truck is driven by a different person each time it is run. Maintenance of equipment is sub-standard when the truck is not assigned to a regular driver, because responsibility for the truck is not confined in one man. Because of the manpower situation, it is believed that each crash truck should be assigned to a competent American driver with a suitable native crew assigned and trained on the equipment.

C O P Y

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dtd 8 June '42
(Cont'd).

5. Communications outlets, control towers, crash trucks, and flight surgeons offices are usually poor, but the radio communications equipment was usually in order. It would be desirable to have a radio receiver set on lower frequency in either the crash truck or the ambulance at each station to aid in reaching airplanes which crash off the airport.

6. Motor maintenance and supply and functioning adequately throughout the Wing, except that difficulties were encountered in obtaining automotive supplies from stations east of Kano. These stations draw their automotive supplies from U.S.A.F. T.E. Quartermaster Depot in Cairo through A.T.C. in Liberton. It is believed that the A.T.C. Liaison Officer of this Wing stationed in Cairo should be directed to expedite automotive supply from that location.

7. Control towers were operating in an excellent manner throughout the Wing. Visibility from most of the towers was poor, because of the smudges of the face of glass in the windows. One large pane of glass in each tower would narrow visibility a great deal. Construction on a new tower at El Fasher by the British has been stopped recently on orders from Liberton. The present tower is inadequate and an effort to obtain permission to continue construction on the new tower should be made.

8. Radio messages and radio circuits operated by A.A.C.B. in the Wing are well maintained and efficiently operated. Towers are usually located a mile or more from the airport and are guarded in some cases by natives, and in other cases not guarded at all. Lack of sabotage indicates that A.A.C.B. guards are perhaps not necessary, but it is believed that the security of the wings transmitters should be reviewed.

9. Fuel servicing is done either from underground pits or from tank trucks. All fuel is pumped into planes through hoses as other operations are not convenient in the storage tanks. Most fuel trucks are U.S. Army owned, but some are rented where regular fuel service is desired. Only one gas station is in the Wing. This is at Fasher and is at Kadi.

10. There is a fuel servicing and storage installation at El Fasher, which has a 10,000 barrel capacity. This unit is owned by the U.S. Army but has never been tested or used. All fuel is stored by the U.S.A.F. in drums and loss through evaporation is great. This unit should be placed in operation at once.

11. There is no attempt at traffic separation or control throughout the Wing, except that planes fly at one altitude going in one direction and over in the other. It is believed that a program of traffic control should be initiated at once to provide for altitude separation of all aircraft flying within one-half (1/2) hour of each other between control points. It is possible that two, or possibly three, planes could be flown in each thousand feet of altitude.

12. Quonset huts are used as barracks at several of the desert locations. These huts are uncomfortable at night, because of lack of circulation of air. It is believed that if the lower half of the sides of these huts could be modified to permit them to be folded up, circulation of air and comfort of occupants would be improved.

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dtd 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

12. Most stations on the route have properly planned and published Instrument Letdown Procedures. There has been no procedure of this type set-up for Asmara or Saiela, and while these airports are not well adapted to instrument approaches, it is felt that procedures should be set up for them, marked for emergency use only. Then, if an aircraft is in distress in the vicinity of one of these stations, there will at least be a possibility of a safe letdown.

13. Security of gasoline storage was generally adequate throughout the Wing, but cases were observed where the boundaries of the base were guarded and gasoline storage area neglected, because it lay within the boundaries of the base. This was true of gasoline storage at Masirah Island. Because of the fire hazard, it is believed that gasoline storage area should be guarded in all cases.

14. Difficulties were being encountered throughout the Wing in keeping the refrigerators in operating condition. The correct operation of these units is very important, because of the high temperature and the necessity of preserving food. Supply of spare parts is slow, and knowledge of maintenance is lacking. If a team of refrigerator repair experts were organized to travel through the Wing to inspect and repair the units, the present critical situation would be greatly alleviated.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that:

1. Technical inspection be placed under a commissioned officer Air Inspector at all stations.
2. Crash trucks be manned by at least one soldier and necessary native crew, and that frequent drills be carried on.
3. Standard operating procedures for aircraft accidents be set up at each station, including best routes to locations outside the airbases.
4. Crash truck or ambulance at each station be equipped with a radio receiver to aid in locating crashes.
5. C.A.F.W. Liaison officer in Cairo be directed to expedite delivery of motor maintenance parts through U.S.A.F.I.M.E. to Khartoum.
6. Security of all radio range stations be studied.
7. Fuel storage unit at Kano be placed in operation, if possible.
8. A study be made of traffic separation and control with a view toward establishing a program of separation in altitude and distance.
9. The Wing Technical Inspector make an effort to give ratings more in keeping with the actual conditions found at a given installation. This is the only way that rating may be made to be effective and standard throughout the Wing.

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dated 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

10. Quonset huts be modified in desert use to provide greater ventilation.
11. Instrument landing procedures be set up in Salala and Asmara to be used in emergencies only.
12. A refrigeration maintenance team be set up to travel throughout the Wing to inspect and repair refrigerators.
13. Security of gasoline storage be checked at all stations for adequate guard against sabotage or fire.

VI. TACTICAL INSPECTION, CENTRAL AFRICAN WING, A.F.C.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. Tactical inspection throughout the wing is just being organized and only two stations visited had written tactical inspection reports on file.
2. There has been very little training as regards firing of weapons throughout the Wing. This is especially noted in the case of men detailed to use of weapons in defense of code rooms, radio ranges, etc.
3. Base defense plans are practically non-existent throughout the stations of the Wing; also adequate plans for defense and/or destruction in cryptographic rooms.
4. At some stations weather maps are prepared four times daily, while at other stations (Masirah) only one map is prepared.
5. No photographs of airports or check points en route are available in a folder for pilots to take with them.
6. Although British D/F. equipment is available at some points along the route, no standard operating procedure was available at the stations to brief the crews on the use of these facilities.
7. Main briefings for the route are held at Accra and Khartoum, with very little, if any, supplementary briefings at other stations.
8. No ground safety program in effect at Wing stations, and Wing stations are not receiving ground safety literature.
9. Armed Forces Institute courses have been and are being given much publicity in this Wing, and personnel at each station visited were aware of the opportunities offered. The Wing is to be commended for its excellent work in making the personnel aware of these educational facilities.
10. At no station visited were aircraft being excessively held up, evidence of the skill and resourcefulness of Wing personnel under the very difficult conditions existing.

C O P Y

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dated 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that:

1. Effort be made to establish a uniform and efficient tactical inspection system throughout the whole wing.
2. All personnel assigned weapons in emergency defense plans be given training on these weapons immediately and all other personnel be fired as soon as possible.
3. Defense and security plans be drawn up at each station and personnel be familiarized with same.
4. A wing policy be established as to the number of weather maps to be prepared daily at each station, and weather personnel be assigned on that basis.
5. That a route folder consisting of photographs of airports and check points be prepared for the use of all tactical crews flying the route.
6. Complete instructions be given to crews on the use of British D/F equipment available on the route.
7. Supplementary briefing be emphasized more at all stations on this route, emphasizing obstructions, available radio facilities, check points, and emergency or alternate fields.
8. That a Ground safety program be instituted at all stations and that the Wing requisition Ground Safety literature for distribution to the stations.

VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. The overall observation of administration in this Wing is satisfactory. There is a lack of standard operation procedure for Adjutants, which results in those bases having aggressive Adjutants have above the average administration (Wing Headquarters and Khartoum). The majority of stations in the Wing (Accra, Kano, Maidururi, El Fasher, Asmara, Aden, Balala, Masirah Island) do not have adequate control of correspondence and as a result have no idea of how much open business they have on hand. They do not have an adequate follow-up system to insure action on correspondence. At El Fasher it was found that no record was kept of confidential correspondence. Only secret documents were recorded.
2. The Administrative Inspectors throughout the Wing do not seem to have the overall concept of their duties. The Administrative Inspector's office at Khartoum was the best seen and was replete with reference data, schedules of inspection, and a follow-up system on corrective

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, Ctd 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

actions recommended in inspection reports. In all other bases there were no schedules of inspections or other plans for the execution of inspection duties.

3. Most of the bases in the Wing have had a parade of inspectors, few of which have left any report or memorandum for the instruction of the Commanding Officer; nor has any report even received through channels.

4. The majority of the bases in the Wing do not have Guard Houses. Those that find a Guard house necessary are maintaining them in excellent manner.

5. The barracks for the personnel of the Wing are excellent considering the conditions. They are well policed and provide maximum comfort for the locations.

6. Although it is realized that the accomplishment of the primary mission of the Air Transport Command is not judged by neatness of its bases, some stations stand out as being conducted in a soldierly and orderly manner, while others show a laxity and general disregard for orderliness. It is difficult to see how efficient administration can be conducted in disorderly surroundings. Kano, Khartoum, Accra were outstanding for their well policed grounds; Asmara, El Fasher and Maiduguri have room for improvement.

7. Post Exchanges and recreation facilities throughout the Wing are excellent. In some instances there is too sharp a contrast in the Officers' Club and the recreation room for enlisted men (Kano, Maiduguri, and El Fasher). It is understood that additional funds are being provided to correct this situation.

8. Messes throughout the Wing are excellent. Every effort seems to have been made to maintain the highest standard of sanitation. At Kano, Maiduguri, and Khartoum considerable resourcefulness has been exhibited. At Guala and Masirah Island the most difficult handicaps have been overcome.

9. There is a general laxity in the security of arms. At two bases it was found that guns are not properly stored to protect them from thieves. At one base, Maiduguri, enlisted men are allowed to keep their rifles in their quarters. Considering the practice of allowing the natives to wander freely through the buildings, this is considered dangerous.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is recommended that some standard practice for the control of correspondence, follow-up, and other procedures for Adjutants be published by the Wing Headquarters for the guidance of all stations.

2. It is recommended that Administrative Inspectors be schooled by the Wing, either by a handbook, correspondence course, or by having a qualified officer visit each station and instruct the Administrative Inspectors in the proper execution of their duties.

C O P Y

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dtd 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

3. It is recommended that an effort be made to have the inspections of the stations made by teams of inspectors. This will relieve stations from the burden of continual parade of inspectors.

4. It is recommended that all inspectors submit a report through channels or a memorandum to the Commanding Officer so that he will have a record of the recommendation of the inspectors.

5. It is recommended that security of areas be given special attention by Wing inspectors.

6. It is recommended that the same standard of neatness of grounds and personnel and attention to discipline, as observed at some stations, be made general throughout the Wing. (Accra and Khartoum).

A. MEDICAL.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. Dispensaries and other medical facilities of this wing are very well equipped, clean, well arranged, and very well administered. Exceptional initiative and ingenuity has been exercised in improvising needed equipment and furniture and in making repairs and spare parts for medical, as well as mess, equipment out of salvaged material.

2. Medical personnel interviewed, both commissioned and enlisted, appeared to be well trained and well qualified for their duties.

3. Morale among medical personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, appeared to be very good considering the environment and isolation of stations. There was, however, considerable outspoken criticism concerning the failure of the eighteen month rotation policy. As expressed by several of the enlisted personnel, it would have been much better not to have introduced a rotation policy at all than to have introduced the eighteen month rotation policy and to have the policy fail through lack of transportation to and from the United States, or because of any other reason. A considerable number of the enlisted personnel, both medical and Air Force, have been in the theatre, or overseas, for twenty to twenty-seven months, and they are very frustrated. Many flying personnel, especially, this way, if continued, would result in a permanent loss of flying efficiency or desire to fly.

4. Disease rates.

a. The malaria rates in this wing vary from 500 to 300 per 1000 per annum during the rainy season at such stations as Accra and Maiduguri to zero the year round at our Arabian desert stations, where there is little or no rain and few or no mosquitoes. Procedures such as draining and oiling, clearing away undergrowth and grass, and enforcement of malaria prevention discipline appear to be excellent throughout this wing. The intensity of this work in such areas as Accra and Maiduguri is difficult to visualize, unless actually observed.

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dtd 8 June '44 (Cont'd).

b. The venereal disease rate in this wing varies from 50.3 per 1000 per annum at Accra, at the time of this inspection, to zero at El Fochi and at our Arabian desert stations, where few or no cases are available. The venereal rate at stations where women, black or light, are available has, however, begun to increase recently for no apparent reason, unless perhaps it may be one of the side-effects of the morale among the troops caused by the failure to carry out the announced rotation policy. None of the new individual prophylactic units has been received at this wing.

c. Aside from the two diseases, malaria and venereal, there were but very few other diseases with a noteworthy rate. Acute upper respiratory diseases, and a few diarrheas of mild or moderate type flare up occasionally. Prickly heat in the desert stations occasionally becomes a problem. Dressing in loose short sleeve shirts and slacks seems to assist one of the personnel to avoid suffering from this very distressing affliction.

3. Medical supplies and equipment in the forward have been adequate and in the stations west of Khartoum requisitions have been promptly filled. However, in stations east of Khartoum, failure to promptly fill requisitions increased as the distance from Khartoum increased, until at Aden and still farther east in Arabian stations from two to three months elapses from the time a requisition is forwarded until the required medical supplies are received. The reason for these delays appears to be the requirement in this Wing that all requisitions for medical supplies be sent to Accra, Wing Headquarters, for approval, thence being returned back through Khartoum to Cairo, the Medical Supply Depot servicing this wing. After reaching Cairo, the requisitions are promptly filled and the required medical supplies are shipped directly to the station that originally submitted the requisition.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. It is urgently recommended that the new individual prophylactic units (10% sulphadiazine in 50% calomel ointment) be shipped by air transport, in adequate quantities, direct to each Senior Flight Surgeon or Station Surgeon in this Wing, such shipment being accompanied by a directive that these tubes be issued gratis to all male military personnel desiring them and that all male military personnel be carefully instructed in the technique of their use.

2. It is recommended that the routing of requisitions for medical supplies, originating at stations in this Wing that are located east of Khartoum, be shortened and that every reasonable effort be made to hasten the filling of these requisitions more expeditiously. The routing of these requisitions could be shortened very considerably if the Wing Surgeon would delegate the authority to the Surgeon at Khartoum to approve these requisitions and promptly forward them to the Supply Depot at Cairo.

COPY

Report of Informal Inspection of the Central African Wing, dtd 8 June '44
(Cont'd).

3. Recommend that every possible effort be made to speed up the accomplishment of rotation of personnel after eighteen (18) months service in this wing. Due to the heat, dust, isolation, and less favorable living conditions at the Arabian stations of this wing, it is recommended that personnel of these stations be rotated within the wing every few months.

JUNIUS T. JONES,
Major General, U.S.A.,
The Air Inspector.

A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. C. Uheras

THOMAS J. C. UHERAS,
Capt Air, Air Corps.

APPENDIX V.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH, CANW, 1943 - 44

End of Period	AFC Total	AC Total	AIR CORPS OFFICERS			AFC & SERVICES AS			
			Total	Pilots	Other	MI	Total	Q	SA
<u>1943</u>									
4th Qtr.	2,741	2,432	568	313	250	1,964	309	75	234
<u>1944</u>									
Jan.	3,013	2,643	558	324	234	2,095	370	87	273
Feb.	3,184	2,968	614	372	242	2,254	316	94	222
Mar.	3,265	3,016	589	348	241	2,427	249	95	154
Apr.	3,231	3,006	583	347	233	2,421	275	109	166

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

*Daniel W. Rohrbaugh*DANIEL W. ROHRBAUGH
1st Lt., Air Corps.Prepared by:
Statistical Control Division
Air Transport Command
15 June 1944

CA-159,47

Station #1

322 (incl)

17 April 1944

SUBJECT: Utilization of Manpower.

TO : Commanding General, Air Transport Command, Washington 25, D.C.

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter from Headquarters, ATC, Washington, D.C., subject: "Utilization of Manpower", dated 9 March 1944, there is submitted the following information:

- a. As of 31 March 1944, the percentage of misassigned Air Corps enlisted men in ATC is 3.3. This is the result of a conscientious and continuous effort by this Headquarters to place each man in the job for which he has been trained. This effort will continue.
- b. An "Officers' Certification Committee" is functioning which actively inquires into and reports on the qualifications of all officers of this wing. In addition to this, officer certification work has been assigned as a full time duty to an especially qualified officer of this Headquarters. It is his duty to coordinate and cooperate with the Officer Certification Committee and at all times to keep the Commanding Officer notified of the status and efficiency of all officers of this wing. It is expected that this procedure will take apparent all instances of officer inefficiency and that corrective action will be taken where necessary.
- c. In order to better control the personnel situation of this wing, one officer in each of the staff sections of this Headquarters has been assigned the additional duty of liaison officer between his staff section and the Personnel Section. It is his duty to know the personnel problems peculiar to his staff section and to assist the Assistant Executive for Personnel in solving them.
- d. There are no AWOL's assigned to the Central African wing.
- e. There is a considerable number of native personnel employed as laborers throughout this wing, providing the necessity for any considerable number of basic soldiers. Under existing conditions it is impractical to employ more or female white civilian help.

4. This Headquarters is employing every possible means to effect proper assignment and to conserve personnel. The 95 percent of assignment indicates the success of our efforts, and you may be assured that this work will be vigorously continued.

WALTER S. STEWELL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

A TRUE COPY

Thomas D. Caulahan

Thomas D. Caulahan,
Capt. U. S. Army.

APPENDIX VII.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS STATION #1 (HQ) CACT

Proceedings of a board of officers convened at Station #1 (HQ) CACT pursuant to paragraph 3, Special Orders No. 157, Headquarters, Central African Wing, dated 5 June 1944, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

The board met pursuant to the following order at Station #1 on the following dates: 6 June, 8 June, 11 June, 19 June, 23 June, 24 June, 25 June, and 30 June, 1944.

PURPOSE: To conduct a survey of the utilization of personnel in the Central African Wing, Air Transport Command, and to ascertain the desired Air Transport Command strength for the Central African Wing by station and department to effect as efficient an organization as is possible, consistent with expected operating requirements.

METHOD:

1. Determination of operational requirements based on available information.
2. Recommended changes in operational policy.
3. Combination of assignments where practical and economical, regardless of department concerned.
4. Consideration of manpower savings from the efficiency standpoint of private enterprise.
5. Careful analysis of functions performed through private survey and consultation with department representatives and board members.
6. Detailed analysis of each section accomplished by conference of manpower board.
7. Analysis of comparison of reports submitted by Field Representatives, Major Tanner and Lieutenant Mashinney.

FINDINGS:

1. A 20% reduction in assigned Air Transport Command strength can be accomplished without affecting operating efficiency.
2. Certain entire installations can be eliminated and the airports used only for alternate landing fields.
3. Some stations should be maintained principally for service activities.

4. The elimination of certain sections can be effected without hindering Central African Wing operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Air Transport Command personnel at Benson Field be removed and the landing strip used only as an emergency field.

2. That only one AACS enlisted man remain at El Gensina to maintain the range and beacon and all other U. S. Army personnel be removed and the field used only for operational emergencies.

3. That the strength of Lagos be reduced by 45% and the remaining officer and men be used for the handling of meat shuttles and in cases of emergency landings.

4. That Asmara personnel be reduced by 35%; the remaining officer and men to handle furlough planes, meat shuttles, and emergency landings when necessary.

5. That Salala, Arabia, be classified as an operational alternate and personnel reduced by 45%.

6. That Kano, Nigeria, be reduced by 40% contingent upon the availability of fuel at Maiduguri.

7. That during the rainy season (through October) the personnel at Roberts Field be reduced by 40%.

8. That the entire Chemical Warfare Section be declared surplus in order that their services may be more fully utilized elsewhere.

9. That the Central African Wing be reduced in Air Transport Command personnel strength as follows:

		<u>Officer</u>	
Present	694	Proposed	477
		Reduction	217

Percentage of Reduction is 31.5%

		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
Present	2619	Proposed	2204
		Reduction	435

Percentage of Reduction is 16.5%

Total Percentage of Reduction is 20% (including O & E)

SUMMARY: Exhibits "C" to "P" inclusive were submitted by the departmental representative board member and other officers as requested for the consideration of the board. Exhibit "B" (CAFV Personnel Summary Sheet) represents the conclusions reached by the board members after consideration of "C" to "P" exhibits. Consequently, in some cases Exhibit "B" (Personnel Summary

Report of Proceedings of Board of Officers, Station #1 (HQ), CAW.

Sheet) does not coincide with the other exhibits. The services of attached units, except where specifically mentioned, were assumed to remain constant and available for service to Central African Wing.

To the best of the knowledge and belief of the undersigned officers, the conclusions reached represent fair, impartial, and unbiased decisions, as determined by majority opinion, and the personnel reductions indicated can be effected without detriment to the accomplishment of the primary mission of the Central African Wing.

The board adjourned at 1600 GMT, 30 June, 1944.

/s/ William D. Wersen
WILLIAM D. WERSEN
Major, Air Corps,
Member.

/s/ Louis O. Carroll,
LOUIS O. CARROLL,
Major, Air Corps,
President

WAR ROEBEREN TANNER,
Major, Air Corps,
Member.

/s/ Seymour Deffin,
SEYMOUR DEFFIN,
1st Lt, A.G.D.,
Recorder.

/s/ Benjamin F. McDaniel
BENJAMIN F. MCDANIEL,
Major, Air Corps,
Member.

/s/ John E. Martin,
JOHN E. MARTIN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Member.

/s/ James B. Crahan,
JAMES B. CRAHAN,
Captain, Air Corps,
Member.

A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. Coulahan
THOMAS J. COULAHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX VIII.

Army Air Forces
HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AIRCOM WING
Air Transport Command
Station #1

CIRCULAR)
NO. 1)

AFD 625, c/o PE,
Miami, Florida,
5 January 1944.

SUBJECT: SECTION:
Appointment of Flight Officers to Commissioned Grades.....I
Judge Advocate General Officer Candidate School.....II
Requisitions for Blank Forms.....III

I. APPOINTMENT OF FLIGHT OFFICERS TO COMMISSIONED GRADES:

1. Information has been received from Headquarters, USAF, stating that the authority to appoint Flight Officers to commissioned grades in the Army of the United States has been withdrawn, and that only those Flight Officers who have demonstrated their fitness for appointment in actual combat will be considered eligible for appointment.

2. In view of the above instructions, no applications for appointment will be submitted to this Headquarters unless the above requirement has been met by applicant.

II. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL:

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Radio A-COM 520, dated 3 January 1944, Headquarters, C. A. W. A. T. C., the following is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

"The Judge Advocate General is continuing to accept and select qualified applicants for the Judge Advocate General Officer Candidate School, at Fort Arden, Michigan, in accordance with Section 7, AF 625-5, Grade 5b. Recently the number of applications received for consideration by The Judge Advocate General has declined appreciably. Publicity will be given in all commands and activities to encourage qualified individuals to apply. Commanders are destined to assist in securing qualified applicants for this school in order that selection of best qualified from Army at large may be assured. However, this action will in no way be construed as lowering standards for acceptance and selections set forth in AF 625-5."

III. REQUISITIONS FOR BLANK FORMS:

1. Attention is directed to the instructions listed below, concerning the preparation of requisitions for blank forms being forwarded

to this Headquarters:

- a. Requisition will be submitted in triplicate.
 - b. Requisition will include the Form Number, Title, and Amount of needed supplies.
 - c. Requisition will be made to cover a three months period, wherever possible.
 - d. Amounts of forms requested will be based on the strength of the unit, and the period of time covered by the requisition.
2. Care will be exercised to void "over-requisitioning". Requisitions received which are obviously greater than the actual needs of the station will be returned for correction.
3. It is imperative that these instructions be followed in order that requisitions may be expedited without delay, thereby keeping all stations supplied with needed forms.

By order of Colonel STOVELL:

C. B. BRIGGS,
Captain, A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs,
C. B. BRIGGS,
Captain, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - All Staff Sections, HQ, CAFW-ATC.
- 1 - All Stations, CAFW-ATC.
- 1 - 8th Air Depot Group.

A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. Coulahan
THOMAS J. COULAHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX IX.

Army Air Forces
HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
Air Transport Command
Station #1

In reply
refer to:
220.3

AGO 625, c/o PM,
Miami, Florida,
31 January 1944.

POLICY LETTER NO. 6

SUBJECT: Rotation of Enlisted Men among Stations of CAFW.

TO: Commanding Officers, All Stations, CAFW-ITC.

1. A program of personnel rotation for enlisted men of the Central African Wing between Wing stations will become effective immediately. This program is designated to afford the greatest possible variety of service offered by the areas through which this command is operating in order to relieve the monotony of long continued duty assignments in any single locality.
2. No mass shifting of personnel is contemplated; rather, instances of rotation will arise from individual cases, based upon recommendations made by department heads, through station commanders.
3. Recommendation will be made whenever it becomes apparent that an individual, through long or otherwise overly fatiguing service at a particular station, will definitely benefit from a change of surroundings. Shifts will be made, as far as possible, among men of equal rank, with similar training and ability. Consideration will be given in every instance to the desires of the enlisted man concerned regarding the proposed change, it being obvious that little benefit could be derived from the rotation of personnel who neither need nor desire a change of location.
4. It is the responsibility of station commanders to insure that the provisions of this policy are understood by department heads, and executed in accordance with the best interests of this command. Attempts made to take advantage of the plan in order to transfer men for reasons other than those outlined herein, will not be tolerated. On the other hand, every effort will be made to facilitate the rotation of qualified men, for whom a change will be advantageous both to themselves and to the efficiency of overall operations.
5. Recommendations will be made in writing, to include the name, rank, and specific duty assignment of the individual, together with a statement by the station commander to the effect that the individual concerned is fully qualified to perform the duties indicated.

6. Except in cases where hospitalization or medical treatment in the United States is required, there is no program presently in existence under which King ground personnel may be reassigned to domestic duty after the completion of any specific period of service overseas. Present duty assignments must therefore be regarded as of indefinite duration.

7. It must be realized that the urgent necessity for prosecuting the war to a victorious and speedy conclusion is of first importance and that the improvement of conditions of service must be regarded, in comparison with this great issue, as a matter which must be deferred until military necessities are satisfied. At the same time, it should not be understood that the conditions of tropical service are lightly regarded or have been looked upon with indifference. On the contrary, the relief of overseas personnel, particularly those serving in the tropics, has and is receiving earnest consideration, but it must not be anticipated that any relief policy involving transfer to the United States will be put in effect until the unforeseeable circumstances of war permit.

/s/ James S. Stowell,
JAMES S. STOWELL,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. Coulter
THOMAS J. COULTER,
Captain, Air Corps.

10-057/brb

Station #1.

319.1

27 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Report on Wing Survey.

TO : Commanding General, Air Transport Command,
Washington, D. C.
(Attn.: Chief, Intelligence & Security Division.)

Transmitted herewith is a report on the results of a survey, conducted by Capt. Arthur H. Sherry, made of the Stations in the Central Africa Wing.

For the Commanding Officer:

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

Monte A. Spear
MONTA A. SPEAR,
1st. Lieut., Air Corps.

/s/ C. B. Briggs,
/c/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

1 Inc: Survey of Wing Stations.

RESTRICTED	
by order of Commanding Officer	
NAFD-ATC	
NAME	<i>Donald W. G. Laugh</i>
GRADE	<i>Captain, A.C.</i>
DATE	<i>1/27/44</i>

Classification cancelled or changed
to ~~RESTRICTED~~
by authority of Commanding Officer
NAFD-ATC
NAME *James W. Robinson*
GRADE *Captain A.C.* Auth.: OO-CAFW
DATE *1/14/44* Initials *AC*
Date.....

~~SECRET~~

10-AHS/brb

Station #1

319.1

21 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Survey of Wing Stations.

TO : Commanding Officer CAFW-ATC.

1. This report is based upon a survey of all stations in the Central Africa Wing with the exception of Asmara, Roberts Field and the 4 Southern Route stations. The survey commenced 8 January 44 at Masira Island and ended 18 January 44 at Kano. Its primary object was to examine existing security procedures, installations and personnel, but in addition thereto a number of other matters deemed to be of interest to various staff sections of this Headquarters will be noted herein.

a. MASIRA ISLAND

(1) Security: Masira is a desert island approximately 35 miles long which by virtue of its isolation is free from any major security problem except for possible attacks from the sea. The convoy route from the Persian Gulf to Middle East ports passes close by and during the first week of January submarine activity (Japanese) has been intense. Part of an RAF Squadron is located here for anti-submarine and convoy escort duty. Its Headquarters are at Sharjah and its total personnel including service units numbers about 250. At present it is operating with 4 to 5 Catalinas and 2 or 3 Wellingtons, but it is anticipated that these aircraft will be replaced with Liberators.

In addition to this RAF detachment, an India Defense force is stationed on the Island numbering about 200 men and officers. From this force guards are drawn for the fuel dump, and landing stage. No regular perimeter patrol is maintained and there is no radar installation, but several of the aircraft are radar equipped. There are machine gun installations located in strongpoints at various strategic places at the northern end of the Island where the airfield is located. The entire airport area is within the field of fire of these installations.

Poor equipment, lack of maintenance parts and the lack of surface vessel support have been blamed by the RAF for its failure at this point to be able to claim credit for any substantial number of successful strikes against submarines. For the whole Southern Arabian coastal zone none of the RAF officers interviewed had knowledge of any successful strike except one.

Fifty six natives are employed at the Air Transport Command Station. The British use many more but the usual petty thievery committed by native employees at other stations does not exist here, doubtless because of the relative difficulty of leaving the Island. Native should operate constantly between Masira and Muscat, and it is usually a simple matter to search all departing natives in the event that any thefts occur. The only instance of thievery known to the Commanding Officer was the recent theft of money from ^{RAF} of the native ATC employees.

- (2) Fire Protection: One Officer acts as a Fire Marshall for the station and extinguishers of various types are located in all station buildings. A fire truck is maintained by the British but mechanical difficulties make it necessary to park this truck on the slope of hill some distance from the camp so that it may be started by permitting it to roll down grade in gear. There is no emergency fire-drill schedule set up and no fire alarm system. It should be noted however, that the fire hazard is not too great as there are but few buildings, most of them Wissen or Quonset huts, all of which are widely dispersed.
- (3) Air Sea Rescue: During the time this survey was made an American vessel, the S.S. Hoke, was torpedoed close to Masira Island. The ship's distress signal was picked up by a Royal Navy station at Karachi and relayed to Masira by way of Muscat with the result that considerable delay ensued before the RAF Squadron at Masira was able to dispatch aircraft to the scene. This was due to the refusal of the Commanding Officer of the RAF to require his radio station to guard 500 kcs. He had previously been requested to do so by the ATC Station Commander but declined on the ground that he was not "authorized." In this connection a similar request had been made of the RAF at their

Headquarters in Aden by the ATC Intelligence Officer there with similar lack of success. The RAF took the position that is the Navy's task to concern itself with distress signals which was a cause of some concern inasmuch as Royal Navy stations are too widely dispersed to give any assurance that they would be in range of any of the transmitters on ATC aircraft which might find themselves in distress. In any event, the torpedoing of the Hoke was apparently sufficient to change the attitude of the RAF who are now guarding 500kcs. as we had requested.

b. SALALA

- (1) Security: This station is located in the territory of the Sultan of Oman and Muscat who governs the coastal people at Salala with feudal severity. Almost adjoining the mud-constructed town of Salala, which is about a mile from the field, is the Sultan's capital of Dhofar. Here he has a palace which is being re-constructed largely by slave labor under the direction of an Indian engineer who is the only person in the native settlement speaking English. The Sultan maintains a private army, the members of which are called Askaris whose principle function is to guard the Salala plain from possible depredations by the wild and uncivilized hill people to the north. The Sultan supplies 12 of his Askaris to guard the ATC camp area; similar guards protect the RAF and BOAC installations at the field. It is impossible to leave the camp without taking an Askari guard along as an escort. This is required by the Sultan to insure among other things that visitors among his people will not offend against their customs and religious sensibilities. For example, smoking is not permitted off the Base and all Europeans must be out of the native city just before sunset which marks the hour of prayer. Justice is swift and severe. If a native steals, for example, one of his hands is cut off so that from the point of view of protection from possible thievery this area is without doubt one of the most secure bases in the entire Command.

Within the military reservation the British maintain security troops numbering about 100 composed of Arabian Levies from Aden. These are regarded by all as professional petty thieves and are strongly suspected of making off with a shipment of 500 Maria Theresa Dollars which they were charged with guarding for BOAC.

(SALALA) This incident together with the theft of about \$200 from an American sergeant, comprises the total known crime wave at Salala. (A safe is available at Station Headquarters where the men may keep their valuables.)

Attack from the sea is considered improbable since the airport is three and a half miles from the sea which is too shallow to permit a close approach except from Cape Risut, 8 miles to the west which is used as an anchorage by supply ships.

- (2) RAF: A staging unit is maintained here for the purpose of supplying ATC and SOAC (the latter organization have the largest permanent buildings at this field which are now largely unused.) A tactical anti-submarine unit was temporarily operating from this field with 3 Blenheims and an occasional visiting Wellington. For the last month submarine sightings by ATC aircraft have been frequent, averaging about 2 per week. F/O Painter is the RAF Officer in charge. He reported the usual difficulties with equipment that hampered effective operations which is supplemented by information by the ATC Station Commander to the effect that unusual delay seemed to exist between the time the sub-sighting was reported and the time and operational flight was authorized. In fairness it should be pointed out that as to one such incident the RAF explained that a patrol aircraft already in the area responded to the same report.

Information was also received here that ATC aircraft have been remaining in the vicinity of sighted submarines. In one instance an IDU unit circled a surfaced sub for 30 minutes. Such practices are not only foolhardy but extremely dangerous and also have a tendency to cause the sighted sub to submerge thus ruining any opportunity for a successful strike. This matter was called to the attention of the Chief Pilot at Asen and all pilots are being emphatically warned to get out of the vicinity of any surfaced subs.

- (3) Food Supply: There is ample fresh water in the Salala area and primitive irrigation systems have been developed for the growing of crops. Although there is no surplus for export, small amounts of local produce are purchased for the ATC mess. Fishing is highly developed by the natives and the supply for food purposes is practically unlimited. Fresh beef is also available for the camp.

c. ADEN (SHEIK OTHMAN)

- (1) **Security:** The airfield, fuel dumps, warehouses, and the main entrance gate here are guarded by British native security troops (Arabian Levies). The RAF uses this field only sea kind of rest camp or staging area, all of their operations being conducted at Khormaksar Aerodrome. Sheik Othman is one of the few airfields in the Wing under the sole operational control of the Air Transport Command. There are no military police presently assigned to provide for interior guard except for 2 or 3 enlisted men who check persons entering and leaving the field by the main gate. The native guards provide a reasonable amount of perimeter security at this station; being most effective in preventing intrusion and thievery by natives. These native guards are useful and effective when it is not necessary for them to exercise any discretion. Thus if one is placed at an aircraft and to prevent anyone from approaching it, he will guard it with his life but if he is told that he is not admit some persons but exclude others he will become confused and ineffective. These guards are under the direction of British officers who are included to carry out their own security plans for the field without such regard for certain changes which have been recommended by the station Intelligence Officer. It was observed also that guard stations are not continuously manned. During the night of 12 January, a C-47 was parked near the ramp in the darkness and beyond the observation of tower personnel without any guard whatever although normally the native soldier is continuously stationed on the ramp. This aircraft was unlocked and unlighted and, for all practical purposes, completely unprotected.

The 35 military police who will be assigned to this station are the minimum necessary to insure a satisfactory degree of security. It should be pointed however, that the Commanding Officer is adamant about using them almost entirely for policing the town of Aden, about seven and a half miles distant. It is his understanding that he is responsible for the discipline of all Americans in the area particularly merchant seamen and troops who may come ashore for passing convoys. As far as station personnel are concerned, so much of the town is restricted to them and it is so difficult and expensive to obtain transportation that there is no station personnel disciplinary problem of any consequence. It appears certain from the conversations with British civil and military authorities that only a more or less nominal town patrol by B.P.s will ever be required.

ADEN (SHEIK OTHMAN) As a matter of fact, Major Swayne of the Aden police and S/L Brettel, RAF Security Officer at Aden, are strongly of the opinion that the presence of M.F.s in town on the scale contemplated by the station commander would not only be unnecessary but would be apt to provoke trouble. It was then suggested that if the commanding officer insisted in policing Aden that his M.F.s be kept at the E.A.F Retention Barracks to be called out only in the case of an emergency. Both of these British Officers state that United States Naval personnel are well disciplined, that American troops passing through the port have caused no trouble with which they are unable to cope and that our merchant seamen of any nation. In spite of their position, the station commander has continued to assert his intention of maintaining a rather large town patrol. He states it to be his belief that when Americans misbehave in town the personnel of this station are blamed and that therefore he is going to make all Americans in the area feel the weight of his disciplinary control.

The wisdom of any Wing station undertaking to police nearby communities except as may be necessary for its own personnel is open to question. It seems that particular care should be exercised in attempting to exert disciplinary control over on non-military personnel who are not associated with or being transported by the Air Transport Command. In any event such measures should never be undertaken to the detriment of station security.

The Intelligence & Security Officer at Aden is also the Provost Marshal. He is in almost complete disagreement with the station commander's proposed use of military police and has been urging that the greatest emphasis be placed upon internal security. In his work he has the assistance of 2 British WOCs who have provided invaluable aid and have contributed much towards maintaining station security.

- (2) Censorship: Lt. Bourlet, Base Censor, supplied by USAFINE, was interviewed together with the commanding officer concerning the employment of an Indian in the censor's office. This employee is a native Indian clerk, hired as a clerk and translator by the censor through the British who have guaranteed his loyalty. His employment in this capacity is necessary since this office must censor mail transmitted through ATC channels by Arabian ATC employees at Aden, Salala, and Rasira. Because of the great volume of mail at this station from transients and from merchant marine personnel, all of which the censor states he is required to control, he commenced using this clerk as a censor.

(Censorship)

When this became known some of the officers at the station protested and questioned the regularity of permitting an alien to censor the mail of American military personnel. As a result, the base censor will upon request personally censor the mail of those who object. As matters now stand, the Indian clerk is censoring almost all transient mail, assisting in spot censoring of enlisted men's mail and the mail of officers who have not stated their objection.

While it is true that much of the objection is doubtlessly founded in prejudice and conceding the loyalty of the employee, the fact remains that his use as a censor should not be undertaken without War Department approval (Training Circular 15) and that it has had a bad effect on morale.

1. KHARTOUM (YEMAN'S FIELD)

- (1) Security: As at Aden this post has excellent perimeter guard composed of Sudanese troops. Inasmuch as the RAF occupies the same camp with AFO, all of their security measure automatically cover AFO installations. Similarly, interior guard, aircraft security at the field and the policing of the terminal are entirely inadequate, deficiencies that will be corrected with the anticipated arrival of a military police detachment. A town patrol is essential here. Lacking it has been necessary for an officer to be detailed each day to duty in Khartoum which is some 22 miles from the airport and to bar transients from access to the city.

Greatest problem at this base is the safeguarding of property from pilferage by natives who unless closely controlled, will literally steal anything. There is such poverty among the natives and almost any article of clothing, no matter how badly worn, is a great temptation to say nothing of metal, personal belongings and valuables. The British are very cooperative and prompt in punishing those found guilty of theft but a native will endure almost any amount of confinement to successfully accomplished what he regards as a worth while theft.

Generally, this is a well organized and efficiently operated station which should find all of its major needs solved when its military police quota arrives.

e. EL FASHER

- (1) Security: This is a desert station more or less inaccessible except by air. It is jointly operated by ATC and RAF. The perimeter of the field and camp is protected with a native thorn fence around the whole installation and it is securely guarded by native Askaris. Because of its location and the comparative prosperity of the natives, security is on a maximum here. The nearby native village is too small and primitive to provide any temptations that might lead to disciplinary difficulties and no necessity exists for the assignment of military police to this station.

When armed guards are required for transient aircraft they are obtained from Operations personnel. Inasmuch as few planes overnights at this base no inconvenience results.

f. EL GENBINA

- (1) Security: This field is almost exact duplicate of El Fasher being another joint RAF-ATC operation, located in similar terrain and governed by identical local conditions. The camp and field are surrounded by thorn fences and the 2 outside installations, radio range and wells, are guarded by native watchmen. This is also the Headquarters of the Sudan Defence Force which occupies a fort overlooking the field. The whole area is under rigid British security control and all native villages, the largest of which is 4 miles from camp, are off-limits for ATC personnel.
- (2) Fire Protection: Unlike El Fasher, no Fire Marshal has been appointed at this base nor has any fire protection scheme been devised. The use of thatched roofs on almost all of the buildings presents a serious fire hazard against which counter measures should be devised. The new station commander, Lt. Des Champs, plans the appointment of the Fire Marshal and the adoption of a fire protection program to meet this risk.
- (3) Runway Construction: The main runway at this airport is surfaced but is constructed upon a soft base which makes necessary the constant repair of its southwestern end where landings normally take place. It is also located at the lowest portion of the field and frequently becomes unuseable in the wet season because of flooding. The auxiliary runway, which runs in an easterly direction is located on high ground and is always useable although unsurfaced. Its use however is limited because of its length about 3500 feet of which is useable.

(Runway Construction)

A project has been planned for the extension of this runway in a westerly direction by some 200 feet which if carried out would make available a little more than 4600 feet of all year runway for 2 engine aircraft. The land has been cleared for this project and the foundation rock and surfacing material transported to the scene of construction but work has been abandoned. Because such little effort would be required to increase the use of this field immeasurably we suggest that the advisability of re-urging the British to finish the project be examined. In addition the Operations Room should be capped with a tower in place of the present roof since in its present condition it is impossible for Operation's personnel to see the E-W runway from their control stations. The back wall of this room which overlooks the runway in question has no openings.

- (4) Refrigeration: The refrigeration units at this station are out of order and are being presently repaired. The maintenance crew doing this job lay the failure of the machinery to overloading resulting from an uninsulated floor. Unless it is sealed with tar and covered with wood flooring they predict that the equipment will soon fail again. Tar is obtainable locally but lumber is non-existent, most of the furniture used at the base and in the officers rooms being constructed of packing cases.
- (5) Courier Mail: Such mail from Accra is destined to El Gueina by way of Khartoum. As a result extreme delay results. On 14 January the Commanding Officer received courier mail from this Headquarters, the most recent date of any piece being 22 December. This has been called to the attention of the courier officers here but it seems to be their opinion that deliveries through Khartoum have to be made. This means that every piece of courier mail destined for El Gueina must travel about 1400 unnecessary miles.

4. MALINGURI(1) Security:

Another jointly operated RAF-ATC field, this station is distinguished by the fact that the American camp is 7 miles from the airport. Native troops are employed by the British in limited numbers to guard the field but the American camp and its installations are protected only by hired native watchmen. Airport personnel must be diverted from their regular jobs and devote considerable extra time to provide armed guards for the large numbers of aircraft which overnight here.

(Security)

The 24 military police which will be assigned to this field are badly needed and should be provided with the least possible delay. A large native town gives rise to disciplinary problems of considerable importance and the regulation of traffic between camp and airport is a matter of some concern. Native drivers have been known to take station vehicles off into the countryside between the 2 places, probably to use them for their own purposes. Otherwise, this is a well operated field which is known from one end of the line to the other as the possessor of the best mess in Africa.

1. KANO

- (1) Security: This field presents much the same situation as Maiduguri although on a slightly smaller scale. The R-F-ATC field is policed and guarded by the British but the American camp, about 2 miles away, is protected only by 1 military police and 6 native watchmen.

The 24 military police which will be assigned to this field are essential for aircraft security at the terminal, camp guard and town patrol. Kano is a large and historically interesting African city which all transient personnel endeavour to visit. As a result a policing problem exists for which no personnel have been available in the past.

Further, a regular guard must be established for the radio range which is 2 miles southwest of the 21 runway and quite close to the walled city. The only protection it enjoys at this time is supplied by a hired native watchman.

2. CONCLUSION

There are no security problems along the main route of this Wing that have not always existed. The situation is substantially unchanged from the days when the route was first opened as far as the existence of security personnel is concerned but tremendous improvements have been made in the adoption of security precautions at the various stations. Some trouble has been experienced in the past from pilferage which at times has reached substantial proportions, but fortunately no damage has been suffered from actual sabotage.

319.1

Sub.: "Survey of Wing Stations," dtd. January 21, 1944.
(Continued) Para 3.

This has not been due so much to our efforts as it has been to the fact that we are operating in friendly countries. When the security personnel being assigned to this Wing from Theatre are finally assigned to their Wing posts, it should be possible to consider that the minimum needs of the route have been met and satisfied.

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

Montrose H. Speers

MONTROSE H. SPEERS,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

ARTHUR E. SHERRY,
Captain, Air Corps,
IAS Officer, CAFW-ATO.

cc: Chief, IAS Division, Washington.

10-OSY/sjc

Station 1

12 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Indoctrination in Safeguarding Military Information.

TO : Commanding General, Air Transport Command,
Washington, D.C.
(Attention: Chief, Intelligence & Security Division.

1. Reference is made to your letter of 1 May 1944, same subject as above, requesting information as to the extent and form of indoctrination now being used within this Command on the subject, Safeguarding Military Information.

2. The following is a list of measures for safeguarding military information which have been taken in this Wing:

a. Upon entering the Wing at Accra, military and civilian passengers alike are briefed in safeguarding military information at the Terminal building as a part of the processing procedure.

b. Personnel returning to the United States are reminded that safeguarding classified military information is the responsibility of each individual having knowledge thereof, irrespective of the time, manner, or place of its acquisition and irrespective of the place of its disclosure, and that AR 380-5 applies with equal force within each theatre of operations, each zone of communications and within the continental limits of the United States.

c. Personnel of special missions are met at the dispersal areas or the Transit Office by Intelligence and Security representatives immediately after their arrival and are briefed on safeguarding military information.

d. Posters, placards, and other printed reminders are prominently displayed at places where military and civilian personnel congregate, such as the terminal buildings, transient areas, and Headquarters buildings.

e. Training films on Safeguarding Military Information, when available, are included in the regular programs at Post Theatres and lectures on AR 380-5 are delivered periodically to military personnel throughout the Wing.

Sub.: "Indoctrination of Safeguarding Military Information." dtd. June 12, 1944
(Continued) Sub-Par 2.

f. An effort is being made to avoid over-classification of documents and messages and Headquarters personnel have been instructed to exercise the greatest care in the handling and storage of classified documents.

g. A concerted effort has been made to prevent the leakage of military information through unauthorized photographic activities and the improper use of photographs. A list of prohibited photographic subjects has been prepared and widely distributed throughout the Wing and photographic finishing may be accomplished only through official channels or by authorized agencies. All official photographic negatives and prints are treated as secret documents until otherwise classified.

h. Lectures on Intelligence and Security, with particular emphasis on safeguarding military information, are to be included in the training program of the Wing Pilot's School conducted at Station No. 3 under present plans which calls for the first lecture on 13 June 1944.

i. A considerable portion of the instructions given to crews of aircraft by the Navigation and Briefing Officer deals with procedures in ditching and forced landings in neutral and enemy territory as they affect the safeguarding of military information.

3. It is the intention of this Section to maintain present measures under existing regulations, directives and bulletins and to continue to adopt new instructions dealing with the safeguarding of military information. A constant effort will be made to improve the briefing, not only of personnel of this Wing, but also personnel travelling through the Wing.

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

Monroe K. Spears
MONROE K. SPEARS,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

CARLETON S. YOUNG,
Captain, Air Corps,
I & S Officer and
Provost Marshal, CAFW-ATC.

STATION #1

13-JTS/rhw

SUBJECT: CAFW Situation Room.

5 July 1944

MEMORANDUM TO : Colonel Robert J. Smith, Deputy Wing Commander.

1. The CAFW Situation Room was formally opened on 15 January 1944, to fulfill the urgent need for a centralized source of current information on all factors contributing to CAFW operations. Data on all CAFW and ferried aircraft (for purpose of operational and maintenance control), figures on supply and service, personnel and malassignment, and maps depicting the progress of the war were planned and installed.


2. A large aircraft control board (a large scale map of Africa) covering one wall was made showing all CAFW routes: movements of all aircraft operating in the Wing are followed from arrival and departure messages and miniature airplanes are moved along the routes accordingly, so that it is possible to tell at a glance the location of any of our aircraft, as well as the Contract Carrier, ferried, and all other aircraft in the Wing. Aircraft out of service are so designated on special boards for each major station, or suspended if at any of the smaller line stations.

3. Other large maps, one for each major theatre of operations, are daily maintained by I&S in accordance with the latest news bulletins, thus giving an up to date and comprehensive picture of the war on all fronts.

4. Two large wall fans display numerous charts and graphs containing assorted information: assigned personnel figures by stations and by grade or rank; malassignment analysis by station; organization chart for the Wing; various operational data such as operating factors, elapsed times on "Comet" trips, arrivals and departures at each station for monthly periods, and maintenance delays; traffic data, such as loadings and offloadings at each station by month, percentages of loads carried to destination on "Comet" runs, and load factors; supply and service charts showing deadlined motor vehicles at each station, messing facilities and housing utilization. The charts on these wall fans are constantly being revised, extended, and in all ways kept up to date.

5. Four major statistical functions are performed in the Situation Room: the Maintenance Control Program, the Out of Service Report, the Ferried Aircraft Status Report, and the constant movement of aircraft on the control board. A staff of four highly qualified enlisted men is maintained for these duties; the Situation Room is open 18 hours a day.

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:



MONROE K. SPEARS,
1st. Lieut., Air Corps,

JOHN P. SHMA,
Captain, Air Corps,
Wing Statistical Officer

APPENDIX XII.

Headquarters
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
Air Transport Command
A.P.O. 625 Miami, Florida
Station #1

~~SECRET~~
Initials
Date 12 June 46

Classification Control changed
by authority of Commanding Office
NAFD-ATC
NAME: *Daniel W. [illegible]*
GRADE: *Captain, O.C.*
DATE: *1/8/46*

MEMORANDUM TO: The Manpower Board.

SUBJECT: Duties of the Provost Marshal and employment of Military Police within The Central African Wing.

1. Each station has certain installations which must be guarded by Military Police personnel. Among these are:

- | | | |
|--------------------|--|---|
| a. Gates. | b. Plans adjacent. | n. Freight and passenger terminals. |
| b. Communications. | i. Barracks. | o. PX. |
| c. Dispersal area. | j. Headquarters. | p. Recreational facilities (on and off base). |
| d. Fuel supplies. | k. Yards. | q. Extra guards for special aircraft or VIP. |
| e. Water supply. | l. Hangars. | |
| f. Power supply. | m. Machine shops and line installations. | |
| g. Motor Pool. | | |

2. The Military Police must exercise constant vigilance against:

a. SECESSION by enemy action, disaffected personnel, disgruntled civilian employees and civilians in the pay of enemy agents.

b. FIRE which can occur through accident or design and which in this climate and with, in some cases, inadequate water supply, is a constant menace to fuel stores, camps, warehouses, airport installations and aircraft. Under AAF Regulation 111-1, 2 October 1943, the Commanding Officer of an exempted station will normally delegate administration and organization of the fire protection set-up to the Provost Marshal. At non-exempted stations this falls to the Post Engineer but in any event the Provost Marshal and therefore the Military Police are charged with coordinating with the Post Engineer on all phases of security against fire.

c. RIOT and DISORDER among military personnel or civilians as for example the insurrection at Nairobi.

d. THEFTS - Ranging from petty to grand, performed by military personnel, civilian employees, enemy agents or outside civilians and including thefts of materiel, foodstuffs, PX supplies, medical supplies, mail, arms, ammunition, Q.M. supplies, fuel, technical supplies, tools and personal possessions of personnel. As an example, Military Police are currently investigating many cases of first aid kit pilferage in a wave that has broken out and affects all stations, also an epidemic of mail bag depredations. This latter includes a dozen instances where mail bags have been sliced or torn open and in several cases certain contents removed. Thefts of money and jewelry are almost constant. Articles are frequently stolen from the baggage and effects of transient personnel. It has been

~~SECRET~~

Duties of the Provost Marshal and Employment of Military Police
Within the Central African Wing. (Cont'd)

stated by British police authorities, both military and civil, that individuals wanting to obtain practically anything from the American camp have only to contact the right people.

e. BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES - Including illicit traffic in foreign monies, commercial diamonds and other contraband.

f. CARELESSNESS is responsible for the enormous losses of manpower, supplies, equipment, property and materiel.

3. At every station a portion of the Military Police is, of necessity, engaged in administrative duties, preparation of reports and keeping of records. An additional portion are to be discounted by reason of sickness, fatigue and being in the clinic. In addition, the Provost Marshal and Military Police must enforce uniform regulations, military discipline, military courtesy, malaria discipline and control, maintain Pass and Permit and Identification Systems; control traffic, guard shipments and movements by military and common carriers, contribute to passenger control and baggage inspection, conduct loyalty investigations, check records of all prospective civilian employees, engage in drill, education programs, training programs, safeguard military information (enforcing 380-5) and other directives and instructions that pertain and instructing all personnel in provisions thereof), register firearms, privately owned automobiles, cameras and animals, apprehend deserters and other unauthorized absentees, furnish information to civilians and military personnel, enforce curfew regulations, and are responsible for the defense of the station and establishment of a warning system. Yet other duties include cooperation with local authorities, reception of distinguished visitors, providing trained crash guard, suppress vice, constantly reviewing security plan for possible betterment, providing proper security and administration of the base guard house or stockade, custody and disbursement of prisoners funds, custody of personal effects of prisoners and properly guarding and designating the duties of prisoners. The Provost Marshal is advisor to the Commanding Officer in all matters pertaining to security, prepares orders or amendments thereto for the approval of the Commanding Officer. To the Provost Marshal is delegated the duty of preventing and investigating all crimes, offenses and/or accidents involving persons subject to military law. Military Police supervise the circulation of military and civilian personnel in theatres of operation. Military Police must provide supervision and control in time of disaster. The Provost Marshal makes recommendations to the Commanding Officer for the increase or decrease of guard personnel in conformity with security standards.

4. At all stations of CAFW except here the Intelligence and Security Officer is also Provost Marshal. At the smaller stations it may be possible to do away with the additional Assistant Provost Marshal who is commander of the Military Police detachment. It is pointed out, however, that the Intelligence and Security Officer has the additional duty of Base Historical Officer. This officer, in his normal functions,

a. Collects, evaluates and disseminates information pertaining to sabotage and subversive activities.

~~SECRET~~

Duties of the Provost Marshal and Employment of Military Police
Within the Central Aircraft Wing. (Cont'd)

b. Conducts general investigations and gathers information concerning possible sabotage.

c. Devises and initiates countersubversion, counterespionage and counter sabotage activities, evaluates reports and information on domestic military intelligence and forswears of significant items to higher intelligence headquarters.

d. Maintains liaison with other intelligence sections and with State Department.

It is recommended, as a first step, that at each station, the Assistant Provost Marshal be also appointed Civilian Personnel Officer.

4. It must not be assumed, without consideration of the facts that there is an excess of intelligence and security and military police personnel in CAFW. Rather, this section desires security to be evenly adequate at each station and installation at base. Some of these deficiencies may be corrected through revision of existing security plans, some can only be corrected with additional personnel and resources. Some officers could be eliminated if USAFLES is agreeable to declining their excess. Follow are a breakdown of the disposition and employment of security personnel at each station.

1. Station #1, Headquarters, CAFW-AFC.

Captain Christian C. Fick, Wing 1st Officer and Provost Marshal. Duties of this officer are:

- (1) To keep the Commanding Officer informed.
- (2) Report to the Commanding Officer on all matters pertaining to intelligence and security and Provost Marshal activities.
- (3) To supervise and administer to and formulate plans and policies for all intelligence and security and Provost Marshal activities within the Wing, subject to the approval of the Commanding Officer and in conformity with instructions from higher echelons.
- (4) To collect, evaluate and pass on to higher and lower echelons all information and reports of an intelligence and security nature.
- (5) To disseminate to lower echelons all information and instructions from higher echelons.
- (6) To perform inspections of an intelligence and security nature of all CAFW-AFC and WASC-USAFLES installations.
- (7) To establish and maintain liaison with other Military and Naval intelligence and security and civilian police agencies in CAFW and other wings, to include U.S., Allied and other friendly nations.

~~SECRET~~

Duties of the Provost Marshal and Employment of Military Police
Within the Central African Wing. (Cont'd)

1st Lt. Bertram L. Kraus, Ass't. Wing I&S Officer and Provost Marshal.

The duties of this officer are to assist the Wing I&S Officer and Provost Marshal in all his duties and to act in his absence.

1st Lt. Louis A. Dinoceno, Ass't. Wing I&S Officer - Ceilands CIG Detachment.

1st Lt. Harry E. Silmvy - Route and Station Intelligence Officer.

This officer works mainly for navigation and briefing and has the important assignment of collecting the constantly changing information contained in the route manuals, pilot's guides, Blue Forms and Form 69's. The necessity for the employment of this officer and the high quality of his work have never been questioned.

1st Lt. Robert W. Frost - Ass't Wing Provost Marshal.

Now attending Police Investigators School at USAFME Headquarters. This officer will assist Capt. Young and Lt. Kraus in all matters pertaining to Provost Marshal activities throughout the wing and be available for special investigations. Charged with supervising destruction of classified waste.

2nd Lt. James A. Hyde - Investigations Officer.

Posts information in Situation Room. Charged with supervision of destruction of classified waste. Subject to being sent to any station where additional aid is needed in investigations. Is now so employed at Station 23.

2nd Lt. Milton P. Ross - Wing Historical Officer.

Assigned by Headquarters, AFM, Washington to Headquarters, USAF-AFC, to compile the history of this wing from its beginnings. Collects and edits contributions of base historical officers. Will be required to travel extensively for this purpose and to coordinate with Wing Historical Officer of USAF on history during AFM-USAFICA period.

2nd Lt. Sidney (A1T) Diamond.

In charge of Pass and Permit Section. It is this officer's duty to install the USAFME Pass and Permit System throughout USAF. Issues officers APO cards and publishes information on all lost credentials. Upon completing installation of Pass and Permit System at Stations Nos. 1 and 2, will proceed to all other stations to install system and instruct personnel in maintenance, reports and records of System.

~~SECRET~~

Duties of the Provost Marshal and Employment of Military Police
Within the Central African Wing. (cont'd)

Conclusions:

This officer realizes that this report is contrary to the desire and intention of the board to reduce personnel. However it is pointed out that, aside from those possible eliminations noted, this section does not consider the number employed in Security throughout the Wing to be excessive but, rather, that it is hardly adequate for proper security.

/s/ Carleton S. Young
CARLETON S. YOUNG
Captain, Air Corps
IMS Officer and
Provost Marshal CAPM-ATC

THOMAS J. YOUNG

Thomas J. Coulman
THOMAS J. COULMAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

CIRCULAR)
: No. 30)

HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
APO 625, c/o West
30 June 1944.

Classification changed
by authority of [unclear] Office
RESTRICTED
NAFD-ATC
NAME: *James W. [unclear]*
GRADE: *Captain, A.C.*
DATE: *7/8/46*

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
CENTRAL FINANCIAL WING, AIR TRANSPORT

1. A Detachment of Agents and Special Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps, Army Air Forces, has been attached to this wing to perform counter-intelligence duties at this Headquarters, at all ATC installations in this Wing, and in all CAFW territory in which ATC has counter-intelligence jurisdiction. The following instructions covering the operations of these agents are published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

a. It is impossible to conceal the identities of CIC personnel inasmuch as they are engaged in investigations in which they must disclose this information. Therefore, the existence of CIC in the CAFW will not be considered classified information, but the identity of the agents of the Corps will be disclosed to a minimum number of civilian and military personnel.

2. Duties of CIC:

a. Agents and Special Agents of the CIC are especially trained investigators and normally perform their duties in civilian clothes, except when otherwise required by the nature of their mission. They may be identified by special credentials and badges. Each agent carries a leather-bound, book-type folder containing photo and particulars of identification, including signature. The seal of the War Department Military Intelligence Division is imprinted on the credentials over the lower part of the agent's photograph. The badge bearing the inscription "War Department, Military Intelligence" are carried by these agents. In addition each agent carries an especially devised "key pass" which is examined by the wing adjutant general and the wing Provost Marshal when riding ingress and egress to all CAFW mess, installations, and restricted areas therein.

b. In accordance with the provisions of War Department TM 30-215, Agents and Special Agents of the CIC have full authority to examine all records of an official character, and likewise all classified material or equipment. All persons subject to U.S. Army law are enjoined to give them every possible assistance. CIC credentials and badges will be honored at all times. The personnel of the Corps is frequently entrusted with missions of a secret character requiring expeditious action, and when engaged in such mission, they must not be delayed by the observance of standard customs and prohibitions.

c. Agents of the CIC are authorized to investigate all cases of suspected sabotage, espionage, and subversion within this Wing. In addition, they are authorized to gather and report any informational intelligence bearing on the security of CAFW installations.

3. General Operations.

a. One or more Agents of the CIC will usually be on duty, on a semi-permanent basis, at the larger installations in this Wing, and their presence will always be known to the Station Commanding Officer and the Intelligence and Security Officer. Where the services of CIC personnel are needed at other Wing installations, requests should be addressed to the Wing Intelligence and Security Officer.

b. The primary mission of the CIC is to investigate and report on matters of a counter-intelligence or security character. Such investigations may be originated by request of the Station or Wing Intelligence and Security Officers, or upon the initiative of the CIC Agent.

c. Reports of investigations requested by a Station in the Wing will be addressed to the Station Commanding Officer, Attention: Intelligence and Security Officer, or to the Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment, CAVI, AFG. In the latter case such reports will be addressed to the Station Commanding Officer, Attention: Intelligence and Security Officer, by post endorsement from the Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment. Informational copies of all such reports will be forwarded to the Wing Intelligence and Security Officer by the Commanding Officer, CIC Detachment.

d. CIC Agents will keep Station Commanding Officers and Intelligence and Security Officers fully informed of their activities. In this connection, it is recommended that weekly conferences be held by the Station Commanding Officer, Intelligence and Security Officer, and CIC Agent for the purpose of discussing matters of interest bearing on Intelligence and Security. Closest liaison should be maintained between Station Intelligence and Security Officers and CIC Agents. Whenever possible, cases under investigation should be discussed by the I & S Officers and CIC Agents in advance of preparation of reports. Duplication in subject matter of CIC and Intelligence and Security reports should be avoided. All matters within the sphere of CIC investigations will be reported by CIC Agents.

4. Character of Investigations.

a. It will be the primary responsibility of the CIC to investigate and report on the following:

- (1) Suspected sabotage.
- (2) Suspected espionage.
- (3) Suspected subversive activities.
- (4) Loyalty of military personnel.
- (5) Security of AFG material and installations.
- (6) Safeguarding military information (AR 380-5).

(CIR. 30)

- (7) Background of civilian personnel employed by AIG.
- (8) Leads developed by Information System.
- (9) Plane crashes, fires and explosions.
- (10) Unexplained presence of foreign material in aircraft and aircraft equipment, and unexplained mechanical failures.
- (11) Political and economic trends.

b. All persons subject to U. S. Army law are enjoined to report promptly to Station Intelligence and Security Officers items covered in 4a, 1, 2, 3, 9, and 10, who will request CIC investigation. Where there is no Station Intelligence and Security Officer, the section head concerned will request a CIC investigation from the Wing Intelligence and Security Officer.

c. Agents will not be called upon to investigate black market, criminal activities, or the moral conduct of Wing personnel unless there is a reason to believe that counter-intelligence implications exist.

d. The counter-intelligence jurisdiction of the CIC in this Wing will be limited by the policies of the Commanding General of the Theater and existing international agreements.

7. The mission of the CIC in this Wing is regarded to be of prime importance in the effective safeguarding and security of our installations. It is important that a close understanding of the mission, as outlined in this letter, be developed through frequent consultations by the CIC agent with the Station Commanding Officers and the Intelligence and Security Officers.

8. This Circular supersedes all other letters and memoranda from this headquarters relative to the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, Central African Wing, Air Transport Command.

By command of Brigadier General STORRELL:

C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C. B. BRIGGS,
C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:

James J. Caulfield
THOMAS J. CAULFIELD,
Captain, Air Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"

HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
A.F.O. 625 Miami, Florida
Station #1

10-DIK/sjc

In reply
refer to:
000.4

27 May 1944

SUBJECT: Station Histories.

TO: Commanding Officers, All Stations, Central African Wing,
Air Transport Command.

1. In conformance with AR 949-105, AAF Regulation 20-8, ATC Regulation 20-20, and AAF Historical Officers Circular #5, each Station, CAFW-ATC, is required to submit in monthly installments a history of that Station.

2. Compliance with these regulations has been incomplete in this wing. To insure a greater uniformity in the manner of submission of Station Histories, it is directed that the schedule presented herewith be adhered to by all Stations.

a. MONTHLY REPORTS: These Historical Reports must cover the entire calendar month, must be in the form of a historical narrative with supporting documents, and must be dispatched in duplicate from the Station, not later than the 10th of the month following the period covered, to the Commanding Officer, CAFW-ATC, or, if not available, for the attention of the Wing Historical Officer.

b. HI-LINKS IN ARRIVAL: In the case of those Stations which have not submitted histories covering the entire period of the Stations existence, to the date of the first monthly installment presented, an early compliance with this phase of the Historical Program is directed. The material in arrears may be submitted in one complete segment, or, in several installments, covering periods of six (6) months or more. In either event, the entire historical narrative, together with supporting documents, now in arrears, must be submitted in duplicate to the Commanding Officer, CAFW-ATC, or, if not available, for the attention of the Wing Historical Officer, not later than 1 September 1944.

3. Under the provisions of ATC Regulation 20-20, the Wing Historical Officer will supervise the preparation of Station Histories and will visit the Stations of this Wing to consult with the Commanding Officers and the Station Historical Officers in matters concerned with the forwarding of the historical program.

By order of Colonel STUMMEL:

Reproduced at HQ, CAFW-ATC,
4 December 1944.

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/b/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.


A TRUE COPY

Thomas J. Coulter
THOMAS J. COULTER,
Captain, Air Corps.

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

HOURS FLOWN

DECEMBER 1943 THRU DECEMBER 1944




LEGEND



- DC-3 AIRCRAFT
- C-48 AIRCRAFT
- NIGHT FLYING

DC-3	05	05	05	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	12	12	17
C-48	-	-	12	20	30	33	40	40	40	30	30	42	
TOTAL	05	05	17	30	40	43	50	50	50	40	42	59	17
	DEC	JAN	FEB	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC


CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
SCHEDULED MILES FLOWN
DECEMBER 1943 THRU DECEMBER 1944



LEGEND

 DC-3
 C-46


TON MILES & PASSENGER MILES FLOWN DECEMBER 1943 THRU DECEMBER 1944



TON MILES
 ■ DC-3
 ■ C-46

PASS. MILES
 — DC-3
 — C-46

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
 AVERAGE HOURS PER PLANE PER DAY
 DECEMBER 1943 THRU DECEMBER 1944



LEGEND

FLEET

DC-3

C-46

ACTIVE

DC-3

C-46

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

MONTHLY AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS

BY STATIONS

FOR MONTH OF FEBRUARY

STATION	CAFW		CONTRACT CARRIERS		FERRIED AIRCRAFT		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	LAND- ING	TAKE- OFF	LAND- ING	TAKE- OFF	LAND- ING	TAKE- OFF	LAND- ING	TAKE- OFF	LAND- ING	TAKE- OFF
3 ACCRA	165	176	120	115	191	191	78	96	563	578
4 ADEN	182	181	40	40	149	156	33	31	404	408
5 EL FASHER	220	219	2	2	56	58	5	5	283	284
6 EL GENEINA	97	97	—	—	4	4	2	2	103	103
9 ASMARA	34	33	—	—	1	1	2	2	37	36
9 KAND	255	253	17	17	145	145	10	10	427	425
10 KHARTOUM	268	265	37	38	195	197	53	52	553	552
11 LAGOS	39	40	—	—	—	—	1	1	40	41
12 MAIDUGURI	285	285	25	25	140	140	24	23	474	473
13 MASIPA IS	180	182	16	16	142	137	19	19	357	354
14 ROBERTS	42	43	2	2	356	336	34	33	434	414
15 SALALA	78	78	—	—	6	8	1	1	85	87
BENSCH	9	9	—	—	—	—	12	12	21	21
TOTAL	1854	1861	259	255	1385	1373	283	287	3871	3776

XV

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

MONTHLY AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS

BY STATIONS

FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH

STATION	CAFW		CONTRACT CARRIERS		FERRIED AIRCRAFT		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF
3 ACCRA	141	171	164	168	230	205	84	95	619	639
4 ADEN	163	163	58	58	164	161	32	35	417	417
5 EL FASHER	191	190	2	2	53	50	5	5	251	247
6 EL GENEINA	71	71	—	—	6	6	3	3	80	80
8 ASMARA	34	35	1	1	4	4	13	12	52	52
9 KANO	229	226	25	25	163	161	14	14	431	426
10 KHARTOUM	244	242	59	58	189	189	64	62	556	551
11 LAGOS	29	29	1	1	—	—	2	2	32	32
12 MAIDUGURI	235	231	38	37	146	145	39	42	458	455
13 MASIRA IS.	147	147	31	31	116	124	29	29	323	331
14 ROBERTS	32	31	—	—	607	610	23	19	662	660
15 SALALA	52	52	—	—	15	15	2	2	69	69
BENSON	5	5	—	—	—	—	3	3	8	8
TOTAL	1573	1593	379	381	1693	1670	313	323	3958	3967

XX

CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

MONTHLY SCHEDULED

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT- BY STATIONS

FOR MONTH OF APRIL

STATION	GAFW		CONTRACT CARRIERS		FERRIED AIRCRAFT		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF
3 ACCRA	161	157	169	165	220	227	44	51	594	600
4 ADEN	130	134	57	57	140	130	45	42	372	363
5 EL FASHER	142	141	3	3	113	114	8	8	266	266
6 EL GENEINA	52	51	—	—	3	3	3	3	58	57
ASMARA	33	32	1	1	3	4	22	19	59	56
8 KANO	189	191	25	26	190	186	7	7	411	410
9 KHARTOUM	193	193	56	56	210	195	60	58	519	502
1 LAGOS	24	24	1	1	—	—	—	—	25	25
MAIDUGURI	195	195	32	32	141	138	39	36	407	401
2 NASSIRA IS	127	127	26	25	107	100	21	20	281	272
3 PORTO	49	46	—	—	504	492	29	29	582	567
4 SOKALA	49	49	3	3	26	26	3	3	81	81
5 BENSON	4	4	—	—	9	9	14	14	27	27
TOTAL	1348	1344	373	369	1666	1624	295	290	3682	3627

X
1
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

MONTHLY SCHEDULED

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT- BY STATIONS

FOR MONTH OF MAY

STATION	CAFW		CONTRACT CARRIERS		FERRIED AIRCRAFT		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF
3 ACCRA	156	147	125	127	336	315	78	71	695	660
4 ADEN	111	116	67	66	175	178	36	38	389	398
5 EL FASHER	132	133	4	4	133	127	5	6	274	270
6 EL GENEINA	55	56	—	—	12	12	—	—	67	68
8 ASMARA	34	35	3	3	7	7	16	16	60	61
9 KANO	179	180	32	32	226	211	2	2	439	425
10 KHARTOUM	182	185	66	66	265	254	54	58	567	563
11 LAGOS	21	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	21
12 MAIDUGURI	235	237	33	32	171	161	30	31	469	461
13 NASSIRA IS.	104	104	28	28	148	149	30	30	310	311
14 PORTS	65	65	—	—	474	491	29	29	568	585
15 TALALA	51	51	—	—	18	17	1	1	70	69
16 TISON	11	11	—	—	—	—	7	7	18	18
TOTAL	1336	1341	358	358	1965	1922	288	289	3947	3910

CENTRAL AIR FORCE WIND


MONTHLY SCHEDULED

AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT BY STATIONS

FOR MONTH OF JUNE 1944

STATIONS	CAFW		FIRE BALLS & CONTRACT CARRIERS		FERRIED AIRCRAFT		OTHERS		TOTAL	
	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF	LAND-ING	TAKE-OFF
3 ACCRA	168	179	168	179	138	142	10	13	484	513
4 ADEN	154	152	77	78	106	115	—	—	337	345
5 EL FASHER	161	160	1	1	53	53	1	1	216	215
6 EL GENEINA	74	74	—	—	9	7	—	—	83	81
8 ASMARA	31	31	1	1	1	1	1	4	34	35
9 KANO	207	207	4	4	84	95	1	1	296	301
10 KHARTOUM	230	232	77	76	126	137	17	17	450	468
11 LAGOS	21	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	21
12 MAIDUGURI	261	261	49	50	74	80	—	—	384	391
13 MASIRA IS.	143	142	40	40	102	108	—	—	285	290
14 ROBERTS	49	48	—	—	117	120	26	28	192	196
15 SALALA	54	54	—	—	20	20	2	1	76	75
BENSON	19	19	—	—	2	2	11	11	32	32
TOTAL	1,572	1,580	417	429	832	880	69	76	2,890	2,965

FERRIED AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT THROUGH CENTRAL AFRICAN WING MARCH 1944




Classified ~~SECRET~~
 IS ~~RESTRICTED~~
 by authority of Commanding Officer
 NAFC-AFC
 NAME: *William P. Robb*
 GRADE: *Captain, U.S.*
 DATE: *1/2/46*

~~SECRET~~
 Auto CAPW
 Initials *WPR* AG
 Date *11 MAR 1944*

FERRIED AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT THROUGH CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

APRIL 1944



Classified by ~~SECRET~~
 is ~~RESTRICTED~~
 by authority of Commanding Officer
 NAFCATC
 NAME *Daniel W. Whitebaugh*
 GRADE *Captain, P.C.*
 DATE: *1/8/46*


SECRET
 Auth: *CAIRO*
 Initials: *CAIRO*
 Date: *11 May 1964*

SECRET

MOVEMENT OF FERRIED AIRCRAFT THROUGH CENTRAL AFRICAN WING

SECRET

MAY 1944



Classification
to ~~RESTRICTED~~
by authority of Commanding Officer
NAFD-ATC
NAME: *Smith W. C. C. C.*
GRADE: *Captain, USAF*
DATE: *1/8/46*

SECRET

APPENDIX XXII.

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT FERRIED THROUGH THE C.A.F.T. FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1944.

	<u>Enroute</u> <u>12/31/43</u>	<u>Arrived</u> <u>January 1944</u>	<u>Delivered</u> <u>January 1944</u>	<u>Cracked Up</u> <u>Salvaged</u> <u>or Lost</u> <u>January 1944</u>	<u>Enroute</u> <u>31 January 1944</u>
Tactical Aircraft	22	389	367	2	42
Transport Aircraft	31	203	213	1	20
TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT	53	592	580	3	62

NOTE: Number of aircraft arrived during January 1944 increased 215 aircraft, or 57% over December 1943 arrivals, while deliveries increased 221 aircraft or 62%. The number enroute at the end of January increased 9 aircraft, or 17%, over those enroute 31 December 1943. Out of 62 aircraft enroute 31 January 1944, 10 aircraft or 16% were delayed due to engine changes, damage on take-offs or landings, awaiting parts or other mechanical reasons.

RESULTS OF DISPOSITION OF FERRIED AIRCRAFT FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1944.

	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
Delivered	580	89.92%
Enroute 31 January 1944, not delayed	52	8.06%
Temporarily delayed due to mechanical troubles	9	1.55%
Cracked Up, Salvaged or Lost	3	.47%
TOTALS	645	100.00%

A TRUE COPY:

Monroe K. Spears
 MONROE K. SPEARS,
 Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX XXII.

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT FLEETED THROUGH THE C.A.P.V. FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 1944

	Enroute <u>3/31/44</u>	Arrived <u>April 1944</u>	Delivered <u>April 1944</u>	Cracked Up Salvaged or Lost <u>April 1944</u>	Enroute <u>30 April 1944</u>
Tactical Aircraft	35 *	353	347	2	39
Transport Aircraft	10	351	319	-	42
TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT	45 *	704	666	2	81

NOTE: Number of aircraft arrived during April 1944 decreased 111 aircraft, or 14% under March arrivals, while deliveries decreased 160 aircraft, or 19%. The number enroute at the end of April increased 37 aircraft, or 64% over those enroute 31 March. Out of 81 aircraft enroute 30 April 1944, 11 aircraft, or 14% were delayed due to engine changes, damage on take-offs or landings, awaiting parts or other mechanical reasons.

RESULTS OF DISPOSITION OF FLEETED AIRCRAFT FOR THE YEAR OF 1944 TO DATE.

	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
Delivered	2,622	96.75%
Enroute 30 April 1944, not delayed	70	2.58%
Temporarily delayed due to mechanical trouble	11	.41%
Cracked Up, Salvaged or Lost	7	.26%
TOTALS	2,710	100.00%

* One tactical ship (B-25) shown as washed out in March 1944 report, is now being repaired.

A TRUE COPY:

Monroe K. Spears
 MONROE K. SPEARS,
 Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX XXII.

REPORT OF AIRCRAFT FARRIED THROUGH THE C.A.F. T. FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE 1944

	Enroute <u>5/31/44</u>	Arrived <u>June 1944</u>	Delivered <u>June 1944</u>	Cracked Up Salvaged or Lost <u>June 1944</u>	Enroute <u>6/30/44</u>
Factical Aircr ft	42	155	165	2	28
Transport aircraft	81	89	133	1	36
TOTAL ALL AIRCRAFT	123	242	298	3	64

NOTE: Number of aircraft arrived during June 1944 decreased 158 aircraft, or 70% under May arrivals, while deliveries decreased 258 aircraft, or 61%. The number enroute at the end of June decreased 59 aircraft, or 48% under those enroute 31 May. Out of 64 aircraft enroute 30 June 1944, 16 aircraft or 25% were delayed due to engine changes, damage on take-off or landing, awaiting parts, or other mechanical reasons.

SUMMARY OF DISPOSITION OF FARRIED AIRCRAFT FOR THE YEAR OF 1944 TO DATE

	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
Delivered	3,676	77.97%
Enroute 30 June 1944, not delayed	37	1.04%
Temporarily delayed due to mechanical trouble	25	.67%
Cracked up, salvaged or lost	12	.32%
TOTALS	3,752	100.00%

A TRUE COPY:

Monroe K. Spears
 MONROE K. SPEARS,
 Captain, Air Corps.

BACKGROUND OF KANO-TRIPOLI ROUTE SURVEY.


On December 20 CAFW received a radio from the South Atlantic Wing, to Meloy and Stowell, asking for suggestions for an alternate airway over which to deliver North African heavy bombers in order to by-pass congestion existing on the Natal-Dakar-Marrakech runs. Reply was made to SAW with information copy to General Meloy that CAFW had suggested to General Meloy during his presence in Accra a week earlier that congestion in the Marrakech area might be relieved by routing heavy bombers from Dakar to Colomb Bechar and Biskra providing these were acceptable delivery points for North African consignees. It was pointed out that both Colomb Bechar and Biskra are relatively weather-free during the winter, Biskra having been used as a base for B-17's in the North African fall and winter campaign of 1942 - 43. Specifically replying to General Walsh's suggestion of an alternate route eliminating Dakar, we recommended the feasibility of sending 4-engine bombers from Natal to Ascension-Accra-Kano and thence non-stop to the Tripoli - Benghazi area (a flight of less than 1600 miles) providing delivery was acceptable there and weather conditions in that area would justify the undertaking. Having received no reply to this radiogram by December 22, we sent another message to Walsh and Meloy that preliminary study by our weather and briefing sections indicated the practicability of winter operations over the suggested Kano-Tripoli route. We inquired of them whether this route was being considered and had been recommended to Washington as a possible solution for the stack-up of 4-engine bombers on the Natal-Dakar-Marrakech run and told them that the Kano-Tripoli route had been mapped last spring by the 1st. Photo Group so that strip maps should be available if asked for from the Washington Headquarters of that organization.

On December 23, Colonel Gardner replied for General Walsh that SAW had made no recommendations to Washington but were awaiting instructions from Meloy and secondarily from Stowell. Here the matter rested until December 29 when we received a radio from Colonel Harris giving us a change in destination for various bomb groups being delivered to North Africa. As the normal routing of these ships in Africa would be entirely within MAFW, we relayed this message to General Meloy and inquired from Washington whether their sending it to us indicated that ATO Headquarters was considering the alternate delivery route via Accra and Kano to Tripoli which we had suggested to General Walsh as a means of lessening congestion on the Natal-Dakar-Marrakech run.

Colonel Harris replied on the following day that this was the first he had heard of the proposed alternate routing but that it would be considered immediately by ATO Headquarters. On January 6, 1944, Colonel Harris radioed us that immediate routing of 4-engine aircraft to the 15th Air Force over the route suggested was proposed and asked us to advise any reason why this would not be practicable. We assumed that the same message had been sent to General Meloy and on the day it was received, a message arrived from the SAW saying they had received a similar query and had requested authorization to release aircraft for this routing. This was followed by another message from Colonel Gardner on January 7 saying SAW had received authorization to route heavy bombers via Accra-Kano to Tripoli and asked CAFW to advise when it was prepared to open this route. We replied the same day, sending our message to ATO Headquarters North African Wing and SAW, outlining necessary arrangements that would have to be made before activating the new route.

These included the provision of 50 additional mechanics at Accra to handle necessary inspections for an estimated 200 bombers a month and 10 additional mechanics at Kano to assist in refueling these ships for the final hop to Tripoli. We also said that our navigation office had an adequate supply of 1/2,000,000 scale maps covering the Kano-Tripoli run and pointed out again that strip maps of the same territory should be available in Washington. We requested that NAFW confirm the status of radio ranges and other navigation facilities in North Africa and indicate their ability to supply Kano with proper weather forecast on which to dispatch aircraft to Tripoli. Colonel Harris also was asked to give us an accurate estimate of H-engine bombers destined for the 15th Air Force thru our wing and lend us necessary aid in obtaining the additional maintenance men that would be needed. At the same time steps were initiated for a survey flight by one of our aircraft over the Kano-Tripoli route to obtain necessary information regarding emergency landing fields and other facilities enroute which would be essential for briefing purposes. On January 9 a radio was received from Colonel Harris saying the North African Wing had advised ATC Headquarters that Marrakech was now prepared to receive all aircraft sent that way so delivery of bombers would resume over that route. Knowing the vagaries of winter in the Marrakech and North African areas between the Atlas Mountains and the Mediterranean, and being already prepared to make the Kano-Tripoli survey flight, we decided to complete this project immediately and sent a message to North African Wing that our survey party was desirous of intercepting General C. R. Smith at Tunis or elsewhere in NAFW as soon as the survey trip had been completed.

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:


MONROE K. SPEARS,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5-CBA/mjt

Station #1

360.11

26 February 1944

SUBJECT: Air Traffic Control.

TO : Pan-American Airways System, African-Orient Division,
Accra, British Gold Coast.
Captain O'Dell, Liaison Officer, 4th Ferrying Division,
Accra, British Gold Coast.
American Air Lines, Accra, British Gold Coast.
Commanding Officer, Air Transport Command, Natal, Brazil.
Commanding Officer, Air Transport Command, Ascension Island.

The following outline of air traffic control in the Central African Wing has been disseminated to all stations of this command. It is submitted for your information and briefing purposes.

Air Traffic Control

1. Air traffic control, as used herein, is considered to mean the control of all air traffic by radio and by assigned altitudes of flight to insure adequate separation of aircraft at all times of poor visibility and/or low ceilings either by difference in flight levels or by time intervals between planes enroute.

2. Poor visibility and/or low ceiling, herein after called instrument weather conditions, is construed to mean visibility of three miles or less and/or ceilings of 1000 feet or less.

3. It is believed that during instrument conditions adequate control of traffic can be exercised only by having a trained flying officer or trained ground operations officer at stations where no flying officers are located, immediately available to both the AACS plane-ground radio and the control tower radio to assist and advise the operators of this equipment.

4. All pilots should be made to understand that under instrument conditions the plane-ground radio and tower radio have absolute control of all traffic and that instructions from these sources will be strictly obeyed. Aircraft will not enter a control zone until cleared to do so except in case of radio failure. Control zones constitute the area within a radius of 25 miles surrounding all CATM stations.

5. While it is expected that the details of an air traffic control plan to suit each station will be worked out by the station concerned, the following general rules should apply during instrument weather conditions and are given for your guidance.

Classification Control	Exchanged
TO	RESTRICTED
By authority of	Commanding Officer
NAFD-ATC	
NAME	<i>Daniel W. Debaugh</i>
GRADE	<i>Captain, USN</i>
DATE	<i>1/27/46</i>

a. All traffic approaching a field should be separated by a minimum of 1000 feet altitude or by a minimum of thirty minutes time if at the same altitude, with vertical separation used whenever practicable. It is the duty of the station from which an aircraft departs to see that proper altitudes and take-off times are assigned to maintain this separation, but it is the duty of plane-ground radio to see that this separation is continuously maintained in the air.

b. No aircraft will descend from its assigned altitude until cleared to do so by plane-ground or tower radio.

c. Altimeter used in determining flight altitude will be set on 29.92 inches mercury at all times until a control zone is entered, at which time it should be reset to show field altimeter setting.

d. In case several aircraft are arriving at a field at or near the same time, they will be "stacked" with a minimum of 1000 feet vertical separation and instructed to hold on a definite leg of the range or in a definite area which will insure their safety from collision with each other. In no case will any aircraft be assigned an altitude lower than the approved initial instrument approach altitude for a particular station.

e. Standard instrument approaches as outlined in the Pilot's Handbook will be used by all aircraft during instrument conditions unless there is no other traffic and radio clearance is obtained to make a contact approach.

f. Only one aircraft at a time will be cleared to make an instrument approach, and in case of a missed approach the aircraft involved will be instructed to climb to a safe altitude, on an unobstructed leg of the range, and hold while other aircraft holding make their approaches unless, in the opinion of the officer on duty, it would be safer to allow the aircraft missing an approach to make another attempt immediately.

g. When aircraft are cleared out of a field during instrument conditions, consideration must be given to all incoming and descending aircraft, and the departing aircraft given definite instructions which will insure adequate separation from other aircraft.

h. All aircraft in this Wing will maintain a continuous listening watch on their assigned frequency and in case of radio transmitter failure, the following procedure will be followed:

(1) Aircraft will descend to and maintain contact flight if possible; continued over-the-top flight at the aircraft's assigned altitude (e.g., above broken clouds or an intervening solid overcast) is a permissible substitute provided contact conditions will prevail at the point of intended landing for approach purposes.

Sub.: "Air Traffic Control." dtd. 26 February 1944. (Continued)

(2) If unable to maintain contact or over-the-top flight, the aircraft will continue on last announced flight plan and will make a standard instrument approach upon arrival at destination. Station of destination will assign other traffic so that the assigned altitude, and all lower altitudes of the aircraft in difficulty will be clear for a reasonable length of time both before and after its estimated time of arrival.

6. Nothing in this directive is to be construed as prohibiting the tower or plane-ground radio or the officer on duty from deviating there from when circumstances indicate such deviation is desirable in the interest of safety.

7. Considerable thought and effort on the part of each station's operations section will be required to set up and maintain an adequate air traffic control, but this is considered essential to safe operation during the periods of low visibility now prevalent and anticipated. Training and instruction of tower and plane-ground radio operators is of primary importance in the success of such a plan, but in the final analysis, it is dependent upon adequate personal supervision by trained officers.

8. All traffic in, or passing through, the Central African Wing will be subject to these air traffic rules, and such modifications thereof as may be considered desirable at individual stations, and crews will be briefed accordingly. It is desired that Wing Operations be notified of any violations.

For the Commanding Officer:

THIS IS A TRUE COPY:

W. H. K. Sperry
WALTER K. SPERRY,
1st. Lieut., Air Corps.

/s/ C. E. Briggs,
/t/ C. E. BRIGGS,
Major, A.C.D.,
Adjutant General

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A FEPDIX XXV

DISPATCH NO. 8

Classification canceled or changed
by authority of ~~RESTRICTED~~ Commanding Officer
NAFD-ATC
NAME: *Daniel W. Robinson*
GRADE: *Captain, G.C.*
DATE: *1/29/44*
Friday 29 January 1944

Wadi Seidna South.

At this ATC station the briefing personnel is composed of three lieutenants--all of whom are navigators--and two staff sergeants of which one is a radio sergeant. At the time that I was at Wadi Seidna two of these officers were away. The only one remaining being Lt. Donald C. Turner. As he had been up very late the night before he was not in the office so I talked to Staff Sergeant Jonathan Terry. As a matter of fact I learned that Sgt. Terry has been in the briefing room longer than any of the others.

From Sgt. Terry I obtained a summary of the traffic which had passed through Wadi Seidna in the month of December 1943. This was as follows:

1. 278 planes to Karachi. Approximately 30% of these were tactical being mostly B24s and 25s and C46s. There were also some 15 to 20 C87s. These were all for the India China Wing and were ferried aircraft with ATC pilots or combat crews.
2. 152 planes to Acree. Practically all scheduled transport service. Most C47s with some C34s and some C87s.
3. 99 to Cairo. Practically all of these were A20s for Russia. These tactical ships were flown by ATC pilots. From Cairo they were flown to Abadan where the Russians take them over.

1. The Karachi route constitutes the real briefing job for this office - which incidentally, is known as Station No. 10, CAPT-ATC, APO 608, c/o PM, Miami. In briefing to Karachi particular emphasis is laid upon the check points of which are noted on the maps furnished to the pilots. A complete set of briefing data which is given out to those flying this route was furnished to me and is enclosed herewith.

2. The briefing Gen covering this route was furnished me and accompanies this report. Here again particular emphasis is laid on check points as noted on the map. In this connection however it should be pointed out that traffic going West to Accra is, as noted above, practically all scheduled transport service with the result that very little briefing in the usual sense of the word is required for this run.

3. I was also furnished a corrected copy of the Khartoum to Cairo Pilots Handbook together with the proper route maps. In this connection Sgt. Terry pointed out that we have been making a serious mistake in showing the termination of the flight at Khartoum. As a matter of fact there are three fields in and around Khartoum, namely (A) Khartoum itself which is a civil airport used by the British in emergency only. As a matter of fact it has a black top runway and is good in all weather but the British use it only in emergency and do not wish the Americans to use it at all. According to Sgt. Terry one of our ships which landed there recently by mistake had to pay a heavy charge to the British, something like \$75 for landing. (B) Wadi Seidna North. This is the regular British field. It does not have as good a surface as the runway at Khartoum (not being black topped) but is the field that the British regularly use. (C) Wadi Seidna South --this is the ATC field and is the only one which should be used by U.S. planes. It now has black top on the runway and is good in all weather.

Unfortunately we have shown Khartoum as the termination point both in our maps and in the pilots handbook "Khartoum--Cairo". This has led to rather serious confusion with the result that quite frequently, according to Sgt. Terry, U.S. ships have called the Khartoum tower for landing instructions and have had to be called over to Wadi Seidna South by the tower at that latter field. As a matter of fact only recently a C46 actually

landed at Khartoum. The runway is not suitable for big ships like this and this one got stuck in the mud as a result.

The actual briefing between Wadi Seidna South and Cairo is very simple. The route lies entirely over desert and in general has frequent contact with the Nile. On the other hand, however, there are places where the Nile wanders far from the route and it is therefore important for a pilot to remember his definite position with reference to various bends of this river.

At this office Sgt. Tucker is making up a revolving stand which will hold photographs of the various fields and check points which he has received from Washington. These are the usual enlargements on heavy card board which bears the notation on the back "Photograph by ACF--ATC--Overseas Technical Unit." Those covering the route from Khartoum to Karachi arrived only a week ago at Wadi Seidna and came directly to them from Washington. A list of certain of these pictures which are used at Wadi Seidna is attached.

As is done at most briefing stations, this office cuts its own stencils for radio data. However, it does not make any diagrams whatsoever. All diagrams and charts of importance are made at ACF for this station.

In this connection it should be noted that the last issue of Pilots Handbook entitled Khartoum--Cairo were sent direct to Cairo. This was a serious mistake for several reasons.

1. Traffic moving between these points goes North from Khartoum-- as already noted--instead of South from Cairo. The only thing going South from Cairo to Wadi Seidna South is scheduled transport stuff and requires practically no briefing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Yadi Seidna South is part of the CAFW ATO. All material destined for this station should in consequence go through Accra. This enables Accra to check the material and be sure it contains last minute data before forwarding it on.

With reference to the scheduled transports which move back and forth between Accra and Karachi, it should be noted that the CAFW on its scheduled transport run pursues a policy similar to that followed by the U.S. commercial airlines, namely crews are changed at certain designated points while the plane continues on. Furthermore the CAFW flies both day and night and very seldom interrupts its scheduled flights at any season of the year. The work is done primarily on instruments and schedules are largely adhered to. Between Accra and Karachi there are such relay crews at Accra, Maiduguri, Yadi Seidna South, Aden and Karachi. These crews are composed of instrument pilots who are thoroughly familiar with the route and fly it day and night on instruments under conditions where planes can be flown at all.

RE NOTE: The briefing office at Yadi Seidna South sends corrections or any changes, etc. to the HQ. at Accra. A copy of such letter which was forwarded to Accra on 30 January 1944 is attached.

Sgt. Tucker called my attention to the requirement entitled "Visual warning of a Submarine" noted on page 37 of the attached document "Communication Instructions For Reporting Enemy Sightings." In this connection Sgt. Tucker pointed out that due to the flight over water on certain parts of the trip between Yadi Seidna South and Karachi his office is supposed to see that the planes have white Very lights for such submarine warning. These should be furnished as part of the plane's equipment before it leaves the U.S.

since the supply available at Tadi Seidna South is very limited. This matter has, I understand, already been brought to the attention of CAFW Hqs at Accra.

ROBERT HART BOLLING
Lt. Colonel, A.C.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Caulahan

THOMAS J. CAULAHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

Arrived here 1900 hrs. G.M.T. on Sunday 30 January 1944. I was met at the plane by Major L.E. Cottrell, Special Services Officer at this Army Air Base. With him was also Lt. Dugger. This Base is very unusual in the attention which it gives to transient officers, to see that they are properly taken care of upon arrival. Major Cottrell is responsible for the fine work done in this regard. He has working under him a certain number of officers who do this in addition to their regular work, and on a purely voluntary basis. Arrangements are made so that one of these volunteer officers is always available during the full 24-hour period. Lt. Dugger is among this group.

The C.O. of the CAF, A.F.C., is Colonel James B. Stowell, and his Executive for Operations is Lt. Colonel C.B. Allen. The Wing Navigation and Briefing Officer is Captain Walter A. Rosenfield, who is very ably assisted by a number of subordinate officers, first among these being Lt. Theodore H. Blachly. Captain Rosenfield has just been appointed to this position, but appears to have the warm-hearted support of Col. Allen and others in the Command. Furthermore, Capt. Rosenfield has had very wide experience in flying over the greater part of the African continent.

I explained to Col. Stowell the nature of my mission and he immediately called Col. Allen and Major Alexander (Chief Pilot for CAF), into his office. We had a preliminary discussion there and then withdrew to Col. Allen's office to continue our conference, as Col. Stowell had other appointments.

Col. Allen told me that I could not have come at a more convenient moment, since he had just prepared by the Wing Navigation Office a report on Pilot's Handbooks and an analysis of the test results in Washington's assistance in this regard. A copy of the report is hereto.

CLASSIFIED
 by authority of the
 NAME OF THE OFFICE
 DATE 1/21/46
 W. A. Palenberg
 Capt, USAF

attached. From this it will be seen that our last Accra to Marrakech Pilot's Handbook of January 5, 1944 made a very favorable impression upon the King Navigation and Briefing Office of CAFI, and has convinced them that we can very effectively be of assistance in connection with these Handbooks.

At this time, Col. Allen told me that in the spring of 1943 Major Goff was sent by the Accra office- which was then AEW- to Washington, for the express purpose of securing a substantial list of reproduction equipment to aid that office in its publication of Pilot's Handbooks. This printing equipment had been worked out with great care by Major Goff and a Major Masief, who was then located at this station. In this connection, it appears that Major Masief (who is now C.O. at Reno), was in civilian life associated with the company which manufactures this printing machinery and is thoroughly familiar with setting it up and operating it. According to Col. Allen, Goff was therefore, sent to Washington around the end of May, 1943, for the express purpose of procuring this machinery. Nothing was, however, received against this order until December, 1943, when late that month Accra did get some of the items which were requested. Unfortunately, however, the machinery which arrived was not complete- and even such of it as Accra received could not be used by virtue of the lack of certain essential items such as ink, etc., for example. Col. Allen is very anxious to find out definitely whether Accra may consider that this order will be completely filled at a reasonably early moment, or whether the whole matter will have to be dropped. With this in mind, he gave me a copy of his correspondence on this subject which is hereto attached. This shows what was supposed to be ordered by Major Goff and what actually arrived around Christmas, 1943. Col. Allen asked me particularly to do anything I could to determine the present status of this order.

In this connection, Col. Allen pointed out that if such complete

they told us that, in collaboration with the CAPW Intelligence and Security Office, they now have a Waste Intelligence Officer, namely, Lt. Harry Billway, to furnish information both to them and to Intelligence Security, on all the routes with which they are concerned. At the present time, Lt. Billway is travelling over the Shartoum - Karsochi route with the result that that office will shortly have a lot more information regarding this. At this time they told us that on the Shartoum - Karsochi route the establishment of ranges at the following places is now in process:

Azra
 Naqoshiya
 Assan
 Marisreeg (Sahrein)
 Sharjan

At this time, the briefing Office of CAPW gave us copies of their letter of February 1st giving a synopsis of recent correspondence of Air Movement Branch, as well as additional handbook corrections, notes of these enclosed herewith. Following my talk with Col. Wilson, I went to the Air Operations and Briefing Office and discussed the Pilot's Handbooks in further detail with both Capt. Bewick and Lt. Sisking. At that time I made certain notes with reference to these Handbooks, which are given below:

1. Lt. Sisking furnished us Pilot's Handbooks to cover all their routes within the area that of Azra to Karsochi. He said that a new one was being made up for this and a set be forwarded to us in the near future.
2. It is recommended that in General Information, we give an explanation of the observed time used under radio.
3. In every case where a range leg does not lie across the field, it is vitally essential to give the bearing range to field.
4. Even though the field elevation is shown on the field sketch, it should also appear in the printed data at the bottom of the page.
5. Pilot's Handbooks dealing with dates which are under the direction

of GAF's, should be sent to Accra, for distribution to be made from that Headquarters. Furthermore, this will enable that office to make a final check before sending these out, to make certain that they include all last-minute data. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that Accra is at present doing all the work for GAF's as well. Until such time as that latter Wing is able to look after its own requirements, it would be my thought that all material for them should also go through Accra for last-minute corrections before being distributed. The one exception to this might well be the Kerekech - U.S., since this is a special run entirely under the jurisdiction of the Briefing Office at Kerekech.

6. The actual briefing at Accra is done by the Briefing Office at the field, that is, the Air Base Office. An account of my interview with the officer at that briefing office will be given later on. In this connection, it should, however, be noted that all material issued by each field briefing office is, of course, obtained from the Air Navigation and Briefing Office itself. The point is that the Air Navigation and Briefing Office gives this out to the field office and the field office in turn, issues it to the pilots.

7. Lt. Alinsky is not only an aviator but is Capt. Alinsky, but is Chief of the Production Section of the Air Navigation and Briefing Office. He, therefore, is the one who normally has to look to to obtain the items which are of interest to it.

8. There is in Accra, a civilian organization known as the 'British Gold Coast Survey.' This is directly under the British Government. For some time now, the Air Navigation and Briefing Office has made up the master waxley map - with the routes and checkpoints outlined thereon - and furnished this to the British Gold Coast Survey, together with the base maps to which it applies. This survey has then printed the overlays for the Briefing Office. In addition to this, although it was an exceptional case,

The Survey did a recent job for the Briefing Office on 1,000 Marrakech to U.S. Harbors - which Marrakech had asked Accra to make up for them.

NOTE: This request was made upon Accra shortly before I reached Marrakech and Capt. Kross told me about it when I was there. As a general proposition, the Survey does not help out in the printing of Pilot's Handbooks but they were called upon in this particular case.

7. As an indication of the service that Accra is performing for WFF, there are attached, carbon copies of two letters of 19 January and 25 January, 1944, respectively, dealing with Khartoum - Cairo Pilot's Handbook which was prepared by A.I.S. and forwarded by A.I.S. directly to Cairo.

8. At my request, Lt. Silvey made up a brief outline of the set-up of the Map Navigation and Briefing Office. This is attached hereto, and gives a good picture of the personnel concerned with the production at Accra, of Pilot's Handbooks. At this time, it must be noted that of the officers in the Map Navigation and Briefing Office, all are navigators with the exception of Capt. Rosenfeld, who is a carrier pilot.

While at Accra, I visited the Intelligence and Security Office of JAF. Then Lt. Silvey gave me a trip he takes with him the blue form, (attached hereto), which is made out at each airfield that he visits. The original of this goes to Major Morgan, the head of A.I.C., Washington, one carbon is given to the Map Navigation and Briefing Office, Accra and the remaining carbon is placed on file in the Intelligence and Security Office here at Accra.

The personnel of this Intelligence and Security Office for the Wing, is as follows:

Chief, Lt. Carlston S. Young
Assistant: Lt. Bertram Krause

Enlisted Personnel:

Staff Sergeant Boland
Private Crooks

This office receives all Forms 69 sent in by the various fields covered by the Wing. These come in as an original and two copies, which are all sent to the office of Major Fred C. Morgan, Chief, Intelligence and Security, A.F.C., Washington.

The Southern Sector of the 19th Weather Region is stationed here at Accra (see outline report of Weather Region attached). The Sector Control Officer is Major Henry A. Mooney, but the one I actually talked to - in Major Mooney's absence - was Major Robert Ross. Under Major Ross is Lt. Arthur H. Frithsen.

I explained to Major Ross the nature of our work and asked him if it might be possible for someone connected with the meteorological service to write up in pilot's language, a description of certain characteristic weather occurrences which prevail at special seasons in different areas in Africa, for example, the Kharattin wind here, the dust storms centering about Atar and Timbuktu, and the violent thunderstorms occurring between Maiduguri and El Fasher. I pointed out to him that we had only a very limited explanation of the real significance of these different weather occurrences. Major Ross said that Lt. Frithsen was ideally qualified to do this and further, more, was definitely interested in that type of work. As a result of a brief conversation which I had with these two officers, it is understood that they will collaborate in writing up for us a colorful but accurate story in pilot's language of the type of thing which I have mentioned above.

NOTE: In like connection there will also be mentioned the locust swarms which center around El Geneina during the months of September and October and which can present a very serious hazard if the pilot is not familiar with them.

At this time it should be mentioned that from 10 January to 21 January, 1944, Capt. Allan and Lt. Frithsen made a survey trip from Accra to Kano to

Tripoli, with the idea of exploring the possibility of opening up a new route for heavy bombers from here to Tripoli. The route flown was Accra, Kano, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Marrakech, Abur, Ouar, Roberts Field, Accra. As a result of that flight Lt. Frithsen wrote up a weather survey for the proposed route. He very kindly gave us a copy of this and it is enclosed herein.

Before leaving Accra I visited the Air Base Briefing Office and talked with the Senior Station Briefing Officer, Lt. A. J. Finelsson, navigator.

According to Lt. Finelsson, the two main runs from here are:

1. Accra to Kadi Bidina South. - Three scheduled flights a day, at 0900, 1500, 1900.
2. Accra to Dakar - Three scheduled flights a day, at 1300, 1400, 1600.

All pilots and navigators are briefed here, while radio briefing is given in a room a short distance away, to the radio operators.

Lt. Frithsen's office has as its personnel, six officers all told - four navigators - and one sergeant. In this connection it should be noted that all navigators assigned to CAP are attached to the briefing service so that when they complete their trips they are called on to give actual briefing for the flights they have covered. All navigators are under the briefing office of the Wing, and all briefing officers except Capt. Assenlin (who is a Senior Pilot) are navigators.

Lt. Frithsen told me that regarding (1) - Accra - Kadi Bidina South - there is a little bit of everything going over this. However, operational planes from the U.S. slightly outstrip the regular scheduled transport ships. The types of planes are mainly as follows:

4-30's - Russians	} - Either carry their own crews or are taken through by ferry crews.
(3-21's - India and China)	
(3-16's - ")	
(3-25's - ")	
(3-17's - ")	
(3-47's - ")	
(3-27's - ")	

In addition to this there are DC-3's, C-54's, and C-87's carrying passengers and cargo on scheduled flights.

The overland maps covering their route comprise all the necessary checkpoints. With regard to the 22 and 24 checkpoints they have been supplied pictures from Washington, but on the following checkpoints they have no pictures at the present time:-

Big Three
George One
George Three
George Five

It is standard practice in the IAFM for the radio operators to report when they pass over each checkpoint (rather than report at a very hour or minor definite time interval). As they are over each checkpoint they report to the nearest radio station along the route. This radio station is always open and is the terminal. In addition to this, the radio operator must contact all radio stations at the radio center en-route, that or not. Now if they are over-flying when they must get cleared through and by that particular tower when they are over-flying.

(3) Accra - Dakar - This route is almost entirely scheduled transports, usually, DC-3's, and the volume is at present about fifteen a week, going from Accra to Dakar. There is very little traffic from Accra to Natal via Accra. On most nights there is, this Briefing Office issues the Handbook turned out by Natal and kept up-to-date at Natal.

There is another route which is used about twice a week - from each end - and covered by scheduled transport DC-3's. This goes through the

Following aircraft:

Accra - U.S. Field
 Folsie Seire - Free French Field
 Loulouville - Belgian Field
 Elizabethville - " " "
 Ndikoni - South African Air Force
 Bakel - " " " "
 New Island South - U.S. Field

This route is very complicated for the radio operator as so many different nationalities are concerned. In some cases, on this trip, they use only radio operators who have made the flight and are familiar with it. At the present time, namely, during February and March, there is very heavy rainfall in this area, with the result that they try to keep the schedule down to one day a week in each direction. There are good airports along the route, and power lines and telephone lines, good visual checkpoints. Except for the months of February and March the weather for the balance of the year is reasonably good over this route.

During my stay at Accra, I had quite a talk with Col. Allen. In 1934 he was appointed by the President as one of three men to serve on the Air Safety Board. Col. Hardin of American Airlines, was also on this board. (Col. Hardin is now C.O. of the Eastern Section - The West - of the C.A.A. - India City, C.F.C.).

As already noted, C.A.F. runs their transport service like the airlines, namely, by division, where crews change but the plane keeps right on. This was originally initiated by Col. Hardin when he was at Accra filling the position of A-3 for A.S.A., which job is now filled by Col. Allen, C.A.F.

According to Col. Allen, this wing used to fly regularly from Accra straight across the desert to Gran, with Colonel Lecher as an alternate. Tactical units, namely, B-24's and A-20's, flew from Kano to Gran. In either event it was a very rugged flight as it covered a long distance of very bad desert, at the end of which there were the clouds over the Atlas Mountains.

It was very difficult to know what the icing level was in these clouds before reaching them, and also what the weather was beyond the Atlas Mountains since facilities at that time were very limited. Furthermore, at that time the Oran field was very bad after a rain. Colomb Bechar, as an alternate, then had no radio range, but could be found if one were within 50 miles of it.

As a result of their night flying, CAPW is very strong for radio aids, with the result that all of their stations have revolving beacons and all radio ranges also have heading beacons.

According to Col. Allen, they cannot use their 24-hour scheduled transport service, let pilots from the States, until they have, at their disposal, a school for special training. After their graduation from this school they usually make their work as co-pilots for three to four months, until they are recommended for promotion; then they check them again before promoting them. At Accra the CAPW has a number of officers who do nothing else but weed out these pilots. According to Col. Allen, the man who needs an horizon to fly by and better not try to fly in Africa, since there is no horizon at night over the desert and very frequently none in the daytime, either.

ROBERT HART BULLIS
Lt. Colonel, A.C.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coultham

THOMAS J. COULTHAM,
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX XXVW

HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
A.P.O 625 MIAMI, FLORIDA

6-JEC/ad

In reply
refer to:
583

14 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Record of Delivery of Cargo to Consignee.

TO: Commanding Officers, All Stations, CAFE-ATC.
(Attention: Priorities and Traffic Officers)

1. A standard cargo receipt system will be put into effect throughout the Central African Wing, in compliance with instructions recently received from ATC Headquarters, Washington.

2. It is hereby directed that all stations not at present using a Ledger Receipt Form inaugurate this system immediately, such form to conform with the inclosure attached hereto. Stations which have been using a Ledger Receipt Form will alter their type of form to conform with the inclosure. Compliance with this directive by all CAFE stations will bring about a uniform method of obtaining the consignee's signature for shipments received at all stations throughout the Wing.

By order of Colonel STOWELL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs,
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - Sample Copy of
Ledger Book Page.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

(Sample Ledger Book Page Heading)

Date	Airwaybill No.	No. Pcs.	Weight	Contents of Shipment	Organization	Received By	Remarks

INCL 1

583

22 April 1944

SUBJECT: Transportation of Animals by Air

TO: Commanding Officer,
Central African Wing
Air Transport Command
APO 625, c/o Postmaster
Miami, Florida

Attention: Major E. H. Smith
Assistant Chief of Staff
Wing Priorities and Traffic

1. An increasing number of reports are reaching this Headquarters relative to passengers arriving in the United States accompanied by various types of pets.

2. Included in the report received for February, it is noted that in four instances passengers whose travel either originated or passed through your Wing enroute to the United States were guilty of this practice.

3. Under date of 14 June 1943, a letter was addressed to all Wings on this subject in which a definite prohibition was contained against the transportation by air of animals, birds, reptiles, etc.

a. The only exception provided therein was to cover such instances as would occur when such animals, birds, reptiles, etc., were to be transported to an institution or agency of the United States or Allied Governments for scientific research.

b. It is now additionally provided that transportation of animals, birds, reptiles, etc., may be granted in the case of definite authority from a higher Headquarters.

4. In all other instances, the prohibition above is to be rigidly enforced.

By command of Major General GEORGE:

O. C. ENGE
Major, Air Corps
Assistant Executive
Priorities & Traffic

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulahan
THOMAS J. COULAHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX XXIX.

HEADQUARTERS
STATION NO.3
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
Air Transport Command

4-DHR/ms

In reply
refer to:
583.

AP0606, U. S. Army,
18 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Transportation of Pets.

TO: Commanding Officer, Station #1, CAFW-ATC, APO 625, U. S. Army.
Attention: Wing Priorities and Traffic Officer.
(Through: Executive Officer for Traffic and Operations,
Station #3, CAFW-ATC, APO 606, U. S. Army.)

1. ATC Headquarters letter of 22 April 1944, Subject: "Transportation of Animals by Air," was recently referred to the undersigned for action.

2. Following incident in regard to this subject is reported.

a. C-54 #0147 was scheduled to depart eastbound from this Station 17 May 1944 at 1030 GMT.

b. Fifteen minutes before departure time, the undersigned noticed that one of the intransit passengers aboard this plane, Lt. G. E. Williams, had with him a small water spaniel, questioning of Lt. Williams revealed that he was a B-24 pilot enroute to an overseas assignment; the dog was and had been for some time the mascot of Lt. William's crew. Lt. Williams stated that he had been told in the States that he could carry this pet with him; he had been permitted to board plane 0147 at Miami with the dog.

c. Lt. Williams had no written authority from the P & T Officer in Miami for transportation of the dog, although the presence of the dog at this Station would appear to be prima facie evidence at least that the Lieutenant was not prevented from carrying the dog aboard at Miami.

d. The Lieutenant had evidence that the dog was inoculated against rabies and distemper.

e. An unsuccessful attempt was made to contact Wing Traffic as the higher authority, for a ruling on the transport of subject animal.

f. Lt. Williams insisted that he would have to be off-loaded if the dog was off-loaded.

g. In view of the short time before plane departure, and in order to expedite this B-24 pilot to his destination, the undersigned authorized transportation of the dog.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulahan
THOMAS J. COULAHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

/s/ Douglas H. Reynolds,
DOUGLAS H. REYNOLDS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Station P & T Officer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX XXX.

HEADQUARTERS
STATION NO. 3
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
Air Transport Command

4-DHR/ms

583 [in ink]

AFO 606, U. S. Army,
28 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Transportation of Animals by Air.

TO: Commanding Officer, Station #1, CAFI-ATC, AFO 605, U. S. Army.
Attention: Wing Priorities and Traffic Officer.
Through: Major Ledbetter, Executive Officer, Traffic-Operations.

1. On 27 May 1944 at 2345 GMT, C-54 #7302 arrived at this Station from Natal with 2nd Lt. J. H. Specht, O-815991, as a passenger. Lt. Specht had in his possession a small black and white fox terrier, and evidence that the dog had been inoculated against rabies and distemper.
2. When questioned by the undersigned, Lt. Specht reported that he had left Miami as a crew member of a tactical airplane which subsequently crashed in South America. He stated that the Operations Officer at Miami told him he could take the dog with him as long as it was properly inoculated. He further stated that transportation of the dog was not questioned at Natal when he left there as a passenger.
3. Lt. Specht's destination is listed as El Aouina in North Africa and he will be routed from here to that point via Dakar.
4. The Priorities and Traffic Officer at this Station has not received authorization for either the destruction of, or maintenance of live pets which are taken from passengers. This makes it quite difficult to abide by subject ATC directive. Furthermore, to prevent a passenger at this Station from onward carriage of a pet which he has been permitted to transport from the States, would serve to create a condition of ill-will and strained passenger relations, directly negating the program of passenger service which has been emphasized so much in recent months.
5. Instructions from higher authority are requested on how this Station shall act in the event of similar occurrences in the future. Request also that action be taken to coordinate the subject ATC regulation with all stations between here and the States.

DOUGLAS H. REYNOLDS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Station P & T Officer.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coolehan
THOMAS J. COOLEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

Classification changed to	RESTRICTED
by authority of Commanding Officer	
NAFD-ATC	
NAME	<i>Daniel J. Fitzmaurice</i>
GRADE	<i>Captain, A.C.</i>
DATE	<i>7/5/46</i>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Cir 27)

CIRCULAR)
:
NO. 27)

HEADQUARTERS, CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND, ARMY AIR FORCES
APO 625, c/o Postmaster, Miami, Florida
8 June 1944.

Section

ANIMAL PETS—Transportation of.....	I
RADIO—Misuse of facilities.....	II
SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT—Issuance to Allied Governments.....	III

I. ANIMAL PETS — 1. Animals, especially those of the monkey, rat, and parrot families, are carriers, reservoirs, or otherwise vectors of numerous infectious diseases, and also hosts of insect vectors of other diseases.

2. Contact with and exposure to these animals is undesirable. Transport of animals encourages the dissemination of animal borne and certain insect borne diseases.

3. For these reasons no animal pets of any kind shall be transported in planes within the Central African Wing. This includes planes departing or entering the Wing to or from other areas.

4. Commanding Officers will dispose of any animals included in paragraph 1 above.

5. Permission will be requested of this Headquarters by those agencies desiring to transport animals through this Wing for scientific purposes.

II. RADIO — 1. The increasing tendency on the part of Wing officers and Station Commanders to use the radio facilities with almost a total disregard for letter communications, has begun to disrupt communication channels.

2. While the use of radio, "as a speed agent" is encouraged, it is not the intent of this Headquarters, that very routine, and relatively unimportant correspondence be transmitted by radio.

3. Officers and Station Commanders are cautioned to exercise their judgment to determine whether or not the messages are of proper importance to be sent via radio; and that the classification of the messages are commensurate with the urgency of the subject message.

III. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT — 1. Section II of Circular 66, Hq USAFIME, dated 24 November 1943 is quoted for your information and guidance.

* * * * * *** E X T R A C T *** * * * * *

CLASSIFIED BY: [unclear] ON: [unclear]
 16 **RESTRICTED**
 by Authority of [unclear] Commanding Office
 NAED-ATC
 NAME: Daniel A. Robinson
 GRADE: Captain, A.C.
 DATE: 12/1/44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

II. ISSUANCE OF MATERIEL TO ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AS A LEND-LEASE AID.

1. All requests for issuance of property, facilities, services, or information to Allied Governments as Lend-Lease Aid, will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval, except for those items listed below.

- a. Stores drawn from and later returned to the British.
- b. Scrap and salvage items turned over to British "Returned Stores Depots" or salvage depots.
- c. Supplies and equipment repaired for and reissued to an Allied Government.
- d. All petroleum products.
- e. Rations issued on individual basis.
- f. Air transportation.
- g. Medical service.
- h. All Lend-Lease transactions within the Persian Gulf Service Command, (On which direct procedure for approval and reporting are set up with the War Department).

2. It is essential that all Lend-Lease transactions, whether subject to approval required in paragraph 1 or not, be reported as direct Lend-Lease in accordance with the provisions of Section I, this Circular. (Except Persian Gulf Service Command—see 1h above).

3. All requests from foreign governments for property, facilities, services, or information will be in written form and submitted to this headquarters where such requests will be processed in accordance with letter AG 400.3121, this headquarters, dated 28 October 1943, subject: "Processing of Lend-Lease Requisitions", addressed to Chiefs of Staff Divisions and Sections, this headquarters.

* * * * *

2. The term Allied Governments as used therein includes the military, air and naval forces of those Governments. Strict compliance with this Circular is required.

3. Requests received from Allied Government agencies for U.S. Army supplies or equipment will be in written form and contain a statement of the basis therefor. Requests for all issues requiring Theater authorization in accordance with the above-quoted Circular will be forwarded to this Headquarters accompanied by a report of the circumstances involved and your recommendations in respect thereto.

By order of Colonel STOWELL:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs

/t/ C. B. BRIGGS

Major, A. G. D.
Adjutant General.

C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
THOMAS J. COULEHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX XXII.

Army Air Forces
HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
Air Transport Command
Station #1

7-BPL/ves

In reply
refer to:
524.2

AFO 625, c/o FM,
Miami, Florida
7 January 1944

SUBJECT: Baggage and Equipment Check Room.

TO: Commanding Officers, All Stations, CAFW-ATC.

1. Reports received by the Inspector General's Office of their inspection for Headquarters, Air Transport Command, indicate a very heavy increase in the loss of government property by ferrying pilots, tactical crew members and other military personnel travelling through various stations over Air Transport Command routes. These losses have steadily increased despite previous instructions issued to this and other Wings.

2. Inspections and reports of survey indicate that these losses are a direct result of continuous wanton carelessness on the part of the various military personnel charged with the custody of this property and also lack of positive control and security measures at many stations.

3. It is directed that:

a. All Station Commanders take the necessary action to provide a secure system for the safeguarding of all government and personal property in the custody of military personnel traveling through this Wing.

b. In all stations of this Wing, a check room be provided and operated wherein Transient personnel may check valuable (not restricted) government and personal property, and be given a receipt or check for such property. This space must be kept under 24 hour guard or securely locked.

c. Exhibit A. Suggested receipt form is enclosed.

d. All arriving military personnel while being briefed will be informed of the existence and location of this check room.

4. This checkroom should be located in or adjacent to the Terminal Building so that the Transient may check property immediately upon arrival and recover same just prior to departure.

5. Exhibit B inclosed above the procedure that will be followed at Station #3.

6. A similar procedure adapted to local conditions will be followed at all Stations.

By order of Colonel STOWELL:

2 Incls.

Incl 1. Exhibit A. *[Not included in Appendix]*

Incl 2. Exhibit B.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

/s/ C. B. Briggs,
C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

E X H I B I T "B"

1. A representative of Operations will meet all arriving tactical planes. At the time of briefing the crew as to billeting procedure, ETD, malarial precautions, etc., the arriving crew will be advised as to the existence and location of checkroom where government property (not restricted) and personal property may be checked.

2. Operations will then transport crew and baggage to the Transient Camp Office.

3. Transient Service representative there registers the crew, assigns billets and handles the checking of whatever equipment and baggage there is to be safeguarded.

4. These articles may be recovered at departure time.

5. This checkroom will be either guarded or locked and will be accessible 24 hours.

A TRUE COPY:

Daniel W. Rohrbaugh
DANIEL W. ROHRBAUGH,
Captain, Air Corps.

C O P Y
APPENDIX XXXIII.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AG 524.2

Cairo, Egypt
21 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Shipment of Baggage.

TO: Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Liberia.
Commanding Officer, Delta Service Command.
Commanding Officer, Eritrea Service Command.
Commanding Officer, Reservoir Air Depot.
Commanding Officer, West African Service Command.

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in this theater in connection with the shipment of baggage belonging to personnel effecting permanent changes of station by air transportation. In accordance with War Department Circular No. 110, dated 27 April 1943, air priority can be given to only so much of such baggage as falls within the fifty-five (55) pound maximum therein established. As a result, where the orders directing the travel of such personnel make no provisions for an excess baggage allowance, the shipment of baggage over and above the fifty-five (55) pound maximum must be accomplished by land and/or water facilities, often resulting in inordinate delays in delivery to personnel concerned.

2. In order to alleviate the situation described above, it will be the policy of this headquarters in the future, where a considerable hardship is imposed due to the limitations of the above-cited circular, to authorize an excess baggage allowance of not to exceed 125 pounds in such travel orders as effect a permanent change of station. Such provision, while not insuring that baggage in excess of fifty-five (55) pounds will accompany an individual in each case, will nevertheless allow its shipment by air transportation, thereby reducing the time element involved to a minimum.

3. It is not the intent of this Headquarters that excess baggage allowances be authorized indiscriminately and each case will therefore be considered separately. Orders covering travel between points jointly served by adequate land and/or water transportation facilities will not provide for such excess baggage allowances.

4. Bedding rolls and similar items of individual equipment which are available for issue at destination will not be transported by air transportation as excess baggage.

5. A policy in accord with that outlined above will be adopted by your headquarters in the promulgation of travel orders which you are now authorized to issue.

By command of Major General BOYCE;

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulahan
THOMAS J. COULAHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

/s/ H. H. Wild,
H. H. WILD,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

Station #1

524.2

18 February 1944

SUBJECT: Shipment of Baggage

TO : Commanding General, Air Transport Command, Washington, D.C.
 (Attention: Ass't Chief of Staff, Priorities and Traffic)

1. Forwarded as a matter of primary interest to Priorities and Traffic is the attached letter, subject, Shipment of Baggage, which was recently circulated to the various commands in USAFIME.

2. It will be noted that paragraph 2 of reference letter authorizes certain administrative offices to issue travel orders for permanent changes of station which require the air transportation of 125 pounds of excess personal baggage when "a considerable hardship is imposed". Further, it will be noted that it appears to be the intent of the reference letter to make the air transportation of such excess personal baggage mandatory and without regard to the usual priority procedures.

3. In transfers of personnel involving permanent changes of station, this Wing and certain other headquarters served by the facilities of this Wing attempt to adhere to the 55 pound personal baggage limitation. It is believed the most favorable results can be obtained when the personal baggage provisions of WD Circular 110 are applied to all Army personnel.

For the Commanding Officer:

/s/ C. B. B.
 /t/ C. B. BRIGGS,
 Major, A. G. D.,
 Adjutant General.

1 Incl:'

Incl 1 - Ltr. Hqs. USAFIME, dated
 21 January 1944 (True Copy).
[Not included in this Appendix]

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
 THOMAS J. COULEHAN
 Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX XXXV

ARMY AIR FORCES
HEADQUARTERS AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Classification of change to RESTRICTED by authority of Commanding Officer NAFD-AIC NAME: <i>Daniel W. G. G. G.</i> GRADE: <i>Captain, A.C.</i> DATE: <i>1/8/46</i>

8 April 1944

SUBJECT: Plane Loading Equipment

TO: Commanding General
Central African Wing
Air Transport Command
APO 625, c/o Postmaster
Miami, Florida

Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff
Wing Priorities and Traffic

1. In view of evident confusion existing relative to loading equipment needed and to be supplied to your Wing, the following information is submitted.

2. From the 1943 production of the Plane Loader, Fork Lift, Pneumatic Tired, three units of this equipment are all that will be delivered to your Wing. These are as follows:

2	Accra
1	Khartoum

The remaining units of this equipment, as requested in your original requirements schedule contained in 1st Indorsement dated 2 August 1943, will go to the North African Wing.

3. Information from the Air Service Command indicated that you have expressed requirements for 20 units of high lift attachments for 2 1/2 ton 6 x 6 trucks. In view of the excessive requirements by various Air Forces, your wing has been allocated only five of these high lift attachments. No definite shipping information is available from the Air Service Command on these.

4. Pursuant to your radio to this Headquarters, #E2286 dated 1944, your estimated requirements for 1944 for Plane Loader, Fork Lift, Pneumatic Tired was established as being 20 units. In view of the situation outlined above, this Headquarters has allocated 31 units of this equipment instead of the requested 20.

5. Request expression from your Wing as to requirements for loading equipment in view of the foregoing facts. This expression should be as specific as possible, bearing in mind that procurement of high lift attachments are not included in this Command's requirements for loading equipment. If high lift attachments are necessary they must of necessity be procured as a special item.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. Loading requirements should include shipping instructions as well as advice as to whether or not the 31 Plane Loader, Fork Lift, Pneumatic Tired are sufficient for operations in the Central African Wing.

By command of Major General GEORGE:

/s/ O. C. Enge
/t/ O. C. ENGE
Major, Air Corps
Assistant Executive
Priorities & Traffic

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

.....
: ~~Secret~~ :
: ~~Authr CO CAFW~~ :
: ~~Initials...SBB.....AG~~ :
: ~~Date.....20..April..1944~~ :
:.....

583.5 1st Ind. 6-JEC/ad
Hq, CAFW-ATC, Station #1, APO 625, U. S. Army. 20 April 1944.

TO: Commanding General, Air Transport Command, Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, Priorities & Traffic)

1. In view of the urgency to other Wings and the other loading aids developed in the Central African Wing to assist fork-lifts, it is believed that this Wing can operate satisfactorily on eighteen (18) plane loader, fork-lift, pneumatic tired units and five (5) units of high lift attachments for 2½ ton 6 x 6 trucks.

2. As three (3) of the fork-lift units have been sent to the Central African Wing under the 1943 production schedule, this leaves fifteen (15) units which will be expected under the estimated requirements for 1944. Unless information to the contrary is received from your Headquarters, it will be assumed that this indorsement will serve as a requisition for the fifteen (15) units of fork-lifts.

3. The inclosed shipping instructions, as requested in basic communication, contain as much information as could be placed at our disposal by the officer in charge of water transportation.

4. Further information as to when this Wing may expect the plane loading equipment is requested.

For the Commanding Officer:

/s/ C. B. Briggs,
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl:
Incl 1 - Shipping Instructions for Fork-lift Units, to CAFW.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~RESTRICTED~~
Classified by _____
to _____
by authority of _____
NAFD-ATC
NAME: *Daniel G. Rohrbaugh*
G. A. I. *Captain, A.C.*
DATE: *1/8/46*

~~SECRET~~

SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORK-LIFT UNITS

<u>STATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS</u>	<u>INSTRUCTIONS</u>
Roberts Field, Station #14, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge is Marshall, Liberia. Code Designator, AGED
Accra Station #3, CAFW-ATC	2	Port of Discharge is Takoradi, Gold Coast. Code Designator, JOGO via HAZY
Lagos Station #11, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge is Lagos, Nigeria. Code Designator, SCUM
Kano Station #9, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge, Lagos, Nigeria. Code Designator, SCUM
Maiduguri Station #12, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge is Lagos, Nigeria. Code Designator, SCUM
El Geneina Station #6, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge is Port Sudan, Anglo Egyptian Sudan.
El Fasher Station #5, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge is Port Sudan, Anglo Egyptian Sudan
Khartoum Station #10, CAFW-ATC	2	Port of Discharge is Port Sudan, Anglo Egyptian Sudan.
Asmara Station #8, CAFW-ATC	1	Port of Discharge is Massaua, Eritrea, or Port Sudan (depending on the service)
Aden Station #4, CAFW-ATC	2	Port of Discharge of these three stations is Aden, Arabia unless service will permit shipment to each individual station.
Salala Station #15, CAFW-ATC	1	
Masira Island Station #13, CAFW-ATC	1	

NOTE: Fork-Lift units should be shipped to the Commanding Officer each station, Attention: Priorities and Traffic Officer.

NOTE: Fork-Lifts for El Geneina and El Fasher will be shipped by air to those stations from Khartoum. Fork-Lifts for Kano and Maiduguri will be shipped by rail to those stations from Lagos.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2nd Ind. AFATC/P&T/HEN/WJM/ebg
HQ., AAF, Air Transport Command, Washington, D. C. 3 May 1944

TO: Commanding Officer, Central African Wing, Air Transport Command,
APO 625, c/o Postmaster, Miami, Florida, Attention: Assistant
Chief of Staff, Wing Priorities and Traffic.

1. Confirming request contained in paragraph 2 of 1st Indorsement, fifteen (15) units of subject equipment are to be allocated to your Wing out of the 1944 production.

2. As advised in letter from this Headquarters dated 14 April 1944, shipping instructions have been issued for seven (7) units of subject equipment to be forwarded to Accra. Basis for such instructions was advice received from the procuring agent, Army Service Forces, that the equipment was available, and request for immediate shipping instructions was made. In the absence of advice from your Wing instructions were issued sic in the belief that available shipping space to Accra would expedite delivery and redistribution might be accomplished from that point.

3. Contacts with the Army Service Forces indicate that the equipment has already departed from their depot and estimated intransit time to Accra is approximately sixty (60) days.


4. Present schedules indicate that the remaining eight units will come off of the production line this month. Therefore, with reference to the foregoing, it is requested that shipping instructions for these eight units be furnished by radio immediately.

By command of Major General GEORGE:

1 Incl
n/c

/s/ O. C. Enge
/t/ O. C. ENGE
Major, Air Corps
Assistant Executive
Priorities & Traffic

A TRUE COPY:



THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX XXVI

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

.....
: ~~SECRET~~ :
: Auth: ~~CS-USA/IME~~ :
: Initials: /1/ AMC :
: Date: 14 Apr 44 :
:.....

AG 311.4

SUBJECT: Army Courier Service.

TO : Commanding General, North African Wing, ATC,
Commanding Officer, Central African Wing, ATC,
Commanding Officer, U.S. Army Forces in Liberia,
Commanding Officer, West African Service Command,
Commanding Officer, Middle East Service Command,
Commanding Officer, Deversoir Air Depot,
Chief, Staff Divisions and Sections, this headquarters,
Officer in charge, all separate activities and offices,
this headquarters.

Classification ~~RESTRICTED~~
to Cairo, Egypt,
by ~~14 April 1944~~ ~~noting Officer~~
NAFD-ATC
NAME: ~~James W. Robinson~~
GRADE: ~~Captain, G.O.~~
1/8/46

1. In accordance with Section III, Circular No. 95, War Department, dated 6 March 1944, and letter AG 311.4 (20 March 44) AM, WD, AGO, dated 20 March 1944, subject: "Army Courier Service" the following standard operating procedure for the Army Courier Service is published for the information, guidance and compliance of all concerned.

2. Functions. The function of the Army Courier Service is the safe and speedy transmission of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents and material and all classes of cryptographic material by officer courier.

3. Material which may be dispatched. No mail will be dispatched by Army Courier Service by any personnel, agency or activity of this command unless it is TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL in nature, or CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL, and is properly classified and marked or stamped accordingly. Official mail which is neither TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL in character will not be presented for transmission by Army Courier Service.

4. Certification Required. All material, except cryptographic, authorized to be dispatched by Courier Service must be accompanied by the request of an officer authorized to classify documents as TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL, as the case may be (See AR 380-5). A sample copy of the request to be used is shown below.

TO: Courier Transfer Officer

Date: _____

The attached mail is TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL in character. It is requested that this mail be dispatched to its destination by courier service.

/s/

(Name and Grade)

(Organization)

~~SECRET~~

5. Transmission. a. The volume of matter transported by the Army Courier Service on airplanes has reached such proportions that unless use of such service is limited to the absolute minimum, delays will result in the transmission of highly important and urgent matter.

b. Effective immediately, no TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL material, other than cryptographic material, and ship's manifests, presented to the Army Courier Service will be dispatched by air transportation from this theater unless it is indorsed (typed or stamped) "Air Service Required" on the outer envelope followed by the signature of a general officer; the commander of an Air Transport Command Wing; the commander of a service command, base command, post, camp or station; a military attache or military observer; a courier transfer officer; or their respective executive officers; the Chief of Staff and heads of divisions, sections, separate offices or activities at this headquarters.

c. Material presented by properly identified military intelligence officers (operating in the field) will be accepted for transmission by air on request of such officers and a courier transfer officer will make the required certification.

d. Material which does not require air transportation will not be indorsed "Air Service Required" and will be transported via fast surface transportation accompanied by an officer of the Army Courier Service from the point of dispatch to point of destination. Such material presented to courier transfer officers at points outside of Cairo for delivery in the United States or other theaters will be forwarded by courier transfer officers to courier transfer station at Cairo or Algiers, whichever is nearest, for surface transportation. It is expected that fast surface transportation from these points to the United States will be available three times monthly.

6. In connection with the above, announcement is made of the rescission of the following War Department letters by letter, WD, AGO, file AG 311.4 (20 Mar 44)AM, subject: "Army Courier Service", dated 20 March 1944.

<u>FILE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
AG 322.06	4 Sep 1942	Army Courier Service
AG 322.06	19 Apr 1943	Army Courier Service
AG 322.06	2 Aug 1943	Army Courier Service
AG 322	18 Aug 1943	Army Courier Service
AG 311.4	6 May 1943	Receipts for Courier Pouches

7. All previously issued directives of this headquarters in conflict herewith are rescinded.

By command of Brigadier General GILES:

/s/ H. H. Wild
/t/ H. H. WILD
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

REPRODUCED BY CAFW-ATC, 24 APR 44.

~~SECRET~~

311.4 1st Ind. 9-CBB/SJR/mg
HQ, CAFW, ATC, Station #1, APO 625, United States Army, 24 April 1944.


TO: Commanding Officers, All Station, CAFW-ATC.

Attention invited to basic communication for strict compliance with the provisions thereof.

By order of Colonel STOWELL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A. G. D.
Adjutant General.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES:



THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX XXVII

AFATC/P&T/WAM/gs
10 May 1944

311.1 [in 1015]

SUBJECT: Destruction - Courier Mail

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff
Attention: Chief, SMI Branch

1. On 23 or 24 April C-54 plane #7304 fell in about fifty feet of water approximately one mile off shore near Masira, Arabia. Salvage attempts have been futile.

2. There were twenty-six pouches of courier mail aboard this plane and present information is that none will be salvaged. The plane is now disintegrating due to the monsoon weather conditions, and it has been suggested that the remains be bombed in an effort to destroy the courier mail.

3. Your comments are desired before such action is approved by this Headquarters. This matter has been informally coordinated with Army Courier Service and they can see no objection to an effort to destroy the courier material providing the area is policed in order to salvage the material which may be blasted loose.

For the Commanding General.

/s/ Leigh C. Parker
/t/ LAIGH C. PARKER
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
Priorities and Traffic

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

Classification Control	Charged
to RESTRICTED	
by authority of Commanding Officer	
NAFD-ATC	
NAME	<i>Daniel W. H. Hough</i>
GRADE	<i>Captain, A.C.</i>
DATE	<i>1/8/46</i>

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Destruction - Courier Mail

AG 386.1 (10 May 44) OB-S-B 1st Ind. EM/bfb 2B-939 Pentagon
WD, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 12 May 1944.

TO: Commanding General, Air Transport Command.

1. The Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, interposes no objection to the suggestion made in paragraph 2, basic communication provided extreme caution is exercised to properly safeguard, salvage, or destroy, in accordance with applicable regulations, any classified material which may be blasted loose in the operation. In this connection, attention is invited to the provisions of letter AG 386.1 (13 Apr 43) OB-S-B-M, 15 April 1943, subject: Destruction of Classified Matter in Emergencies on Land, Sea, and in the Air.

2. It is desired that a complete report indicating the method employed and precautions taken in this matter be forwarded to The Adjutant General's Office, Attention: Army Courier Service.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Stamped) LESTER E. JENSEN
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification canceled or changed
to **RESTRICTED**
by authority of Commanding Officer
N- FD-ATC
NAME: *Robert R. Roberts*
GRADE: *Captain J.C.*
DATE: *1/5/46*
6-016/ad

APPENDIX XXXV/III.

HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
A. P. O. 625 MIAMI, FLORIDA
Station #1

In reply
refer to:
311.13

31 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Protection of Mail.

TO : Commanding Officers, All Stations, CAFW-ATC.

1. Recently, a few instances of suspected thievery of mail and small cargo have come to the attention of this Headquarters. Known facts of these alleged thefts have been turned over to the investigative and protective agencies located throughout the Wing for apprehension of the violator.

2. Each Station Commanding Officer is directed to take whatever steps are necessary to assure that theft of mail or cargo will not occur at his station. Action necessary may include:

a. Placing an armed guard on every transport aircraft while it is on the ground.

b. Establishing a better and more secure method of warehousing off-loaded, originating, or intransit mail or cargo awaiting air transportation.

c. Establishing more adequate supervision over those persons, including native personnel, who have access to the cargo and mail store-room or to the loaded aircraft while it is on the ground.

d. Instructing radio operators to make a visual check of cargo and mail pouches while in flight for evidences of pilfering.

3. In addition, it is directed that the Priorities and Traffic Officer who boards arriving planes at every station make an immediate visual inspection of the mail pouches for evidences of rifling or tampering. When time permits, mail pouches may be unloaded for a thorough inspection. Immediately prior to the departure of the plane the Priorities and Traffic Officer will again make a visual inspection of the mail pouches. If everything appears to be in order, the Priorities and Traffic Officer will indorse the back of each mail manifest with the following statement:

CONFIDENTIAL

_____ mail pouches arrived _____ at _____
(Number) (Station) (Time)
and departed _____ in good condition.
(Time)

(Signed with name and rank)

4. Evidences of tampering will be reported promptly to the Station Commanding Officer who will conduct an immediate investigation. Radio report will be submitted to this Headquarters followed by a letter giving complete details.

5. Within seven days of receipt of this letter, each Station Commanding Officer will submit a letter to Wing Headquarters outlining the procedures that have been taken to assure the adequate protection of mail and cargo.

By order of Colonel STOWELL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS
Major, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
STATION NO.3
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
Air Transport Command

4-DHR/hr

APO 606, U. S. Army,
12 June 1944.

311.13 [w 12K]

SUBJECT: Suggested Action for Prevention of Pilfering of Small, Valuable Cargo Shipments.

TO : Commanding Officer, Station #1, CAFW-ATC, APO 625, U. S. Army.
Attention: Wing Priorities and Traffic Officer.
(Through Major Ledbetter, Executive Operations and Traffic Officer, Station #3, CAFW-ATC.)

1. Within the past two months several instances of theft and pilfering have been reported by the Air Freight Depot at this Station. The instances reported were thefts and pilfering of small shipments of PX watches, G.I. watches, cigarette lighters, and other PX shipments. The general nature of all these instances indicates that the thief watches for light weight shipments which are indicated on the airwaybill to have contents of a relatively high intrinsic value and readily saleable in the black market.


2. Each instance of theft and pilfering has been reported to the Base Provost Marshal, but efforts to apprehend the perpetrator of these crimes have been unsuccessful.

3. It is suggested that small packages of this kind would be better controlled if they were shipped in mail sacks as registered mail.

(a) In the event that such packages were too heavy or bulky to be shipped as mail, the airwaybill should not list such contents as "watches", "PX supplies", and "cigarette lighters" but should carry an uninviting list of contents such as "nuts and bolts" or "spam". The shipping ticket which should be mailed by the consignor to the consignee, could then show the actual contents of the package, the airwaybill number, and other pertinent information.

/s/ Douglas H. Reynolds
/t/ DOUGLAS H. REYNOLDS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Station P. & T. Officer.

A TRUE COPY:



THOMAS J. COULEHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX X.A.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AG 311.13

21 July 1944

SUBJECT: Registered Mail.

TO : Commanding General, North African Wing, ATC,
Commanding Officer, Central African Wing, ATC.

1. Every effort is being made by the Army Postal Service in this command to insure protection of registered mails and prevent any recurrence of the deprecations that have been reported at various times within the past year. In most instances deprecations have been committed by cutting a slit in registered mail pouches with a sheaf knife or a similar instrument and then extracting small parcels, rifling them of their contents, and then replacing the wrappers or containers in the pouches.


2. It is considered that fixing responsibility upon one individual at all times is necessary for the complete protection of registered mail during the period such is in custody of the carrier. This requires the giving and taking of hand receipts when registered mail is turned over to the carrier; and thereafter at every transfer in the same manner as prescribed for handling courier mail. This headquarters has recommended to the War Department that such procedure be prescribed in Army Regulations.

3. The adoption of a courier receipt system by the ATC for safeguarding registered mail is desired in this theater to supplement the efforts of the Army Postal Service. Such a system should be rigidly enforced at all stations and should cover transmission by tactical aircraft carrying mail. Your comments and any further suggestions are requested.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ H. H. Wild
/t/ H. H. WILD,
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:



THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

Hq, CAFD-ATC, 1200th AF Base Unit, APO 625, U. S. Army, 13 August 1944.

TO: Commanding General, USAFIME, APO 787, Cairo, Egypt.

1. Referring to basic communication, procedure in handling and safeguarding registered pouches in Central African Division is here-with outlined.

a. Registered mail pouches are receipted for at point of origin by a Base Unit ATC Postal Officer or in his absence by a representative of the Director, Priorities and Traffic, who lists each pouch by lock and rotary numbers on a cargo and mail manifest. At destination the manifest is checked and notation of any discrepancy is made and initialed by a Priorities and Traffic Officer. Evidence of tampering is reported promptly to the Base Unit Commander who conducts an immediate investigation. A radio report is submitted to this Headquarters followed by a letter giving complete details. In Addition, Flight Traffic Clerks enroute and Priorities and Traffic Officers at all intermediate Base Units have been directed to make visual inspections for evidence of rifling. If everything appears to be in order, the following notation is made on the back of each mail manifest:

_____ mail pouches arrived _____ at _____
 (Number) (Station) (Time)

and departed _____ in good condition.
 (Time)

 (Sign with name and rank)

b. As a security measure, each Base Unit places an armed guard on every transport aircraft while it is on the ground. He is present when mail is loaded or off-loaded and accompanies it between the plane and the warehouse, where a guard is maintained at all times. Since the system was inaugurated ten weeks ago no report of a depre-dation within the Division has been received at this Headquarters and only one case of a slit pouch has been noted. Investigation indicated a damaged bag had been used inadvertently, as there was no evidence of pilfering.

2. A courier receipt system if adopted by the ATC would require numerous hand receipts and a check of each lock and rotary number at every crew transfer point. As an example: Registered pouches made up and dispatched from Accra to Chabua would require nine hand receipts. Over that route crews change at Maiduguri, Khartoum, Aden and Karachi, therefore, four re-checks would be necessary. In most instances mail would have to be off-loaded in order to make these checks, especially when it is carried in the nose and belly compartments. A procedure of this kind would be slow and cumbersome, and would result in many

delays. It is believed that placing responsibility upon one individual will not eliminate deprecations. Instead of a courier receipt system, the adoption of a method similar to the one used in this Division is suggested, for it has proven very satisfactory and resulted in no delays.


3. Records show that less than two per cent of the numerical contents of a registered pouch consists of registered matter. The balance is ordinary mail. Less than ten percent of the total number of all pouches carried by the ATC are registered.

4. Your attention is invited to the fact that the Post Office Department several years ago discontinued the system of hand receipts insofar as Commercial Air Lines in continental United States were concerned, when it was found their use was impracticable and resulted in many delays.

For the Commanding Officer:

/i/ CBB
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:



THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX XLI.

HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND

A.P.O. 625 MIAMI, FLORIDA

Station #1

Classification canceled or changed
to ~~RESTRICTED~~
by Authority of Commanding Officer
NAFD-ATC
NAME: *Samuel C. DeRube*
G. ADE: *Captain, etc.*
DATE: *1/8/44*

7-JLS/rlt

In reply
refer to:
430.1

18 April 1944

SUBJECT: In-Flight Meal Procedure.

TO : Commanding Officer, Station #____, CAFW-ATC, APO_____,
U. S. Army. ATTN: P & T and Service Officers.

1. The In-Flight meal procedure stated in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 in directive from this Headquarters, file No. 430.1, dated 28 February 1944, Subject: "In-Flight Meal Procedure", is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

2. Hot coffee will be carried on all flights of CAFW-ATC transport planes and contract carriers. Coffee will be black, sugar and milk separate. Thermos containers will not be issued to other aircraft than the above.

3. a. In Flight meals will be served on the following transport flights:

Roberts to Ascension	Maiduguri to Wadi Seidna (Non-stop)
Roberts to Natal	Wadi Seidna to Maiduguri (Non-stop)
Accra to Ascension	Wadi Seidna to Nairobi
Accra to Leopoldville (or Pointe Noire)	Wadi Seidna to Cairo
Accra to Maiduguri (non-stop)	Aden, eastbound
Kano to El Geneina (non-stop)	Masirah, westbound (K Ration)
Maiduguri to Accra (non-stop)	

b. In-Flight meals will continue to be served on C 47 flights between Wadi Seidna and Aden.

c. The Transient Service Office will provide In-Flight meals for other flights when such meals are advisable due to unusual delays in departure.

4. In order to insure the smooth and efficient handling of In-Flight meals and beverages, the following procedure will be adhered to.

a. Duties of Priorities and Traffic:

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(1) Notify Transient Service Office in writing (using special form for that purpose) of the number of In-Flight meals required for both crew and passengers of transport planes. Transient Service Office will be notified far enough in advance to permit proper preparation of In-Flight meals and coffee.

b. Duties of Operations.

(1) Notify Transient Service Office in writing (using special form for that purpose) of the number of In-Flight meals required for Ferry crews and for Combat crews. Transient Service Office will be notified far enough in advance to permit proper preparation of In-Flight meals and coffee.

c. Duties of Radio Operators: (Flight Traffic Clerks)

(1) On CAFW-ATC planes, Radio Operators will perform the duties ordinarily performed by Flight Traffic Clerks in other Wings.

(2) On all flights he will obtain coffee for crew and passengers from the Transient Service Office just before departure and see that it is made available to both crew and passengers during flight.

(3) When In-Flight meals are required, he will obtain them from the Transient Service Office and see that they are properly distributed to the crew and passengers during flight.

d. Duties of Transient Service Office.

(1) Order the required number of In-Flight meals from In-Flight kitchen.

(2) Issue the In-Flight meals in accordance with requests from Traffic and Priorities and from Operations.

(3) Be responsible for all thermos containers in his custody.

(4) Collect 25¢ for each In-Flight meal from passengers and crews. (Enlisted Men excepted)

5. Control of Thermos Containers:

a. Radio Operators will sign the Transient Service receipt for all thermos containers issued to them. This receipt will be surrendered by the Transient Service Office to the Radio Operator when these or similar containers are returned.

b. Radio Operators immediately upon arrival at a station where they will remain for several hours will turn in their thermos containers to the Transient Service Office and obtain a receipt for them. Upon departing the Operator will exchange this receipt for full containers of coffee.

c. Receipts will not be used when an empty thermos is exchanged for a full thermos and the time element is negligible [sic].


d. At turn around stations out of this Wing such as Cairo, Dakar and Karachi, Radio Operators will retain custody of Thermos Containers. Upon notification of departure, radio operators will give their thermos containers to the Transient Service Office for cleaning and refilling, allowing sufficient time for this work.

e. Radio Operators will be held responsible for all thermos containers issued to them.

By Order of Colonel STOWELL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS
Major, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:



THOMAS J. COULAHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~Auth: CO, WAGO~~
~~Initial: [unclear] Adj~~
~~Date: 29 Jun 44~~

APPENDIX XLII.

HEADQUARTERS
WEST AFRICAN SERVICE COMMAND
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In reply
refer to:
400.

APO 606, U.S. Army
29 June 1944

*** E X T R A C T ***

SUBJECT: Levels and Order and Shipping Time Factors for Supply.

TO : Commanding General, CAFW-ATC, this station.
Commanding Officer, USAFIL, APO 601, U.S. Army.
Commanding Officer, Base Command, APO 622, U.S. Army.

* * * * *

5. Requisitions should be submitted sufficiently in advance to allow for the time involved by the port of embarkation in processing the requisitions and transporting and delivering the supplies to this area. The time involved from the date the requisition is submitted until the actual date the supplies or material is received is commonly known as the "order and shipping time factor". The order and shipping time factors vary in accordance with the class and service of the supplies requisitioned. In this connection attention is invited to letter, Headquarters Charleston Port of Embarkation, file SPTAC 400.312, subject, "Editing Requisitions at Ports of Embarkation", dated 19 May 1944, with inclosure, and 1st Indorsement thereto, this headquarters, dated 18 June 1944, copy inclosed. (Inclosure No. 1). For convenience of reference, the order and shipping time factors as pertain to the West African Service Command are shown below. These factors will become effective, 1 July 44, and will remain effective until further notice.

CLASS I

Quartermaster 90
Medical 110

CLASS II

Signal 120
Chemical Warfare Service 90
Quartermaster 90
TC - General Supplies 120
- Spare Parts 210
Engineer - General Supplies 120
- Spare Parts 155
Ordnance - General Supplies 180
- Spare Parts 180

CLASS III

Quartermaster 90

Class Restricted
to **RESTRICTED**
by authority of Commanding
NAFD-ATC
NAME: [unclear]
GRADE: [unclear]
DATE: 1/1/46

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASS IV

Army Exchange Service	120
Special Service	120
Quartermaster	90
Transportation Corps	120
Engineer - General Supplies	120
- Spare Parts	155
Signal	120

CLASS V

Chemical Warfare Service	90
Ordnance	180

* * *

For the Commanding Officer:

/s/ I. E. Whisnant
/t/ I. E. WHISNANT,
Major, A.G.D.
Adj. Gen.

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

APPENDIX XLIII

HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL AFRICAN WING
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
A.P.O. 625 MIAMI, FLORIDA
Station #1

7-JAC/rlt

In Reply
Refer to:
331.3

9 May 1944

SUBJECT: Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing.

TO : Commanding Officer, Station #____, CAFW-ATC, APO _____,
U. S. Army.

1. There has been a growing necessity for the establishment of a uniform system of rationing of Army Exchange items and a method of registering the purchases of rationed items that will be used at all CAFW-ATC Army Exchanges.

2. To avoid the issuance of cards to transients at each station, and to provide a more easy method of serving CAFW-ATC personnel in travel status, a uniform method will be established. Explanation of procedure is as follows:

a. Effective date of this uniform system is 1 June 1944.

b. Attached type of ration card will be provided by and used by all CAFW-ATC Army Exchanges. A supply of ration cards has been sent to all Stations. Green cards will be used for transients and blue cards for permanently assigned CAFW personnel.

c. For permanent personnel, Commanding Officers of units and organizations will issue blue cards to all personnel under their command. Ration cards to cover a period of one month and to be stamped indicating the month for which they are issued. Cards for the previous month to be returned before new cards are issued. Hospitalized CAFW-ATC personnel and transient personnel will receive new ration cards only on submission of cancelled cards to a designated authority.

(1) All personnel assigned or attached and traveling through CAFW-ATC will use their regular monthly cards at all Stations and will have them renewed, if necessary, at any Station enroute on submission of the ration card covering previous month to Station Adjutant.

d. For transients arriving at CAFW-ATC Station a green ration card will be issued by the Transient Officer accompanied by an appropriate letter containing pertinent information concerning the Army Exchange. (See Exhibit "A" attached)

~~RESTRICTED~~

Subject: Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing. (Contd)

(1) All eastbound transients arriving at Station No. 3 will receive green ration cards before proceeding along CAFW and it will not be necessary for other Stations to issue ration cards to transients eastbound through Station No. 3 unless the cards are more than 10 days old from date of issue. Obsolete cards will be submitted before issuance of new cards. The loss of a card is not usually considered sufficient reason for replacement.

(a) For transient personnel arriving in CAFW-ATC at Stations east of Station No. 3 and westbound transients arriving at Station No. 3; the Transient Service Officer will make inquiry relative to previous issue before issuing a ration card.

(2) It is to be noted that all CAFW-ATC personnel in travel status will not require ration cards other than the regular blue cards issued monthly.

(3) It will be necessary for each exchange clerk to determine the status of each ration card before making a sale. The date of issue will be checked and no sales will be made to holders of obsolete cards.

(a) Ration cards will be issued to CAFW-ATC personnel on a monthly basis and the first purchase period will start with the first day of each month.

(b) Ration cards will be issued to transient personnel on arrival in CAFW-ATC and they will be effective for a ten day period. This is based on the experience that transients move out of CAFW-ATC before the expiration of a ten day period.

(c) Before issuing a green ration card to a transient a portion of the card from the 11th day to the 31st day inclusive will be cancelled in an appropriate manner.

(d) Purchases by transients of rationed items for the current period will be indicated on the green ration card in space provided for the ten day period 1st to 10th inclusive.

(e) Transient personnel assigned to CAFW-ATC for permanent duty will surrender transient cards before receiving regular ration cards.

(f) A notation will be made on each ration card with pen and ink indicating purchases of rationed items by marking a cross through allotted space.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Subject: Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing. (Contd)

(4) All items will be rationed to conform with maintenance allowance as provided in WD Circular No. 245 or available stock. At each Station the demand for various items will vary and each Exchange Officer will determine the rate of ration.

(a) Maintenance factors consider the average. For example 24000 units of beer are allowed for 1000 men for one month. This provides 24 units of beer for each man. If sufficient non beer purchases allow for an excess of 3000 units per month, the ration can be increased to 27 units per man per month.

(b) Information will be posted in each Exchange and in each department listing the rate of ration for one day, or a ten day period or a monthly period.

(c) For items that are issued frequently, i.e., beer and cigarettes, the month will be divided into three periods, i.e., 1st to 10th inclusive, 11th to 20th inclusive and 21st to month end.

(d) As the maintenance factor on beer is 24 units per man per month this will allow for the purchase of 8 units during each period. Personnel may buy one unit each day on eight successive days or buy the entire ration for the ten day period at one time (or obvious alternate purchase intervals).

1 Sign or posting will read:

BEER RATION - 8 Units - 1st to 10th
8 Units - 11th to 20th
8 Units - 21st to month end

(e) If the available supply limits the sale of beer to 6 cans for the period the posting will designate this quantity and all ration card holders will be subject to the available allowance, i.e., if the ration is 6 units of beer for a period and a transient has purchased 5 units elsewhere he is entitled to purchase one unit.

(f) It is the responsibility of the Exchange Officer to provide the maximum quantities allowed by the maintenance factors by submitting requisitions to Quartermaster promptly.

(g) Cigarettes may be sold on a basis of not more than 40 packs per month. The maintenance factor is 30.5 packs per man per month. Experience has proven that there are sufficient non smokers to provide for the increased sale. If black market activities are created by this increase, it will be immediately cancelled.

Subject: Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing. (Contd)

1 Ration will be arranged to allow for sale of cigarettes as follows:

- 13 Packages during 1st period.
- 13 Packages during 2nd period.
- 14 packages during 3rd period.

2 As spaces are not provided for more than 31 issues of cigarettes on the ration card the blank spaces under "Juice-Cola" will be used to indicate the sale of 9 packages of cigarettes.

(h) Fruit juices and other easily concocted beverages should be dispensed from bulk where possible and combined with concentrates to save shipping space and containers. Ration can be based on supply. It is suggested that individual units of canned juices be used as a reserve or sold where there are no dispensing facilities.

(i) All other items not required frequently such as fountain pens, lighter fluid etc. are to be sold on a basis of not more than one unit a month. As the present ration does not provide for the inclusion of all items the restriction of multiple purchase of items unlisted on the ration card will be controlled by the Exchange Officer to the best of his ability.

(j) There are blank spaces on the ration card for the addition of items at the discretion of the Exchange Officer.

(k) Personnel may anticipate the purchases of one period. On entering the next period any item remaining unpurchased is cancelled, i.e., considering that the normal ration of 8 units of beer is available for a period and the holder of a ration card buys 6 units during the period; on entering the next period 8 units are available for purchase and 2 units are cancelled on the allotment for the previous period.

(l) The sale of watches will be made with sales slips, made out in duplicate, one retained by the purchaser and one by the Exchange. Full name, Army Serial Number, grade or rank, unit, and permanent station to be included on sales slip. A description of watch (and number if possible) also to be included. A file of sales slips to be maintained as a check against multiple purchases by individuals.

3. Transient personnel and CAFW-ATC personnel in travel status will receive the same privileges as permanent personnel in the purchase of all items placed on sale in CAFW-ATC Army Exchanges.

Subject: Uniform System of Army Exchange Rationing. (Contd)

4. It must be emphasized that all ration cards must be issued with care. All unused cards must be kept in safe keeping and their issue must be placed under responsible control.

By Order of Colonel STONELL:

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS,
Major, A. G. D.
Adjutant General.

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan

THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

~~RESTRICTED~~

APPENDIX XLIV.

HEADQUARTERS
WEST AFRICAN SERVICE COMMAND
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

JSM/p

APO 606, U. S. Army.

22 February 1944.

SUBJECT: Reciprocal Aid Procurement.

TO : Commanding Officer, Station #3, CAFW-ATC, APO 606, U S Army.

THUR[sic]: Commanding Officer, Station #1, (Hq), CAFW-ATC,
APO 625, U S Army.

1. By agreement with the British authorities, the Reciprocal Aid procedure has been expanded to include the following items heretofore acquired as needed by local purchase:

a. Soap. The present U. S. Army contract with J. B. Saxel of Nsawam will be continued and the U. S. Army will provide the Director of Supplies, Secretariat, Accra, with a copy of the contract and supplemental agreements. All bills submitted by Mr. Saxel will be examined, and if correct, they will be certified for settlement under Reciprocal Aid and forwarded to the Director of Supplies who will effect payment. Up to two tons per week may be drawn without further arrangements.

b. Charcoal. The same procedure [sic] as above outlined for soap will apply to charcoal. Mr. Saxel should, however, submit separate bills for the soap and the charcoal.

c. Kapok. This item may now be supplied on reverse lend-lease by the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale, Accra. Estimates of requirements have been submitted calling for two tons during the first half of 1944 and up to ten tons for the second half of the year. Verified bills will be certified and transmitted to the Director of Supplies for payment.

d. Fruit. All fruit now supplied [sic] under Reciprocal Aid will continue to be so supplied. In addition the Gold Coast Government will pay all certified bills for fruit procured from the Farmers Group at Asebu.

2. Accordingly no further invoices for the foregoing supplies will be submitted to an U. S. Army Finance Officer for Payment. All Transactions henceforth should be reported as required by Section I, USAFIME Circular No. 66, subject [sic] Procedure for Reporting Direct lend-lease and Reverse lend-lease. The above arrangements are not retroactive.

For the Commanding Officer:

cc. Finance Officer, APO 606, Post.

A TRUE COPY: *Thomas Coulehan*
THOMAS J. COULEHAN
Captain, Air Corps.

/s/ I. E. Whisant
/t/ I. E. WHISANT,
Captain, AGD,
Assistant Adjutant.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPENDIX XAV.

MEMORANDUM ON HISTORY OF ECONOMICS ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICA

TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, WASC, USAFIME

1. The functions of the recently constituted economics section are a consolidation of some activities previously carried on by other staff sections with other activities that have been only recently developed. The principal fields are six in number. They are dealt with separately herein since their histories and hence the pertinent comparisons are not parallel. The first five come within the work scope performed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, at USAFIME, while the sixth is handled at Theater Headquarters through the SJA.

a. Lend Lease: Before the establishment of WASC, assistance to allied governments from stocks of USAFICA was given by the CG, USAFICA, through the CG, SOS, USAFICA. Requests from allied government agencies were processed by the staff section affected and final action was generally taken by HQ, SOS, USAFICA. In rare instances the matter was referred to HQ, ASF, Washington. This system was changed by the closing of HQ, USAFICA and by USAFIME Circular # 66, dated 24 November 1943. By the changes this instituted it became necessary, with minor exceptions, to refer all requests for lend lease assistance to higher levels and incidentally to scrutinize such requests with greater care and with a broader geographical point of view. The processing was still for some time thereafter done mainly by the supply section normally dealing with property of the class covered by the request. But gradually more and more of these requests came to be routed to the Reciprocal Aid officer for handling. With the establishment of the Economics Section, it is possible to invoke a procedure similar to that set forth in USAFIME Staff Memo # 7 and to obtain a more thorough analysis of requests and closer adherence to USAFIME Circular # 66. The one practical result of this procedure has been to reduce the proportion of requests that are granted and eliminate unsubstantiated requests and unauthorized assistance at the outset.

b. Reciprocal Aid: Prior to November 1, 1943, the extent of Reciprocal Aid being obtained by the United States in this area included only those supplies and services which could be procured through allied government agencies acting in a normal course of their business, plus a few special cases worked out by those in command of USAFICA and WASC as it was first organized. Because of the shortages of staff and highly restrictive instructions from London, local government agencies were unwilling to procure for the United States Army needs, and many items of local supply were available only through commercial sources. There had been, it appears, no effort to induce these government agencies to open new fields and to assume new financial responsibility for United States Army procurement. On or about March 1943 a Quartermaster officer was designated as Reciprocal Aid Officer in addition to his ordinary duties. A list of all regular supplies locally was then drawn up that were procured and presented to the local government. A few additional items, such as aviation fuel handling contract and the compensation claims of native employees for personal injury have been added to this original

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list as circumstances brought same to attention. Negotiations have proceeded over the intervening period, which has seen a gradual improving attitude on the part of the British authorities. At the present only three matters of importance remain unsettled. These are: Nigerian food-stuffs, aviation fuel handling expenses, and reimbursements claim for petroleum products. The first two are for balances, certain items already being furnished under RA. Favorable consideration of most of these balances is already assured. The third matter is being decided at higher levels.

c. Retransfers and Disposals: The matter of retransfers of lend lease property was not taken up until April of 1944. Up to that time any retransfers were carried out by the British Army without reference to the United States Army. It is now recognized that retransfers of lend lease property must be cleared by the U. S. Government. With the beginning of this field, cases arising in this area were usually allocated to the RA officer. Since each case must be investigated and reported on its merits, this function requires considerable time. The future of this field is definitely seen as one of expansion as more and military equipment outlives its usefulness and limited transport make shipments to other areas undesirable. In a similar manner, disposals of U.S property are doubtless due to increase. There have been few such sales in the past but those that have taken place have given evidence of being improperly supervised. The establishment of policies for the disposal of surplus military property by higher levels has been started by the Surplus War Property Administration. Information on all past transactions is now being collected and coordination with the FEA has been affected.

d. Accounting: Under the USAFICA administration accounting for all forms of procurement was centralized in the Fiscal Office. This arrangement was continued in the first months of the existence of WASC. In December 1943 the Fiscal Office was transferred to the CAFW and took with it the accounting functions insofar as they pertained to CAFW stations and organizations. Accounting for service command procurement activities remained a WASC responsibility but no designated office to undertake it. It, therefore, evolved upon the RA officer to supervise the production of LL and RA vouchers and to obtain valuations where same were required. Evaluation of locally procured supplies and services, rentals, used equipment and similar items has proved difficult for RA, USAFIME to accomplish; hence, its has been and will be necessary for many evaluations to be made at WASC Headquarters regardless of the provisions of USAFIME Cir # 66 on this point. A recent directive from HQ USAFIME has required Dakar to report LL and RA transactions through WASC. This also is in effect a change from the procedure of USAFIME Cir # 66. The volume of accounting has tended to shift from the Fiscal Office to the RA officer as RA has been extended and local purchasing cut down. The division of LL accounting duties between CAFW and WASC in this area seems likely to continue although there are some difficulties inherent in such a situation which requires considerable coordination, such as scales of pricing, investigations of past issues not adequately accounted for, and the inauguration of new procedures with the addition of new items to the RA list.

e. Purchasing and Contracting: All local purchasing was centralized in the QM office during the USAFICA regime and the first days of WASC. Upon the formation of the CAFW, the Wing took over the purchasing power for its regular stations procurement leaving in WASC only the purchasing and contracting functions connected with service command procurement. Within WASC the Pand C continued under the QM. This activity has steadily decreased in importance as the field of RA has widened. The most important single subject was the purchase of gasoline and lubricants. Except for supplies for Liberia from the US this project has become now a RA accounting function rather than a Purchasing and Contracting duty. With the separation of the RA officer from the QM, the P and C activities (which were assigned to that officer in the QM office) have also come to the Economics section. A year ago two officers and nine enlisted men were engaged in local procurement under HQ, SOS, USAFICA, drawing on both purchase sources and the RA sources then available. Today the bulk of this work is being done by the QM depot which has been attached to the CAFW.

2. From observations and experience there have become apparent certain principles which are recommended for guidance in the future. First, it is not effective to divide up the foregoing functions and parcel them out here and there as additional duties to personnel who are primarily responsible for other missions. Second, sufficient and appropriate personnel should be assigned to this work to insure that it will be completely understood and correctly carried out, for the work differs from other military duties and familiarity with all phases of it requires more than a casual study. Third, there is considerable saving to the USA of financial expenditure involved in this work, which will pay many hundred times over the salaries of the personnel devoted to the work. Since the appointment of a RA officer in November 1943, nearly a million dollars worth of supplies and services have been added to the RA program in West Africa (including Dakar for which arrangements are made with NATCUSA). A larger sum is represented by pending negotiations. In addition, there is the money to be realized from the proceeds of sales of LL property by allied government agencies. Although this last is primarily a function of the FEA, this Headquarters can report that the FEA is taking action in this respect thru the instigation and with the assistance of this Headquarters.


3. In view of the following, the recommendation is offered:

a. That the position of this Headquarters vis-^{-a-}vis the CAFW be clarified, especially with respect to our responsibility for CAFW's observance of the limitations on granting LL assistance and with respect to accounting responsibilities. It is suggested that HQ USAFIME officially sanction the centralization of all Lend Lease, RA, and Retransfer and Disposal functions in Headquarters, WASC, with authority to CAFW to carry out specific operations where requested by WASC.

b. That HQ, USAFIME, scrutinize CAFW purchase orders and RA vouchers for decorative or luxury purchases since WASQ has at present no jurisdiction over CAFW in this respect, does not have any right to see the documents, and cannot, therefore, prevent spending for such purposes.

/s/ John S. Marsh
/t/ JOHN S. MARSH
Captain, FA
Economics Officer

A TRUE COPY:



THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

7-MGF/ayd

Station #1

9 May 1944.

400.3295

SUBJECT: Reciprocal Aid under Socony Operating Contracts.

TO: Commanding General, Air Transport Command, Washington, D.C.
(Attention: Lt. Col. B. H. Brinton, Fiscal Division).

IN NIGERIA

1. Procedures have been established and are functioning smoothly which provide for internal and numerical control of certifications (accompanied by required documents) of Reciprocal Aid Application upon Company designated official signatures with counter-signing by U. S. Army representative. The negotiations retroactive in their application to September 3, 1942 (the effective date of Reciprocal Lend/Lease Treaty in this British Colonial Territory) were of necessity in considerable measure consummated by Socony representatives but under U.S. Army A.T.C. Contracting Officer Representative supervision and direction for initiating and processing of items considered to be available for cash reimbursement or in kind (service, facilities, materiel, etc.). This was so of necessity, mutually recognized by all parties concerned in the field, by reason of fact that British Governmental Officials, Railroad Executives et al. maintained headquarters in Lagos where U. S. Army have and [sic] had no organization other than nominal operating personnel at Apapa Airport.

2. It is recognized that certain general limitations set up by War Department instructions and Theater circulars exist upon the scope of Reciprocal Aid, among which the following are not considered eligible for Reciprocal Aid:

- a. Pay and allowances of United States Army personnel or United States civilian employees of War Department.
- b. Administrative expenses.
- c. Requirements for cash.
- d. Purchases made directly from sources other than those made available by local army or government authorities.
- e. Transactions with foreign nationals as distinct from authorized representatives of foreign governments.

Classification	to RESTRICTED
	by authority of Commanding Officer
	NAFD-ATC
NAME:	David W. Whitehead
GRADE:	Captain, A.C.
DATE:	4/8/46

Ltr, File 400.3295, Hq, CAFM, 9 May 1944 (cont'd).

Notwithstanding, it may not be amiss to point out that cash reimbursement was obtained recently from Colonial Government as a policy matter for costs expended for 12 months period ended August 31, 1943 for lorry truck hire from individual transport operators in excess of \$160,000.00. Other major items being obtained under Reciprocal Aid include:

- a. Railroad transportation services.
- b. Local native labor payrolls.
- c. Harbor terminal duties (customs duty refunds are being obtained but as a sovereign nation right as distinguished from an accounting Reciprocal Aid Charge).
- d. Public utilities services.
- e. British Army or local government transport by truck or ship when they make them available.

3. Substantially all negotiations have been completed to establish working precedents and specific extent of Reciprocal Aid where believed to be within its scope. In event further negotiations are deemed necessary it is intended to be governed in principle by the policy that Army representatives initiate and develop its application, with Socony accomplishing the presentation of appropriate documents and effecting collection or credit for benefit of the U. S. Army to be handled as reimbursable items: all of which is in line with the methods heretofore and presently in vogue pursuant to which Socony issues credit memos in number five (5) series for Reciprocal Aid items when received either (a) as a cash reimbursement for an expenditure previously made, or (b) on the basis of a warrant or other charge properly authenticated to U.S. Army identified to Operating Contract by British Authority in lieu of a cash cost which would otherwise have been incurred by Socony.

4. A typical illustration of what (b) in paragraph 3 refers to are railway transportation costs where goods are shipped on warrant involving no cash outlay covering movements some of which may be collected for in New York by Socony as a normal contract delivery and some of which may be processed on a field local purchase order. For the month's services a consolidated statement is prepared by Railway Company who thru established procedure with British Government Authorities receive cash from British Treasury Officials upon charge to U.S. Army under Reciprocal Aid. It is intended, in so far as it is practicable, to distinguish and separate as between contract reimbursements and field order reimbursements when cash refunds are received from Socony in accord with credit memos currently set up to reflect such liability.

5. Problems of conversion so far are academic for the foreign exchange rates prevailing during period of recovery are pegged with only

Ltr. File 400.2295, HQ, CAFE, 9 May 1944 (cont'd).

variation being the difference in local bank charges for service of buying or selling. However, inasmuch as Socony cost on field orders are incurred in local currency with payment in United States dollars, the conversion rates applied afford a partial basis for equitable consistent application.

IN GOLD COAST

6. In Gold Coast Colony which includes Accra and Takoradi, since the Socony accounting is handled in Lagos, the procedures are somewhat similar except that in the initiation of new items the channel utilized where possible is West African Service Command to effect an integrated path to British Officialdom Headquarters near Accra. About the same Reciprocal Aid items as in Nigeria are available here and have been since 3 September 1942 with exception of lorry truck hire paid to individual transport contractors which matter is presently under consideration.

IN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN AND EGYPT

7. Matters of Reciprocal Aid scope and development are the responsibility of International Aid Division of USAFIME; only upon instructions from such Headquarters pursuant to inquiries referred thereto are any items applied for and processed. Previously in February 1944 report to your office the status there was outlined and as you know is now in "as was suspense" pending outcome of present negotiations.

IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA

8. Recent reports from Captain Furman to you set forth the situation. On the basis of advice from your office and further correspondence with all field parties concerned presumably the Reciprocal Aid processing by Socony has commenced. Captain Furman had suggested to Mr. Rea at Dakar, and to Fuel Control Officers at NAFW Headquarters and Dakar that the services be utilized of Captain Donbar in Dakar with West African Service Command who is the liaison officer on all matters involving Reciprocal Aid Lend/Lease with the French in Senegal to develop the full scope of benefits to be derived.

9. Acknowledgement is made of the receipt of your three letters dated 27 April 1944 with inclosures.

For the Commanding Officer:

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS
Major, A.G.D.
Adjutant General

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

7-HHM/ves

353

3 August 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Status of Chemical Warfare Training in Central African Division.

TO: Commanding General, Air Transport Command, Washington 25, D.C. (Attn: Chemical Warfare Officer)

1. General: In compliance with letter, Headquarters, ATC, Subj: "Complete Check-up on Training in Defense Against Chemical Attack", dated 6 July 1944, the following information is hereby submitted:

a. The standards for chemical training in this Division have been in accordance with AAF Regulation 135-1 and are outlined in the Training Directive this Headquarters, dated 4 January 1944. (Incl. 1)

b. During the past eight months a program of instruction has been carried out as follows:

(1) At larger stations (200 or more personnel), Unit Gas Officers and Non-commissioned Gas Officers courses have been conducted in order to qualify the prescribed gas personnel. These courses have varied from the fifty-two hour course, recently completed at Accra, to thirty hour courses given by mobile training groups.

(2) At smaller stations, basic courses of six to ten hours duration have been conducted for all personnel.

2. Training: The following outlines give a detailed picture of the training program:

UNIT GAS OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED GAS OFFICERS COURSES

Station	Strength	Date of Courses	Number of qualified gas personnel as of 1 August 1944.	
			Officers	Enlisted Men
Accra	2,845	(25 Oct. - 9 Nov, 1943) (29 April - 21 July, 1944)	9	16
Aden	371	20 March - 1 April, 1944	4	20
Kano	209	3 April - 13 April 1944	2	10
Wadi Seidna	778	24 Jan. - 5 Feb, 1944	3	17
Maiduguri	349	23 March - 3 April, 1944	-	10
Masirah	168	21 Feb - 4 March, 1944	4	9

Classified by *[Signature]* on *[Date]*
 to **RESTRICTED**
 by authority of Commanding Officer
 NAFC-ATC
 NAME: *Colonel W. R. R. R. R.*
 GRADE: *Captain, A.C.*
 DATE: *1/8/46*

~~SECRET~~

UNIT BASIC COURSES (10 Hours)

<u>Station</u>	<u>Date of Courses</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Personnel Trained</u>
Accra (Hq.)	8 July - 22 July, 1944	329	All Enlisted Men.
El Fasher	7 June - 14 June, 1944	86	All Personnel.
El Genena	12 June - 15 June, 1944	72	All Personnel
Asmara	10 April - 12 April, 1944	58	All Personnel
Lagos	25 July - 27 July, 1944	51	All Personnel
Roberts Field	12 July - 14 July, 1944	205	All Personnel
Salala	10 March - 14 March, 1944	57	All Personnel

a. In addition to the above training for ATO Units, other units lacking Chemical Warfare Service personnel have been given appropriate courses of instruction. These organizations include personnel of the Eritrean Service Command (see Incl. 2) and personnel of the West African Service Command, Headquarters Squadron.

b. At Accra, where the bulk of the Division personnel are stationed, training has been most extensive. The regularly assigned Station Chemical Officer and his staff have given twelve hour basic courses to each organization on the Post, in addition to a comprehensive Unit Gas Officers and Non-commissioned Gas Officers course. (see Incl. 3)

c. Each junior officer assigned to Accra and all officers attending the Flight Training School at Division Headquarters are currently receiving instruction in Chemical Warfare as part of a Staff and Command course. The schedule which includes lectures and field exercises is inclosed. (Incl. 4)

3. Mobile Training: With the exception of Accra, where the Station Chemical Officer, his Chemical MO's, and Unit Gas Personnel have given the necessary instruction, all other training in the Division has been conducted by mobile groups consisting of a Chemical Warfare Officer and one or two chemical enlisted assistants. The procedure which has, for the most part, been followed on training tours is outlined in the inclosed "B.O.P. for Mobile Chemical Training", dated 1 January, 1944. (Incl. 5)

a. Also included with this report are:

(1) A sample of the distribution issued at stations along the line in conjunction with Unit Gas Courses. (Incl. 6)

(2) Photographs of field exercises held at Aden and Accra. Explanations are written on the back of the photos. (Incl. 7)

4. Station Defense Alerts: Not all of the stations have defense plans at present; however, these are rapidly being submitted. Where installations are shared with the RAF, smaller stations are collaborating with the British in submitting an overall plan. The Division Chemical Officer is presently working with the Asst. Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Security to provide the necessary chemical defensive arrangements.

a. At Accra there is a well organized chemical annex which is currently being tested in actual gas alerts. Unit Gas Officers are responsible for their own individual area, and it is planned to test gas discipline on a weekly gas alert day.

b. All individuals are being properly equipped with chemical protective material in accordance with current Theatre regulations. (Incls 8 and 9). Only the service gas mask is authorized for this Division. At present a trained crew is visiting each station, inspecting masks, replacing old canisters with the new MIA2 type, and giving instruction in the care and use of protective equipment.

c. Organizational equipment for the Division is being stored at two central storage points in accordance with the Chemical Supply Plan. A copy of this plan, now in revision, will be forwarded in the near future.

5. Miscellaneous: In cooperation with the Special Service Department, topics pertaining to Chemical Warfare have been included in the orientation and education program. (Incl. 10). To stimulate an awareness of the threat of gas, posters, charts, and pocket reference cards have been distributed from time to time. (Incls. 11 - 14)

6. Prescribed Check-up: As directed in reference letter, Headquarters, ATC, a check up on status of training has been initiated in the Division. All stations have been required to fill out the "Technical Information Report", a copy of which is inclosed. (Incl. 15)

7. Summary: Each station of this Division has received chemical training during the period, January to August, 1944. Where the size of the station has permitted, all personnel were trained. At the larger stations, personnel capable of continuing instruction have been qualified in Unit Gas Officers and Unit Non-commissioned Gas Officers Courses.

For the Commanding Officer:

The fifteen inclosures referred to in the text are not included in this Appendix

/s/ C. B. Briggs
/t/ C. B. BRIGGS
Major, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

A TRUE COPY:

Thomas J. Coulehan
THOMAS J. COULEHAN,
Captain, Air Corps.